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Successful Venture Building: What Matters ! 





Incubator models have evolved since the first known US incubator in 1959. From the first 
generation of a facilities-focused incubator model in the 1960s to the fourth generation of 
emerging models, commonly referred to as, the “Accelerator” model and the “Venture 
Builder” model.  
Since 2006, there has been a significant increase in the number of venture builders and 
accelerators. Yet very little is known about a) their performance and the antecedents; b) the 
key differences between venture builders and accelerators; c) the factors and practices that 
characterise highly successful venture builders and d) their (venture builders)comparative 
advantages or disadvantages compared to the large number of accelerators.  
This study examined and analysed the venture building phenomenon where there has been a 
paucity of rigorous published scientific research. Meanwhile, practice-oriented publications 
have proliferated.  
The empirical research adopted both face-to-face interviews and online semi-structured 
surveys that comprised three separate studies. Study 1 saw the participation of eight overseas 
and local incubation practitioners in separate face to face hour-long interviews (four 
accelerators and four venture builders). The literature review and the findings in Study 1, 
which detailed the actual practices of these two incubation models, yielded ten key important 
practices that these incubators represented as their modus operandi. These ten practices 
became the independent predictors which were used in Study 1a and Study 2. Study1a was 
an extension of Study 1 in that twenty-nine highly experienced incubation practitioners (from  
 
 
diverse location such as Hungary, US, Canada, Portugal, France, Mexico and Turkey) 
participated in answering an online semi-structured survey to ascertain their agreement or 
disagreement about these ten practices as characteristics of venture building practices. 
Finally, Study 2, an online semi-structured survey, was launched. Study 2 yielded responses 
from forty-four start-ups from wide-ranging diverse countries including Singapore, Canada, 
US, Thailand, Turkey, India and Japan. This was the focal study that provided the data for 
testing eleven pairs of hypotheses.  
Success, being the predicted outcome of the start-ups was assessed from two angles - 
financial success and psychological satisfaction. The study identified the key incubation 
practices that were associated with successful start-ups and produced a binomial logistic 
regression generated prediction model for each of the two success outcomes. Together the 
findings of the three studies were triangulated and yielded eight key insights on the predictors 
that contributed to successful start-ups.  
To develop financially successful start-ups, incubators should focus on the five key practices 
of marketing performance, demand orientation, market scope, internationalisation and long-
term engagement; whereas in developing psychologically satisfied start-ups, the four key 
focal practices are marketing performance, demand orientation, market scope and 
internationalisation (high commonality with practices identified for financially successful 
start-ups). This exploratory research contributed to our innovation knowledge by exploring 
the known gaps and provided key insights that are useful for start-up investors, government 
innovation policy-makers and entrepreneurs of start-ups looking to maximise success. The 
study concluded by suggesting some areas for future research. The key takeaway of this 
research is this: “Given the often-confusing labelling of incubators as accelerators or venture 
builders, it is not what they call themselves that is critical to the success of start-ups - but 




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ iii 
Chapter 1  Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Business Incubation and Evolution ...................................................................................... 2 
1.2. Perspective One: Government Policy Formulation .......................................................... 10 
1.3. Perspective Two: Start-ups’ Choice of Growth Guidance ............................................... 11 
1.4. Perspective Three: Investors’ Choice of Investment Options .......................................... 11 
1.5. Perspective Four: Research Community ........................................................................... 12 
Chapter 2: Review of Key Industry Findings and Research Literature ......................................... 13 
2.1. Innovation and Entrepreneurship ...................................................................................... 13 
2.2. Business Incubation Outcomes ........................................................................................... 14 
2.3. Business Incubation Best Practices ..................................................................................... 15 
2.4. The Emerging Phenomenon of Venture Building ............................................................. 16 
2.5. Differentiating Venture Builders from Accelerators ........................................................ 25 
2.6. Theoretical Foundations and Frameworks ........................................................................ 38 
Chapter 3 Research Hypotheses ......................................................................................................... 41 
3.1. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 41 
3.2 Three Propositions and Related Hypotheses ..................................................................... 41 
Chapter 4  Research Methodology ..................................................................................................... 50 
4.1 The Research Framework, Design and Methods .................................................................... 50 
4.2      Study 1: Compare Accelerator practices versus VB practices .......................................... 51 
4.3      Study 1a: Industry Survey of the Practices of Accelerators and Venture Builders ........ 51 
4.4      Study 2: VB & AC Incubation Practices and their Relationships to Successful Start-ups
 ............................................................................................................................................................ 52 
Chapter 5  Results and Discussion ...................................................................................................... 55 
5.1 Study 1 Face-to-Face Interviews with Eight Incubation Practitioners ........................... 55 
5.2 Study 1a Online Survey of Practices of Twenty-Nine Incubators ................................... 62 
5.3 Study 2 Online Survey of Forty-Four Start-ups ................................................................ 77 
Chapter 6  Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................. 108 
6.1 Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 108 
6.2 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 114 
6.3 Limitations of the Study .................................................................................................... 115 
6.4 Future Research Directions ............................................................................................... 118 
6.5 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................................... 119 




Appendix 1: Glossary of Terminologies ........................................................................................... 129 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Study 1, 1a and 2 ........................................................................... 136 
Appendix 3: Eight Interview Transcripts of Study 1 ...................................................................... 169 
Appendix 4: Overview Box Plot of the Mean & Variances of the 3 Entity Groups ..................... 298 








“Ọ na-ewe obodo dum iji zụlite nwatakịrị” – a proverb from the Igbos of Africa. 
The wisdom of this proverb is a timely humble reminder for me that “it takes a whole village 
to raise a child” –  and that includes a doctoral student.  
This learning journey would have not been possible without the village elders, friends and of 
course my family for their invaluable support and encouragement with the occasional nudge! 
My sincere thanks and gratitude for countless friends and mentors who have contributed 
numerous ways to the fruition of this dissertation.  
First, I am indebted to the local and international faculty who taught me at the beginning of the 
program and the dissertation committee comprising of the Chair, Professor Phillip Zerrillo (or 
affectionately known amongst my doctoral peers as the one and only Dr Z).  Dr Z has been 
instrumental in guiding and encouraging me in this marathon  His down-to-earth, thoughtful 
and practical reassuring guidance made the journey seemed smoother than what it actually was. 
Thank you Dr Z for contributing to my learning journey and for the honour to work with such 
a sincere and kind human being ! My gratitude to the dissertation committee members (in truth 
the village elders) - Professor  Raj Srivastava (my former Provost at SMU who impressed upon 
me his marketing depth and wisdom), Prof Terence Fan (the ever-willing thoughtful and kind 
expert who always have time for me), and Prof Shantanu Bhattacharya (for your reassuring 
support and program guidance). And I should not forget to thank the program go-to person, Ms 
Louise Ho for her great administrative support.   
Thank you Dr David Ng for your great friendship and innovation insights; and the copious 
amounts of coffee as you shared your research experience – the tips and advice – to ensure I 
stay on track. Thank you Rosie Tang for sharing your amazing statistical expertise especially 
during the final analytical phase which was very motivational. Glad that you told me the stats 
made sense after a week-long staring at Chi-square and heteroskedasticical results etc  
My journey of innovation would not have been possible if not for the interest and support of Sir 
Terry Matthews (Executive Chairman) and Greg Vanclief (MD, Global Investments) – veteran 
venture builders of the Wesley Clover International group. They opened the door for me to this 
amazing world of innovation which triggered my academic curiosity in their MIDAS 




who introduced me to Terry & Greg ! To the other partners of the Alacrity family builders of 
new enterprises – Owen Matthews, Tolga Gures, Josh Seerattan, Mike Manson, Jean-Paul 
Cossart, Giri & Saurabh, David Descheemaeker, Will Williams, Alejandro Arriaga, Mario 
Santamarina, Leo Lax, Henry Wu, Foo Kim-Peng – thank you guys ! 
To the many incubator practitioners and start-ups who responded, I am very thankful for your 
participation. In particular, I am grateful to Hugh Mason of JFDI for your enthusiastic sharing 
and generous time you gave just like the veterans in the industry – David Cohen, Attila Szigetti, 
Lim Jui, Craig Dixon, Paul Meyers, Gerald Tock, Narulla Harveen, Gnirck Marcus, Magnus 
Grimeland, Ozkan Demir, Mike Soylu, Yoav Elgrichi, Bobby Ngor, Felix Tan, Amos Avner, 
David Toh, Tong Hsien Hui and many others ! 
Thanks to my SIS colleagues (Dr Alan Megargel and Koh-Foo Hau) and mentor; in particular 
Provost and Prof Steve Miller who started me on this journey with a Sunday morning call to 
join SIS or in his words “come and contribute to building the next generation”.  
For those who have supported me and were mistakenly omitted in this acknowledgement, I 
apologise and will make it up when the opportunity arises over coffee.  
Finally, I am very grateful and indebted to my family especially my wife Dr Mabel Soh, the 
pillar of strength, for her constant encouragement to me to complete the race.  That goes too for 
my three children Christabel, Christopher and Christian and our bundle of joy Milky (pet 
Cavoodle) who always cheer me at the end of a long day ! To my parents for their unconditional 
love and support all these years and my late mother-in-law for her laughter and joy while the 
family sipped her Lipton tea on Saturday evenings.  
I hope the completion of this program will mark the beginning of my turn to help others in the 
village of experiential learning – the “juniors” as Dr Z aptly puts it. See you in the village soon 
future doctoral students ! 
 
 





Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
     Introduction to Incubation and Purpose of Study 
Why do a significant majority of start-ups fail within three years of founding ? Based on the 
study by Shikhar Ghosh of more than 2000 start-ups who received at least $1m in VC funding 
from 2000 to 2010, 95% fail where failure is defined as failing to see the projected return on 
investment (Gage, 2012). However, that percentage may be much higher given that there are 
many unreported start-ups receiving less than $1m of funding; and the phenomenon of 
venture capitalists who "bury their dead very quietly." That is, these firms most naturally 
emphasize the successes but are silent about the failures.  
There have been numerous research efforts studying this issue focusing primarily on the 
start-ups and the key start-up eco-system players such as incubators, accelerators, “smart 
money”, venture capitalists, government support etc.  
VCs, angel investors, traditional incubators and accelerators are key venture development 
players in the innovation eco-system in terms of resources, network access, and know-how 
contributions. This is evidenced by the total investments made by VCs which have leapt 
from $40Bn worldwide in 2010 to $170Bn in 2017 – a 400% increase  (see Figure 1.1 below) 
(KPMG Enterprise, 2018). Given the significant financial resources invested in start-ups, it 
is research worthy to look closely at this group of critical venture developmental players in 
terms of their successes, failures and more importantly what characteristics or role they 
might play in ensuring venture success. Additionally, how they reduce the incidence of 




        
Figure 1.1.   VCs’ Investments in Start-ups as at Q1 2018  Source: (KPMG Enterprise, 2018) 
1.1. Business Incubation and Evolution 
The first known form of business incubator started in 1959 by founder Joseph Mancuso in 
New York, the Batavia Industrial Centre (Lewis, Harper-Anderson, & Molnar, 2011). By 
2006, there were approximately 1400 business incubators in North America  alone, (US: 
1115 and Canada:300) and 7000 globally  (Lewis et al., 2011).  
A business incubator is essentially a venture developmental entity that runs incubatory 
programs “designed to accelerate the successful development of entrepreneurial companies 
through an array of business support resources and services, developed or orchestrated by 
incubator management, and offered both in the incubator and through its network of 
contacts” (Lewis et al., 2011). A business incubation program’s main goal is to produce 
successful firms that will leave the incubator program and be financially viable and 
freestanding. Critical to the definition of an incubator is the provision of management 
guidance, technical assistance, and consulting tailored to young, growing companies (Lewis 
et al., 2011). It is a model or mechanism used by venture developmental entities to “deliver 
incubation services to start-ups and create and capture value from them” (Pauwels, Clarysse, 




From an ownership and capital sourcing perspective, there are three types of incubators;  1) 
public which have been started by government-based initiatives, 2) Private (these can be both 
for-profit and non-profit) and 3) university based (again, these can be both for-profit and 
non-profit). 
With the significant and rising investment in start-ups many questions have been asked 
about: what gives new ventures a greater-than-average chance of success?  A study by the 
US Department of Commerce Economic Development Administration (EDA) led by the 
University of Michigan has shown that business incubation best practices are positively 
correlated to an incubatees’ success (Lewis et al., 2011).  But why or what will be the future 
state is still largely unanswered as much of this research was simply correlation based. 
1.1.1 Evolution of Incubation Models:  Four Generations from 1959 to 2018  
Incubator models have evolved over time due to changing needs of the new ventures, 
maturity of the innovation eco-system and the prevailing economic financial and social 
climate.  
Shepard (2017) identified three generations of incubation models: Generation 1 (1959-
1979); Generation 2 (1980-1999); and Generation 3 (2000-2012). Two evolving models have 
been observed in Generation 4 (2012 to 2018), that is the accelerators and venture builders. 








        Table 1-1.  Four Generations of Incubation Models 
        
Generation 1: In the aftermath of World War 2, Generation 1 (1959-1979) of incubation 
models of the 1960s focused primarily on the provision of basic physical office facilities 
such as reuse of declining buildings and basic telephone and secretarial support (Shepard, 
2017). The idea was that a significant expense which acted as a barrier to business formation 
and germination could be partially mitigated.  
Generation 2 (1980-1999) incubation models encompassed Generation 1’s basic facilities 
and some financial support but now extended to connectivity and interactive support by the 
government and universities with “20 to 70 openings (new incubators) between 1984 and 




were for profit. These incubators attempted to go beyond cheap facilities for starting-up and 
into developing communities and services for the start-ups.  
Generation 3 (2000-2012) incubators evolved around the provision of intangible high value-
added services such as product developmental support, access to knowledge and expertise 
and networks of mentors and VC finance (Pauwels et al., 2016). Generation 3 incubators 
best practices were starting to be identified by Zablocki including: 
• access to capital resources 
• community support 
• linkages to universities 
• tenant selection process 
• entrepreneurship education 
• clear programmatic approach (Zablocki, 2007). 
Generation 4 (2012 to date) incubators with the pioneers which started as early as the mid-
2000s saw the evolution of incubation models towards two emerging models, that is the 
accelerator model and venture builder model. 
The accelerator model – a more knowledge-intensive programmatic, time-limited, mentor-
guided model where advanced stage new ventures are competitively selected. These firms 
often engage in a specified training/development period culminating in a “Demo-Day” as 
the graduation milestone. This demo day is an effort to prepare the resident firms to be 
prepared to interact with major stakeholders including (but not limited to) potential sources 
of funding, customers, perspective employees, government bodies etc. The accelerators 
typically offer pre-seed investment in exchange for 5-10% of the new venture’s equity and 




individual investors’ characteristics. Demo days are showcase events where the graduating 
ventures often pitch to potential investors for pre or Series A type funding typically not 
exceeding US$2m-5m. 
While the extant literature on incubation mechanisms agrees on their contribution to 
nurturing new ventures in general, it also points out that we have to take into account the 
heterogeneity of the different incubation models such as the venture builder model (Barbero, 
Casillas, Wright & Garcia, 2014).  
This other main form of emerging model is the venture builder (VB) or start-up-studio form 
of incubation. Fundamentally a VB is a form of entity that builds new start-ups from scratch. 
They begin with identifying a business problem and then form the team of talented co-
founders to start the new venture. Within VBs are two sub forms, Corporate VBs (VBs that 
are started and funded by incumbent large corporations such as Citibank and Singtel) and 
Independent VBs (VBs that are independently started and micro-funded by experienced 
entrepreneurs such as Rocket Internet and Wesley Clover’s Alacrity Group). 
Typically, the VB takes the form of a holding company that owns controlling or majority 
equity in the new ventures or companies they create. Anecdotally, the more successful ones 
appear to be significantly more operational and hands-on than a holding company and 
definitely are more engaged for a longer period than accelerators. That is, rather than being 
passive financial investors they are engaged and directive in multiple aspects of the new 
firm’s development. VBs raise and provide seed capital, help their new ventures raise capital, 
help staff the team, provide business services support such as legal, accounting and legal and 
governance, build Minimal Viable products (MVPs), assist with pre and post-launch phases, 
and work towards an exit typically within a 3-7 years’ time frame. VBs are like high-paced 




business model, consequently creating an ecosystem where newly created platforms can be 
shared among their ventures (through cross licensing). One of the pioneers of VB, Spivack, 
a technology futurist, serial entrepreneur, and angel investor, wrote about the model in 2011 
calling it “a new approach to building start-ups” (Diallo, 2015). Notable VBs include 
Germany’s Rocket Internet (Foodpanda, GoJek etc); Obvious Corp (Twitter and Medium) 
and Betaworks (Instapaper and Blend) (Diallo, 2015).  In essence this is considered a high 
touch model. 
To date, most of the scant published studies, are descriptive in nature (Pauwels et al., 2016). 
Hence taking into account Barbero’s et al (2014) (heterogeneity of different incubation 
models) and Paulwels’ et al (2016) (new incubation practices) observations, it would further 
our knowledge if this study compares the effectiveness of the two entrepreneurial venture 
models of interest, that is, the prevailing accelerator model and the emerging venture 
builder model as the former model has been the predominant form since the mid-2000s 
(Pauwels et al., 2016) while the latter VB model is a recent emerging model (Szigeti, 2016). 
Szigeti (2015) in his study “Start-up Studio Trends 2015” (Szegeti, 2016) investigated 51 
venture builders and their 212 portfolio companies (start-ups built by them). The study 
looked at how VBs and their new ventures performed using publicly available data from 
Crunchbase and Mattermark. He concluded the following: 
- VBs create more companies’ year on year at a rate of 15% 
- Since 2008, VBs raised more than US$4b 
- Funding of new ventures created by VBs have steadily increased 48% year on year 
- There have been a reported 14 exits since 2012 and they are on the rise 




- The new ventures created by VBs employ about 16,000 employees (averaging 285 
employees per new venture as compared to the accelerator-based ventures average of 
333 employees per start-up) 
- Top accelerators raise on average 105% ($214M) more money than top VBs ($104M) 
- However, the MatterMark growth score (tracks signals of web traffic, inbound links, 
social network interactions etc) of VB’s ventures is 740 which is 26% higher than 
companies incubated by accelerators of 587. 
Szigeti summarized these findings as follows “It seems to suggest that growing a new 
venture from a VB is much more cost efficient than fuelling growth of a start-up from an 
accelerator” (Szigeti, 2015). 
The Szegeti study is a notable and important first step in this research area. It provides strong 
analytical support and illumination for differences in the models, their operations and their 
success. However, it has limited depth in its study of the micro-mediating activities, 
experiences or adaptations that take place during a typical life of a venture.  This study will 
compare VBs with Accelerators given that the latter has been the predominant form of 
venture developmental in the recent decade; and the distinct characteristics and drivers of 
this accelerator incubation model. Research to date is scant (Birdsall, Jones, Lee, Somerset, 
& Takaki, 2013) despite in 2013, Seed-DB reporting the existence of 213 accelerators 
worldwide supporting 3800 new ventures. Currently the published literature on the success 
or failure of these models is lacking in a) quantitative analyses b) the proper definitive 
definition of what an Accelerator or a VB is and thus many of the findings are simply lumped 
together, and c) a rich understanding of the insights or the journey that either the funding 
firm or the start-up team goes through and how the Accelerator or the VB model assists or 




In the next section, a discussion of VBs, their characteristics, practices and processes will be 
discussed and then compared with accelerators in the section thereafter.  
1.1.2 Further Evolution: Venture Builders - New Generation of Incubation Model 
An emerging type of start-up developmental model in the form of venture builders (VBs)  
has been observed (Szigeti, 2016); (Scheuplein & Kahl, 2017). They are a rapidly growing 
phenomenon since 2010 with very little rigorous research made to date. The first known 
form of VBs, Ideaslabs, was founded in 1996 by Bill Gross. It has performed very well with 
150 new ventures and 45 exits (“Idealab,” 2018).  From 1996 to 2006, there was a lull in the 
growth of this model until 2010 when there was a significant spurt of new VBs (see Figure 
1-2   (Montgomery, 2017)).   
 
Figure 1-2.   Distribution of VBs as at Mar 2017       Source:(Montgomery, 2017)  
Most of the research studies to-date are focused on accelerators and start-ups; while there 
has been little rigorous research undertaken on VBs. Much of the information, and theoretical 
justification that is available comes from the numerous practitioner-written VB articles. 































self-promotion as an end. That is, there has been little systematic, and rigorous research 
divorced from self-interest available on this topic.  
VBs essentially build new ventures from the ground up with hybrid characteristics of the 
traditional Incubators and Accelerators (IAs). Given that there are simply many more 
Accelerators and they have been around longer one might ask; Does the growing trend of 
VBs signal a change in direction of approach to innovation and investment style ? Why is 
this phenomenon happening ? Does this mean that the typical incubator and accelerator 
models are not as effective as one assumed? Or has the model begun to be replaced?  Perhaps 
the Accelerator models are not suitable for most start-ups, today ? Are VBs an emerging 
alternative model that is more superior compared to the traditional Accelerator models ? If 
yes, what are the characteristics of this new model that matters in high success rates of start-
ups ? Which start-ups are more suitably guided by this new emerging venture development 
model ? These are important questions from four perspectives: 
1.2. Perspective One: Government Policy Formulation 
Governments across the world are trying to grow their economies and innovation has been a 
fundamental driver for business growth, job creation wealth development and exports. In the 
drive to innovate, many government policies have been formulated to encourage investors 
and start-ups through grants, subsidized services and various incentives often tax based. 
Having a good understanding and evidence-based insight of which growth model 
(accelerators or an emerging alternative form) works and under what conditions will be very 






1.3. Perspective Two: Start-ups’ Choice of Growth Guidance 
A quote from a start-up founder, “My start-up death certificate was issued the day I formed 
my start-up.” Seemingly, paradoxical, but true, the frequency of successful start-ups are 
relatively low. This is in a sense vexing, when one considers the amount of resources and 
effort put in. Are there alternative growth or venture building models that can up the success 
rate of these start-ups ?  It is generally assumed, while it may not be the case, that start-ups 
fail because of a lack of some sort of information or resources.  Thus, start-ups are constantly 
on the lookout for growth guidance and resources through incubators, venture builders, 
accelerators and the likes. However, most entrepreneurs do not have an idea of which growth 
mechanism is optimal for their innovation enterprise. Hence a good understanding of the 
appropriate model that will maximise their growth potential is critical for them to make the 
right choice of venture building support. 
1.4. Perspective Three: Investors’ Choice of Investment Options 
Investors from the angel community to significant VCs and PEs often funnel their 
investments directly into start-ups as their preferred modus operandi. However, given the 
large number of start-up failures, are there alternative funding models of innovation by the 
investment community ? Is there an emerging venture building model the performance of 
which exceeds the track record of traditional incubators and accelerators ? If there is, what  
are their practices; and how can these firms adopt the practices of  this new venture building 
model ? 
Incubators and accelerators may obtain insights as to how the emerging venture building 
model’s strengths can complement their existing modus operandi; and perhaps suggest 




1.5. Perspective Four: Research Community 
From the research community perspective, is there a new phenomenon of venture building 
that is evolving but which lacks evidence-based findings that can guide stake-holders in the 
innovation ecosystem ? What are the significant characteristics about this emerging venture 
building model that are distinct from the traditional models ? Can existing theories such as 
the Resource-based View (Barney, 1991), Market-based asset (Srivastava, Fahey, & 
Shervani, 1998) and Market-facing business processes (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 





Chapter 2: Review of Key Industry Findings and Research Literature 
 
2.1. Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Venture-backed start-ups as we know in its current form are only about 40 years old 
(Marmer, 2018). This modern form of innovation and entrepreneurship paradigm is 
evolving, albeit at a rapid rate given the significant financial and human capital resources 
invested by governments, investors and start-ups. KPMG estimated that in Q1 2018 alone, 
total capital invested by VCs alone in Q1 2018 was $49Bn (KPMG Enterprise, 2018). Many 
of the pre-paradigm pieces have been developed and studied especially in the last 20 years 
under the cross disciplines of innovation and entrepreneurship. These sub disciplines include 
the Lean Start-up, The Business Model Canvas, Design Thinking, Customer Experience, 
Technopreneurship etc.  
In the Stanford’s Start-Up Genome Project (Marmer, Herrmann, Dogrultan, & Berman, 
2012), where 3200 start-ups were studied, four distinct stages of start-up development, also 
known as Marmer stages were identified. They are: 
1. Discovery: The entrepreneur discovers a problem or an idea that solves an existing 
problem. 
2. Validation: The start-up team evaluates if the idea to the problem has market demand. If 
market support for the idea cannot be validated, then the start-up pivots the idea to 
another market or problem. 
3. Efficiency: The idea or solution gains traction and the start-up begins to acquire 
customers and to raise funds. 
4. Scale: The new venture aggressively pushes the boundaries of customer acquisition and 




In addition, Bergfeld added two later stages (Bergfeld, 2015): 
5. Profit maximisation: The established company increases revenue and is profitable. 
6. Renewal or decline: The established company must either continue to innovate or 
upgrade its offerings to stay ahead of the competition or else it may go into a decline. An 
example is SE Asia’s GRAB that has ventured from ride-hailing to additional businesses 
such as financial (e-wallet) and food deliveries.  
Diagrammatically this is shown in Figure 2-1. 
                 
            Figure 2-1. The 6 Stages of Venture Journey              Source: (Bergfeld, 2015) 
I will return to this diagram after discussing the topology of venture developmental entities.  
2.2. Business Incubation Outcomes 
In any incubation models, when measured by the new venture’s growth and financial 
performance,  there are five possible outcomes at the completion of the incubation process 
(Lewis et al., 2011): 
Successful Outcomes: 
1. The new venture is surviving and growing profitably. 




3. The new venture is surviving but is not growing; and not profitable or marginally 
profitable. (One can argue that this can be considered an unsuccessful outcome; In 
private equity circles these are often referred to as, “zombie” companies where the 
companies continue to operate but does not have an assured future.) 
Unsuccessful Outcomes: 
4. The new venture operations were terminated while still in the incubator, but losses 
were minimised. 
5. The new venture operations were terminated while still in the incubator, but losses 
were significant. 
These outcomes will be referenced during this study when classifying whether the new 
venture is successful. 
2.3. Business Incubation Best Practices 
Hackett and Dilts (2008) conducted a systematic review of the incubation literature and 
fieldwork in North America and Asia. They identified a series of business incubation best 





Figure 2-2. Business Incubation Best Practices  Source: (as cited in Lewis et al., 2011) 
 
2.4. The Emerging Phenomenon of Venture Building  
According to TechCrunch, a popular practitioner-referenced site, Endeavour Insight 
Analysis (Morris, 2015) in a survey of top VC firms found that the general partners of these 




On average 40% of the current partners of these VCs are experienced entrepreneurs.  See 
Figure 2-2a below. 
         
      Figure 2-2a. High Proportion of VC Partners with Entrepreneur Experience (Morris, 2015)  
We observe this phenomenon of entrepreneurs morphing into venture capitalists (VCs) as 
evidenced by the large numbers in the innovation hubs of the likes of the Silicon Valley, 
London and Singapore. Many of these entrepreneurs move on to form incubators and 
accelerators as a funnel or window into investment opportunities, often termed as pipelines 
or deal flows.  
The plot has taken a twist recently with an emerging class of innovation investment vehicles, 
also known as Venture Builders (VBs) or Start-ups Studios where the general partners are 
former experienced entrepreneurs. The most well-known is Rocket Internet established in 
2007 from Berlin. This group has successfully built and nurtured start-ups such as Lazada, 
Foodpanda and Hellofresh. Another example is the Wesley Clover International group (the 
researcher has collaborated with this group for several years) where the founder, Sir Terry 




VBs are a hybrid form of incubators and accelerators with additional unique features that are 
typically not found in the traditional incubators. The unique features include equity 
ownership by the incubating firm, which is generally pegged at a higher proportion compared 
to Accelerators (double digit equity positions ranging from 20% to 60% are typical), their 
venture building methodologies, and the management and ownership structure (some taking 
on co-founder titles on some of their start-ups and pre-seed to seed-stage investment). 
However, central to VBs is the characteristic of sharing synergistically common group 
infrastructural resources such as sales, legal, finance, analytics, market analysis, customer 
base, channels etc (a form of network market-based assets) to scale their companies. These 
last characteristics are key as they can free up the founders and co-founders to focus on high 
value creation activities in the domain area, rather than some of the mundane tasks of 
operating the business. In emerging technologies such as deep tech coding, scientific 
molecule and DNA research this frees up capital for content-intensive feature building of 
their innovations. John Borthwick of New York VB Betaworks commented that unlike a 
traditional VC model where failure happens in the marketplace, the VB model has a “more 
flexible platform for innovation” where “if things don’t look like they will work out, we can 
easily pivot because there hasn’t been as much capital and investment put in. Death and 
breakage is part of the system” (Rao, 2013).  Notice that this is akin to movie production 
studios, such as Disney, wherein they share common organisational resources and hence VBs 
are sometimes known as start-up studios.  
From the VBs’ perspective, they can contribute and “scale their experience across a number 
of start-up ideas, take a hands-on approach …in product and engineering and take equity 
stakes. The new, young entrepreneur gets to learn how to build a company from someone 
who has had success and can scale more quickly.” (Rao, 2013). This model allows VBs to 




the traditional VC model. Mentors and investors in the typical incubator and accelerator 
models are often not sufficiently close to the company to add significant value on a regular 
basis compared to the VB’s resources which may include highly experienced experts who 
possess deep specialised expertise. 
Szigeti (2016) identified the basics of VBs or Start-up Studios as depicted in Figure 2-3 
below: 
 
Figure 2-3.   VB Basics         
Source: (“How we 13x-ed our start-up portfolio value in less than 12 months,” 2016) 
((Szigeti, 2016) 
Garcia-Luengo (2017) in Figure 2-4 below succinctly provide a summary table comparing 
VBs with accelerators. He identified five activities that are core or central to VBs and two 
non-core ones. For each activity, he estimated the amount of value-added effort of three key 
phases of Design/innovation, Acceleration/Incubation and Scale-up/Commercialisation. In 





    Figure 2-4. Core vs Non-core activities of VBs and Accelerators  
    Source: (García-Luengo, 2017b) 
VBs typically in the Design/Innovation phase, goes through a four-month process where 
multi-disciplinary teams explore an industry or opportunity using tools such as design 
thinking, lean start-up (García-Luengo, 2017b) and business canvas model. The VBs 
capitalise on their large network of ventures and clients they have in this opportunity-seeking 
or problem-identification phase resulting in a well-defined problem, business model, 
financial model and go-to-market strategies and prototype. 
In the Acceleration/Incubation phase, VBs build the founding team where concepts designed 
in the Design phase are tested with the building of a minimal viable product (MVP) (García-
Luengo, 2017b). This is done within six months where the go-to-market strategy is tested, 
and the MVP fine-tuned (product validation).      
Finally, VBs in the Commercialisation/Scale-up phase will coach and support their new 
ventures to focus on scaling up, develop growth strategies, build management systems 
(García-Luengo, 2017b)and strengthen governance (examples include proper documenting 
of minutes of meetings; and board formation etc). The VBs will provide active support to 
seek capital for this growth stage from their network of VCs. 
Core Activities Non-core activities
Business ideas Build team Find capital Lead ventures Shared services Methodology & learning processes Provide Talent 
Venture Builders
  - Design/Innovation
  - Accelerate/Extended period incubation
  - Scale-up/Commercialisation
Accelerators






In Garcia-Luengo’s view (García-Luengo, 2017b), there are three sub-types of VBs as 
depicted in Figure 2-5 below. 
              
    Figure 2-5.   Three Sub Types of VBs                  
    Source: (García-Luengo, 2017b) 
On one extreme, “In-house VBs” are owned by a corporation, also known as Corporate 
Ventures. This model is often used by corporates to fight disruption (examples include 
Prehype; Sidebench (Carter & Cheung, 2017) ; and FINLAB co-owned by UOB and IMDA). 
The second model, “Working for Investors” is a form of entrepreneurship industrialisation 
where established entrepreneurs, angel investors and high net-worth individuals pool 
together their funds in the VB itself. The VBs own the majority of the new venture equity 
while recruited co-founders own the minority equity (typically ranging from 20% to 30%). 
The new ventures are charge fees for the services the VBs provide. Examples of such VBs 
include Polymath Venture, Betaworks, Rockalabs (García-Luengo, 2017b), Obvious 




In the third model, “Working for Corporations VBs”, or “Venture-Building As a Service”, it 
is essentially a consulting fee model where the VBs provide VB services (Design, 
Acceleration and Commercialisation) and are paid accordingly. The corporation that they 
provide the VB services for is both the client and the investor of the new ventures. Examples 
include BCG Digital Ventures and Mach49 (García-Luengo, 2017b); and Ikama and 
AppnRoll (Carter & Cheung, 2017).  
There are three main approaches to Business Idea Identification (García-Luengo, 2017b):  
▪ cloning with factory/assembly-like characteristics (example Rocket Internet (Köhler & 
Baumann, 2016) where they identify models that work elsewhere and replicate in the 
target region such as Airbnb cloning Wimdu); 
▪ tapping on the proven experience of the VB’s experienced founding 
investors/entrepreneurs (example Wesley Clover’s depth in the telco and ICT domain 
expertise) and 
▪ reusing a proven formal methodology which are not often used by VBs except for some 
“VB as a Service” model. 
2.4.1 Challenges of VBs 
VBs (García-Luengo, 2017a), from the investment spectrum can range from taking a strong 
VC-focus (sees themselves as investors, less invested in the operations and methodologies; 
and willing to let start-ups fail if necessary) to cofounding-focus (more interventionist in the 
new ventures, increased operational complexity, but significantly reduce the risk of failure). 
This poses a challenge as to which spectrum is more suitable. 
Secondly, the VB model has been criticised that since the co-founders did not originate the 




founders are high. However certain types of co-founders may be more suitable for the VB 
model.  
Thirdly, finding the right talent is extremely difficult as the VB model is emerging and not 
well known. VBs” are doing something new… is still in its infancy, and VBs are focused on 
figuring it out” (García-Luengo, 2017a). Hence the potential pool of co-founders’ is quite 
hard to seek.  
The above challenges provide some insights as to the gaps which this study attempted to 
explore and hypothesise.  
As at 2016, it is estimated that there are approximately 150 VBs globally of which about half 
are based in Europe as seen in Figure 2-6 (Montgomery, 2017).  
    
     Figure 2-6.   Distribution of VBs as at Mar 2017  Source: (Montgomery, 2017) 
This is a relatively small number and is dwarfed by the high growth and presence of a large 
number of incubators and accelerators of over 3000 ((Hochberg, 2016) and refer to Figure 




       
Figure 2-7.   Evolution of Accelerator Industry 2001-2015  Source: (Gust, 2016), (Gust, 2015) 
         
Figure 2-8. Growth of Accelerators and Incubators Globally (Bioulac, 2019) 
Figure 2-9 shows the growth of new VBs from 1996 to end 2016. Bill Gross started one of 
the earliest in 1996 with Idealabs in the US but since then Europe (about 70 out of 143 VBs) 
has overtaken North America (US & Canada have 23 out of the 143) of this new asset class 





Figure 2-9.  Distribution of VBs as at Mar 2017       Source:(Montgomery, 2017)  
Given this recent phenomenon, it was not surprising that a database search using Google 
Scholar and other academic databases uncovered very few academically rigorous 
evidence-based studies.  
Hence this study is note-worthy in that it will be pioneering in nature and will shed light 
for further research and theory formulation of this emergence of venture builders or 
innovation investors.  
Given the newness of the phenomenon and the relatively lack of empirical data, the 
adoption of a mixed methods design is considered appropriate to draw out the evidence 
needed for a meaningful study. 
2.5. Differentiating Venture Builders from Accelerators 
There has been significant language confusion of the definitions of venture builders and 
the other types of start-up developmental entities, aggravated by the media, policy 
makers, researchers and well-meaning practitioners Figure 2-10 provides a typological 































incubators and angel investors. (It should also be noted herein that this confusion is 
possibly also driven by the intent of some not so well-meaning individuals as well. With 
typical equity fees for VB operators being substantially higher than those of an 
accelerator, this representation as a VB may be more about fee/participation or self-
interest.) This will be followed by an in-depth discussion of each of the comparative 
differences between venture builders and the other three start-up developmental entities.  
Venture Builders Accelerators* Incubators* Angel Investors*
Duration 1.5 - 6 years 3 months 1-5 years Ongoing
Cohorts No Yes No No
Business model Investment Investment; non-profit Rent; non-profit Investment
Selection frequency Non-competitive; ongoing Competitive; cyclical Non competitive Competitive; ongoing
Venture stage Foundational funding Early Early or late Early
Education offered
Seminars, peer sharing, education by 
experinced mentors
Seminars Ad hoc, HR, Legal None
Venture location On-site for an extended period Usually on-site On-site Off-site
Mentorship Long term, high frequency Intense, by self and others Minimal, tactical As needed, by investor
Equity owned 30%-60% 5%-10% Cash or 5% equity ??  
 Figure 2-10.  Characteristics of Incubators          Source:  (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014) 
2.5.1 Venture Builders and their Characteristics 
A Venture Builder (VB) is essentially a form of incubator that builds companies or start-ups 
from ground up. One of the key touted strengths of the VB is the availability of “a system of 
knowledge, resources and networks (C. Li, 2015) so as to enable their new ventures to tap 
on and execute better than the average start-up. 
A closer examination of the VB Model reveals a hybrid of (Diallo, 2015): 
▪ The primary function of a venture capital firm is that it funds ventures and builds a 




▪ Such firms differ from the VCs in their significant “hands-on” involvement in the 
operational aspects of their new ventures and aggressive disciplined application of 
business management techniques 
▪ These firms specialize in extracting value and resources from their carefully curated 
network and eco-systems (Eco-net) to assist their new ventures ability to scale or go-to-
market fast due to their vast eco-net connectivity; and intimate knowledge of their 
portfolio’s customers; and cross-sharing of ever increasing new technology platforms - 
gleaned from their ever-growing portfolio of ventures. 
Paypal founder, Peter Thiel (2014), asserted controversially that VBs should pursue a 
monopolistic strategy as part of their vision where he defines a monopolistic company as 
“one that is so good at what it does that no other firm can offer a close substitute” (Thiel & 
Masters, 2014).  
Venture Builders’ Characteristics 
VBs are purported to have the following main characteristics, though there is variance in 
answers: 
Background and Quality of VB Founders and Mentors: 
The founders are typically entrepreneurs who have exited or sold off their innovations; and 
are experienced in building companies.  Many of these VB founders have set up an 
equivalent “Fund of Funds” with other co-investors who could be high net worth individuals, 






Network and Eco-system (Eco-Net) Creation 
These VB Founders together with their mentors are often well connected to businesses and 
the investment community so that they can open doors, provide business advice and develop 
the fledging founders and team. Diallo (2015) is of the view that VBs build “powerful 
networks and ecosystems from which resources can be instantly pulled” (Diallo, 2015). 
Marrero (2017) gave an example of this network and eco-system creation impact using 
Idealab as an example (an early pioneer of VB founded by Bill Gross) in the figure below. 
         
 Figure 2-11.   Idealab’s Network Ecosystem  (Eco-net)       Source: (Marrero, 2017) 
While having an eco-net is indeed a valuable resource, it is also critical that managing 
partners of VBs have the ability to unify a “vast array of resources in the most effective 
way”, “federate all these resources under one governing body that can build ventures in a 
very focused and dedicated way …” such that these resources can be made available to their 
new ventures by creating “an internal culture of trust, deal flow, attentiveness, and 
determination” (Diallo, 2015).  
It cannot be over-emphasised that the ability to extract value from the eco-net, which has the 




distinctly different from the traditional start-up model (Diallo, 2015). It comes into play 
especially in the dynamic world we live in today - one where technologies are descending in 
rapid waves (AI, Blockchain, Big Data, Cyber Security etc), the highly competitive nature 
of today’s ever-increasing new start-ups, and the fast-changing needs of consumers and 
corporates.    
According to Diallo (2015), VBs share these four values or practices: 
▪ capital commitment (typically from their past venture success) 
▪ industry experience (market knowledge, know-how, operational expertise as they have 
built successful ventures before) 
▪ a strong desire or passion to build something new (serial entrepreneur) 
▪ a natural gravitation towards collaboration (strong respect for the values of trust, 
friendship and loyalty). 
The intent of this study in part is to operationalize and test if these practices are supported 
by empirical evidence and how and whether they are critical in contributing to the success 
of new ventures. 
Start-up Team Formation: 
The team members are recruited by the VBs as co-founders (minimum CEO/CTO pair) who 
are then given total equity of between 30% to 50%. In many instances, one of the cofounders 
is technically strong and plays the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) role while the other acts 
as the CEO to lead the team, engage customers, suppliers, investors etc. 
Recruitment of co-founders that match the VB’s requirements and those of the tasks to be 
performed is key for start-up success. Some of the attributes which VBs look for in co-




passion, and business development skills), structured and hands-on, technology competent, 
working with others who possess diverse skills,  
Equity Ownership of Start-ups: 
VBs typically take a higher percentage of equity of the companies they build as compared to 
incubators and accelerator types. The VBs’ share of equity of the new ventures ranges from 
20% to 60% while Accelerators tend towards 5% to 10%. 
Shared Resources: 
The VBs have pooled resources and expertise which are shared across their new start-ups. 
This expertise could include legal advice, IP protection, hiring, office facilities, market 
intelligence gathering, network of mentors, customer base and global office connections. 
The idea with this support is to allow the founders and co-founders to focus on their core 
expertise (coding, design, marketing) and conserve capital usage. 
Proximity or Active Engagement Duration of Start-ups: 
VBs when compared to Accelerators tend to support their new companies more deeply and 
for a longer period of between 18 to 36 months. They tend to guide the new ventures from 
conception (where they recruit the co-founders) and all the way till the ventures exit or 
terminate without an exit. Hence the proximity of VBs to their ventures in terms of 
engagement duration, connectedness, active involvement in the start-up’s performance and 
awareness of the start-up’s key success factors may be a key contributing factor to success 






Stage of Investment: 
VB’s tend to be the first dollar investor investing mainly in pre-seed to seed funding with 
the occasional Series A and subsequent equity dilution over time. This is a part of the reason 
why their equity position is so high. 
Venture Growth Developmental Methodology: 
VBs typically recruit co-founders with entrepreneurial and technology skills. They will then 
familiarise the team members with their inhouse methodology, like an accelerator program. 
Unlike accelerators’ programs that are typically three to six months in duration, the VBs 
programs are for an extended period as the VBs will link the new ventures to their networks 
of mentors, ventures that were previously built or in the process of building, share customer 
base or referrals, cross license useful underling technology platforms of what their peers are 
working on or have developed, links to the VBs’ network of investors etc.  
Hence the approach has greater depth, better access to trusted and proven resources and 
speedy go-to-market potential. The approach essentially utilises the organisation valuable, 
rare, hard to imitate assets which are essentially market assets.       
Business Focus and Market Validation: 
The VBs tend to be B2B focus and are demand-driven, that is, they actively seek out business 
problems faced by corporates who are prepared to be their first pilot or Proof of Value 
(POV). 
As VBs tend to be demand-driven (as opposed to ideas-driven), they spend a significant 
amount of time validating the market or customer needs carefully, assessing the problems 





The successful start-ups they build can expect to generate some recurring revenue from the 
second year onwards. However, according to Greg Vanclief, a VB veteran practitioner from 
the Wesley Clover group,  they tend to exit their start-ups between 4 to 8 years which means 
that they do not get any significant returns on their investments in their start-ups until the 4th 
to 8th year of forming the start-up.  
Activities Practised by Venture Builders: 
Garcia-Luengo (2017), in Figure 2-12 identified activities offered by VBs into core and non-
core ones (Garcia-Luengo, 2017). These activities will be investigated and validated in this 
research. 
 
Figure 2-12.  Venture builder’s activities                                Source: Garcia-Luengo, 2017 
Five Core Activities of VBs 
Business Ideas 
The goal of this activity is to identify a market-viable solution. The diversity of approaches 
include cloning existing models (example, Rocket Internet ); exploring diverse prototypes; 
working with incumbent corporates joint-identification of corporate or industry problems 
such as Wesley Clover International and Founders’ Factory (Garcia-Luengo, 2017) etc. 
Build Team 
Once the business idea is identified, the VB then create or build teams from the ground up 
looking for co-founders with complementary skills. VBs such as  eFounders and LeStudio 
Core Activities Non-core activities




VC have Talent Acquisition teams constantly looking for co-founders (Garcia-Luengo, 
2017). 
Find Capital 
VBs such as Nuclio Venture Builder (García-Luengo, 2017b) and Wesley Clover’s Alacrity.  
assist and facilitate access to capital for their new ventures though their own funds or link 
them to their network of investors  
Lead Ventures 
VBs provide the leadership role in the form of governance or active management of their 
new ventures. An example is Blenheim Chalcot VB (García-Luengo, 2017b) who uses their 
experts to give their new ventures “an unfair competitive advantage”. 
Shared Services 
Shared services such as legal, accounting, design and marketing are often provided as a 
common resource pool for their new ventures. This makes sense so that new ventures can 
focus on what they excel at with their innovations. An example if Rocket Internet which 
provides their logistics’ platform for their ventures (García-Luengo, 2017b). 
Two non-core Activities of VBs 
Methodologies 
Given their extensive experience in building new ventures, some VBs have formalised this 
knowledge by documenting the know-how and training their start-ups. An example is 
Polymath Ventures which has formalise on their know-how in designing and growing 




Talent Depth  
VBs tend to have a large network of talents (experienced senior executives and 
entrepreneurs). They are able to supplement and provide talents when the need arises such 
as when co-founders quit or the team requires certain skills at the stage where the original 
co-founders may be lacking in those skills. BCG Digital (García-Luengo, 2017b) and Wesley 
Clover  are examples of incubators with deep bench strength where they supplement the new 
start-up with critical skills when needed such as when co-founders quit or valuation skills 
for exits are raised. 
Using the Marmer and Bergfeld 6-stage journey of a new venture, the coverage and scope of 
VBs and the other developmental entities in the value chain are shown in Figure 2-13. 
          
Figure 2-13.  Value Chain of VBs, Accelerators, Incubators and Angels (Bergfeld, 2015) 
 
2.5.2 Accelerators and their Characteristics 
While there is no clear comprehensive definition of an accelerator that exists in the literature 
(Lewis et al., 2011), it may be broadly classified as either: 
• a late-stage incubation program, assisting ventures that are more mature and readier 




• a facility that houses a modified business incubation program designed for incubator 
graduates as they ease into the market (Lewis et al., 2011). 
    Accelerators’ Characteristics 
Accelerators have the following main characteristics, although, these may vary slightly from 
Accelerator to Accelerator: 
Background and Quality of Accelerators’ Founders and Mentors: 
The founders are typically entrepreneurs who have exited or sold off their new ventures; and 
are experienced in building companies. Many of these entrepreneurs will continue to set up 
for-profit accelerators; work for corporate-funded or university-funded accelerators. 
Examples of universities-backed accelerators include NUS Enterprise and SMU’s IIE. 
Corporate-backed accelerators include UOB-IMDA FINLAB and Ascendas’ Airmaker. 
Corporate accelerators are typically set up for profit or to explore investment opportunity in 
the new ventures or to use the innovations for their corporations. Sometimes they label 
themselves as venture builders which add to the confusion in the industry. 
Similar to VBs, accelerator founders together with their mentors are often well connected to 
businesses and the investment community so that they can provide access to capital and 
business advice; and develop the fledging founders and team albeit for a limited time. 
Start-up Team Formation: 
Unlike VBs, the start-up team members are often formed by the time they approach the 
Accelerators.  





Equity Ownership of Start-ups: 
Accelerators typically take zero or low percentage of equity of the companies they incubate 
or accelerate and instead take cash for their services. If they take equity, it is usually below 
10% as compared to VBs taking equity ownership of 20%-60%.  
Shared Resources: 
The Accelerators have limited pooled resources and expertise. For corporate-backed 
Accelerators, the expertise could be limited to the industry of the corporates but highly 
valuable as they tend to be domain-specific and targeted if the start-ups choose to innovate 
in that industry. 
Resources offered include mentors, office facilities, some access to potential customers 
through the mentors and global office connections. The idea with this support is to allow the 
founders and co-founders to focus on their core expertise (coding, design, marketing) and 
conserve capital usage but the time period is usually limited to 3-9 months. 
Proximity or Active Engagement Duration of Start-ups: 
According to Bergfeld (2015) most Accelerators actively support, mentor and guide the start-
ups typically between 3 to 9 months. They tend to guide the new ventures only when the 
team is already formed. 
Accelerators typically engage  their start-ups for only a brief part of their journey and without 






Stage of Investment: 
They provide pre-seed investment in exchange for equity (Miller & Bound, 2011) typically 
below 10%.  
Accelerator Growth Developmental Methodology: 
Accelerators typically start off with an application process that is open to all and usually 
highly competitive. (Miller & Bound, 2011) 
They do not usually recruit co-founders with entrepreneurial and technology skills. They will 
only work with teams that have already been formed or teamed before they enrol them in 
their programmed events and intensive mentoring (Miller & Bound, 2011).  These programs 
are conducted for cohorts consisting of ten to thirty teams. The program typically concludes 
with a “demo day” or pitching event where the investment community are invited to see and 
hear the business plan.  
This approach appears to be more time-compressed and intensive in terms of learning 
opportunity for the start-ups,  it would be of interest to test in this research  if it is effective 
in developing successful start-ups.   
Business Focus and Market Validation: 
The Accelerators are usually customer segment agnostic while VBs tend to focus more on 
B2B segments given their strong business network.  Often market validation by the 







Most accelerators have no emphasis on in-depth exit strategies for their start-ups given their 
short engagement with them (Bergfeld, 2015). These start-ups have to work on their own 
exit strategies as part of the accelerator’s formal program and usually agreed with their key 
investors.  
2.6. Theoretical Foundations and Frameworks  
The three main theoretical lens that are used to explain and test for the efficacy of the 
Accelerators and Venture builders  are:  
• Resource-based view (Barney, 1991) 
• Market-based assets and processes (Srivastava et al., 1999a) (Srivastava et al., 1998) 
• Core competencies for sustaining competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 2006) 
2.6.1 Resource-based view  
Rumelt (1984) (Foss, 1997) postulated that in the Resource Based View (RBV) of the 
firm, one can regard a firm as a bundle of resources which enables a firm to obtain 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
Barney (1991) added further that these resources have the following characteristics, that 
is, they are valuable, imperfectly imitable, rare and non-substitutable.  (Barney, 1991) 
Resources can be categorised as competencies, tangible and intangible resources such 
as human resources and know-how (practices, techniques and processes)  (Ambrosini, 
2003).  
Using the RBV Theory as the study’s theoretical foundation, we observe that 




rare, inimitable and hard to substitute. If these two incubator models have such resources 
and practices on hand, it will be interesting to find out which specific practices have a 
stand out competitive edge by examining the success outcomes of start-ups that they 
have applied their practices to.  
2.6.2 Market-based assets and business processes  
Srivasta et al (1999, 1998) in their landmark paper “Market-based Assets and 
Shareholder Value: A Framework for Analysis” developed a marketing framework that 
proposes marketing “is concerned with the task of developing and managing market-
based assets”. Essentially market-based assets are assets that “arise from the 
commingling of the firm with entities in its external environment”.  Examples which 
they provide include customer relationships, channel relationships and partner 
relationships (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1999b) (Srivastava et al., 1998). 
Srivastava et. Al, go on to encourage firms to expand the conception of the marketing 
department. They point out that investments into brand building, store fronts, contracts, 
franchises etc are all ways in which the firm can enhance its customer connection and 
improve their capability in altering the timing, level and composition of demand.   
We observe this phenomenon across the spectre of the incubation industry wherein 
Accelerators and VBs do indeed possess these intangible and tangible market-based 
assets in the form of their mentor networks; investor relationships, installed customer 
bases, and even their own personal credibility or reputation (Chong & Halff, 2014)   
linkages to universities etc.  
Hence it could be useful to apply the market-based asset framework as one of the 





2.6.3 Core competencies to sustain competitive advantage   
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) in “The Core Competence of the Corporation” defined core 
competencies as the “collective learning in the organisation, especially how to 
coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies”; 
“the organization of work” and “the delivery of value”.  It is argued that core 
competencies are the real sources of advantage for any organisations to have a 
competitive edge over their peers. While a core competency may be a single activity it 
is generally a series of steps or processes that lead to a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1980).  That is, it has been argued that the real advantage of a company is often 
found in a complex and intricate series of steps and processes that put them ahead of the 
competitor. If this is indeed the case, it would seem that the deep involvement of the VB 
relationship would yield a much greater opportunity for the incubatees to develop or 
gain such a competitive advantage.   
We see this in Accelerators and VBs in that they are organised to deliver value through 
their unique form of organisation and practices where they have to coordinate their 
diverse production skills and handle multiple streams of technologies. Technologies are 
defined in the wider sense of not just ICT technologies but techniques and practices in 
several aspects of venture incubation such as valuation know-how; market demand 
assessments etc.  
We will examine what are these core competencies which Accelerators and VBs are 
most likely to cultivate and how effective such competencies are for successful 
incubation. Moreover, this research will try to examine the relative efficacy of some of 
these variables. That is, where are we most likely to see an impact on the success of the 




Chapter 3 Research Hypotheses 
3.1. Discussion 
The RBV theory of strategy predicts that the more intangible resources a firm has, the greater 
the sustainability of its competitive advantage (Itami 1987; Conner, 1991; Barney, 1996). 
Practices, market-based assets (Srivastava et al., 1999b), resources and processes of 
Accelerators and VBs are their core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 2006). These core 
competencies are key to the success of the start-ups that they incubate.  
The main research question to test this prediction is a non–directional hypothesis:  
Is there a relationship between the type of emerging incubation model (Accelerators and VBs)   
and the success of the start-ups that they have incubated ? 
Two corollary questions that relate to the main research question are: 
▪ Are there specific practices that are closely associated with Venture Builders versus 
Accelerators ? 
▪ If we are unable to distinguish clearly the distinct practices of Accelerators versus VBs given 
the lack of clear definitions of the 2 models, then which practices are linked to the success 
of start-ups ?  
 
3.2 Three Propositions and Related Hypotheses  
Three Propositions 







Hypotheses for Proposition 1A Associating Successful Start-ups to Venture Builders  
Proposition 1A: Venture builders have a higher likelihood of incubating successful new 
ventures compared to Accelerators. (refer to Figure 3-1 for diagrammatic representation) 
H1Aa: Start-ups that have been incubated through a venture building program will have a 
higher likelihood of achieving financial success than start-ups that have been through an 
accelerator program.  
H1Ab: : Start-ups that have been incubated through a venture building program will have a 
higher likelihood of achieving psychological satisfaction than start-ups that have been through 
an accelerator program.  
            
Figure 3-1.   Hypotheses H1Aa and H1Ab  
The key constructs are “Practices” and “Success” of new ventures defined as: 
▪ “Practices” of an incubator model are the processes, actions, programs, tasks, activities 
and competencies that are applied by an incubator over a period of time (definitions are 




▪ “Financial Success” of new ventures is defined as entities who have experienced success 
as measured by : 
o evidence of revenue generation (necessary) (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001); 
o investment funding size between US$100k to US$10m or more (necessary) (de 
Langen & Groenewegen, 2012); 
o their going concern status (necessary); and 
o in the process or have the potential or have been merged, bought out, acquired by 
third parties or investors (de Langen & Groenewegen, 2012)(not necessary as 
some new ventures may want to continue to self-fund without the above exit 
mechanisms). This criterion if it is met reflects a strong signal of success.  
Rosemary et al (2014) suggested that entrepreneurial success is a “multi-dimensional 
construct best captured by more than financial and economic indicators”. This is validated 
in Study 1 (refer to Chapter 5) where the practitioners suggested that psychological 
satisfaction is an important success outcome. Hence it was decided that the attainment of 
psychological satisfaction is an important success outcome that the model should look into.   
▪ “Psychological Satisfied” new ventures are defined as entities who have experienced 
satisfaction as measured by (Rosemary Fisher, Maritz, & Lobo, 2014) : 
o evidence of affirmative control in achieving their business goals or goal-
achievement (Steffens, Davidsson, & Fitzsimmons, 2009) (sufficient); 
o having control over their work life balance (sufficient) and 







Hypothesis for Proposition 1B Linking Specific Practices to Venture Builders 
Proposition 1B: There are specific incubation practices that are associated with Venture 
Builders as compared to Accelerators  
H1B: The specific incubation practices that have been identified in this research are closely 
associated with Venture Builders (see Figure 3-1a). That is, the level of their existence will be 
purported to be greater than in an accelerator.       
              
  Figure 3-1a. Hypothesis H1B Formulation  
Hypothesis for Proposition 2 Associating Successful Start-ups to the Ten Identified 
Incubation Practices of the two incubator models ( VBs & Acs)  
Proposition 2: There are ten key practices of incubation as practised by both Accelerators and 
Venture Builders that are positively related to the success of their incubatees.  
Porter (1980) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) both concurred that “generally a series of steps 
or processes” are required for start-ups to achieve “a sustainable competitive advantage”. Hence 





For each practice, a corresponding pair of hypotheses are proposed – one for the financial 
outcome and one for the psychological satisfaction outcome. The ten paired hypotheses are (see 
Figure 3-2). 
H2a: The ten key incubating practices of VBs and Accelerators are positively related to the 
financial success of new ventures.     
H2b: The ten key incubating practices of VBs and Accelerators are positively related to the 
psychological satisfaction success of new ventures.    
             
Figure 3-2. Hypotheses H2a and H2b Formulation  
The key constructs and the related hypotheses relating the ten independent variables (incubation 
practices) of VBs and Accelerators to success outcomes are as follows: 
▪ V1 (Marketing Performance): “Marketing Performance” is defined as the persistent focus 
on market growth rate and intensity; and is measured by market growth rate as “the extent 




intensity as “the extent to which a firm is pursuing a strategy based on unique marketing 
efforts” (H. Li, 2001) 
H2a1: There is a positive relationship between the practice of marketing performance and 
the financial success of a start-up 
H2b1: There is a positive relationship between the practice of marketing performance and 
the psychological satisfaction of a start-up 
▪ V2 (Demand-driven Orientation): “Demand-driven Orientation” is defined as the practice 
of “going to all lengths to satisfy their customers” or customer-centricity (Asare, Alejandro, 
Granot, & Kashyap, 2011). This practice is the direct opposite of creating a solution and then 
chasing for a customer to use the solution. 
H2a2: There is a positive relationship between the practice of demand-driven orientation 
and the financial success of a start-up. 
H2b2: There is a positive relationship between the practice of demand-driven orientation 
and the psychological satisfaction of a start-up. 
▪ V3 (Market Scope): “Market Scope” is defined as the variety in customers and customer 
segments, their geographic range, and the number of products (H. Li, 2001) and (Marino & 
De Noble, 1997). High market scope ability implies that the start-up has higher capability to 
be flex their innovation to meet differing customer needs. 
H2a3: There is a positive relationship between the practice of market scope and the financial 
success of a start-up 
H2b3: There is a positive relationship between the practice of market scope and the 
psychological satisfaction of a start-up 
▪ V4 (Internationalisation): “Internationalisation” is defined as the extent to which a firm is 




research,  how cross-border markets can be penetrated through the VB and Accelerators’ 
capability will impact the start-ups’ success. 
H2a4: There is a positive relationship between the practice of internationalisation and the 
financial success of a start-up. 
H2b4: There is a positive relationship between the practice of internationalisation and the 
psychological satisfaction of a start-up.  
▪ V5 (Customer Segment Focus): “Customer segment” is defined as “the identification of 
target customer groups (a homogeneous group of people with similar type of needs/wants), 
where customers with similar requirements (expectations) and buying characteristics are 
aggregated into the same group (Kara & Erdener, 1997). In this research I want to determine 
if the successful ones are associated with business customer segment (B2B)as distinct from 
consumer business (B2C) given that B2C business tend to require high upfront investments 
such as advertising outreach etc   
H2a5: There is a positive relationship between the practice of B2B customer segment and 
the financial success of a start-up. 
H2b5: There is a positive relationship between the practice of B2B customer segment and 
the psychological satisfaction of a start-up.  
▪ V6 (Equity Ownership): “Equity ownership” is defined as “the measure of ownership” of 
the start-ups  (Singh & Davidson III, 2003).  Singh and Davidson (2003) discussed the 
concept of agency problem where low equity ownership tends to be associated with high 
agency costs leading to lower profitability. The research will assess if there is a positive 
relationship linking high equity owned by the VBs and Accelerators with the performance 




H2a6: There is a positive relationship between the practice of equity ownership and the 
financial success of a start-up. 
H2b6: There is a positive relationship between the practice equity ownership and the 
psychological satisfaction of a start-up.  
▪ V7 (Team Formation): “Team Formation” is defined as how the founding cofounders’ are 
recruited, hired or assembled including knowing where and how to source these talents; and 
developing the team members over time (Clarysse & Moray, 2004). VBs tend to source for 
the individual co-founders when assembling the new venture management team while 
Accelerators tend to incubate teams that have already been formed.  In the context of this 
research, team formation is viewed as the recruitment of individuals to form the new venture  
team.   
H2a7: There is a positive relationship between the practice team formation and the financial 
success of a start-up. 
H2b7: There is a positive relationship between the practice of team formation and the 
psychological satisfaction of a start-up.  
▪ V8 (Access to Critical Resources): “Access to critical resources” is defined as the 
availability of resources that the VBs and Accelerators provide which are critical to the 
success of start-ups such as IP Protection; legal support; investment partners (Song, 
Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, 2007). 
H2a8: There is a positive relationship between the practice of providing access to critical 
resources and the financial success of a start-up. 
H2b8: There is a positive relationship between the practice of providing access to critical 




▪ V9 (Depth of Mentor Network):  “Mentor Depth” is defined as the depth of the network 
that “constitute successful founders themselves and valuable experts within their respective 
fields such as specific technologies, legal, human resource, online marketing and branding.”  
(Kupp, Marval, & Borchers, 2017) 
H2a9: There is a positive relationship between the practice of providing access to deep 
mentor network and the financial success of a start-up. 
H2b9: There is a positive relationship between the practice of providing access to deep 
mentor network and the psychological satisfaction of a start-up.  
▪ V10 (Long Engagement): “Long engagement” is essentially the incubation time horizon; 
and is defined as the incubation time needed “for reaching key milestones, including time to 
raising of venture capital, exit by acquisition and achievement of customer traction.” (Cohen 
& Hochberg, 2014). The reasoning of this issue is the threat of compression diseconomies, 
or “the idea that temporal compression of learning and network formation is likely to involve 
trade-offs that may ultimately undermine performance” (Hallen, Bingham, & Cohen, 2014). 
Hence it will be interesting to find out if there is a relationship between the incubation time 
given by the VBs and Accelerators to the success of the ventures ? 
H2a10: There is a positive relationship between the Long Engagement and the financial 
success of a start-up. 
H2b10: There is a positive relationship between the between the Long Engagement  and the 







Chapter 4  Research Methodology 
 
4.1 The Research Framework, Design and Methods  
The overarching objective of this research is to gain an understanding of the effective 
practices of emerging incubation models with the primary focus on VBs and 
Accelerators. Additionally, it was designed to test the difference in efficacy of the two 
models. The results will provide evidence and support for instilling more effective 
practices within either incubation model to ensure more successful new ventures. This 
is a cross-sectional study where evidence is collected at a point in time to validate the 
effectiveness of the incubation practices.  
The principal investigator in this research has had ten years of significant exposure and 
association with both the VB and the Accelerator models for start-ups. In this period, I 
noticed a divergence of incubation models and the consequential lack of clarity and 
confusing terms. 
I began a literature search as outlined in Chapter 1 and discussed in depth in Chapter 2 
(Literature Review). Not surprisingly, a large majority of the extant literature were 
written by industry practitioners where there is a lack of scientific rigour or evidence-
based research.  
This led to my developing a preliminary model of the practices of Venture Builders and 







4.2 Study 1: Compare Accelerator practices versus VB practices  
The preliminary model was then enhanced and contextualised by 8 field interviews 
(Study 1) which took place in Jan-Feb 2019. The interviews were based on a semi-
structured questionnaire and were audio-recorded and transcribed using an innovative 
“Otter” tool for further content-analysis. The interview research instrument is found in 
Appendix 2 and the transcripts of the interviews are found in Appendix 3.  
Study 1 led to a more rigorous and newly informed literature search of the practices and 
outcomes of venture builders and accelerators.  
A final model with three propositions, twelve constructs and twenty-three associated 
hypotheses to be tested was developed. This was discussed in Chapter 3 (Research 
Hypotheses).  
4.3 Study 1a: Industry Survey of the Practices of Accelerators and Venture 
Builders 
Study 1a was done by constructing a semi-structured online questionnaire. The 
questions in the questionnaire were developed based on the twelve constructs outlined 
in Chapter 3. Ten of the constructs are the incubation practices of Accelerators and 
Venture Builders that lead to success of start-ups; while the other two constructs are the 
success outcomes of incubation (financial success and psychological satisfaction).  
Most of the questions developed in the survey were already in use in prior research  (see 
Chapter 3 for the references where the questions were further validated by (Song et al., 
2007)). However new questions were developed as they could not be referred to in the 
literature. These were questions relating to V6 (Equity Ownership), V7 (Team 




The online survey where the questions (based on a seven-point Likert scale) was sent 
globally to practitioners of Accelerators and Venture Builders. The incubators were 
randomly selected from sources such as Crunchbase, SG Innovate database or through 
industry contacts known by the researcher or recommended by practitioners.  
In total forty-four responses were received of which only twenty-nine responses were 
useable. The rejected data sets were due to incomplete responses and insufficient time 
spent on responding.   The survey questionnaire is found in Appendix 2. Note that this 
study was planned mid-way after Study 2 was launched on advice of the supervisor who 
felt that the research will have better grounding support of the findings in Study 2. It 
took about six weeks to collect the data from late May to end of June 2019. 
4.4  Study 2: VB & AC Incubation Practices and their Relationships to Successful 
Start-ups  
The research objective of Study 2 was to ascertain which of the ten identified incubation 
practices were impactful by analysing whether the incubation practices are positively 
related to the new ventures’ success outcomes (financial success and psychological 
satisfaction).  
Study 2 was done by constructing a semi-structured online questionnaire (Appendix 2) 
The questions in the questionnaire were developed based on the identical twelve 
constructs outlined in Chapter 3. Ten of the constructs are the incubation practices of 
Accelerators and Venture Builders that lead to success of start-ups; while the other two 





Most of the questions developed in the survey were already in use in prior research  (see 
Chapter 3 for the references where the questions were further validated by (Song et al., 
2007) ). However new questions were developed as they could not be referred to in the 
literature. These were questions relating to V6 (Equity Ownership), V7 (Team 
Formation) and V10 (Depth of Mentor Network).     
As Study 1a survey was launched, Study 2 online survey where the questions (based on 
a seven-point Likert scale) was concurrently sent globally to start-ups that were venture-
built or accelerated. The start-ups were randomly selected from sources such as 
Crunchbase, SG Innovate database or through accelerators and venture builders known 
by the researcher or recommended by practitioners. A total of fifty-five responses were 
received of which forty-eight passed the data quality test. Of the forty-eight, four start-
ups incubated by University-linked incubators were not selected as the primary focus of 
this research was on Accelerators and Venture Builders 
The research design is diagrammatically shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2.. 
 





            Figure 4-2. Research  Design and Method of Study 1, 1a and 2 
The results were tabulated and outlined in Chapter 5 (Results and Discussion). The 
findings, recommendations, limitations and future research directions are discussed in 





Chapter 5  Results and Discussion  
5.1 Study 1 Face-to-Face Interviews with Eight Incubation Practitioners  
The overarching purpose of Study 1 was to explore whether the practices that were identified 
in the literature review and insights as a practitioner are aligned to the actual practices of 
industry accelerator and VB practitioners.  The insights obtained were then used to refine 
and finetune the practices (which are the antecedents or independent variables) which 
resulted in the success/non-success outcome (the dependent variable) of start-ups they have 
been incubating. In addition, it provided qualitative insights about the two models in terms 
of similarities and differences. 
Results 
Eight senior industry incubators were interviewed face to face using the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire. Four respondents classified themselves as Accelerators (R1A; R2A; 
R3A and R4A) and the remaining four classified themselves as Venture Builders (R1V, R2V, 
R3V and R4V). Each interview took about an hour and recorded with the respondents’ 
permission. The eight detailed transcriptions are found in Appendix 3.     
The thematic analysis focus practices in Study 1 yielded the following insights which form 
the basis of the research hypotheses. This has been very helpful to inform the formulation of 
the ten antecedents and the addition of a second outcome measure (psychological 
satisfaction) that goes beyond financial success. 
A taxonomy of ten key practice focus themes supported by the literature findings; and  






Table 5-1   Ten Focal Practices (Independent Predictor Variables) of Venture Building 















performance  (H. Li, 
2001) 
 







“interest in … market 
functioning”, “research of 
.. competitors”, 
“understanding of 
business model”, VBs 
(provide services on 
marketing; go to market 
strategy) 
 b. Demand-driven 
orientation centricity 
(Asare, Brashear 
Alejandro, Granot, & 
Kashyap, 2011) 
Focus of solving 





ideas chasing for 
customers. 
VBs (“thoroughly 
understand the market 
problem”), “discovered 
successful ones solve 
boring steady problems 
for large corporations”, 
“customer discovery”, 
“producing something 
nobody wants”, “product 
market fit”, “domain 
insight”, “pattern 
recognition”, “critical to 
have strong customer 
support or making 
customer successful”, VBs 
(“talking to customers is 
critical”) 
 c. Market scope  
      (H. Li, 2001) and 





than one type of 
use cases, that is, 
ability for 
innovation to 
pivot to other use 
cases or 
industries. Song 
et al , (2008) 
“pivoting”, “business 
model will change”, “9 to 
18 months to find product 
market fit”, “transfer 
insights from one domain” 
to another, “new market 
opportunities” 
 d. Internationalisation 
(Bloodgood et al., 1996) 
Globalisation 
outreach beyond 
home or domestic 
market 
“develop and maintain a 
global network “, “for 







 e. Customer Segment  
(Kara & Erdener, 1997) 
Primarily B2B 
focus as distinct 
from B2C. 
“domain insight”, “more 
interested in the domain 
insight”, “understanding 
of customer problem”, 
“must know why Kodak 
failed”, VBs (“they come 
out knowing their market 
better than anyone else”). 
2. Resources f.    Equity ownership 





than 50%) by the 
VBs while 
Accelerators 
tends to take 
equity ownership 
that are often ten 
percent or less. 
“between 5% and 10%”; 
“$25k to $50k per start-
up” 
VBs (“extensive and active 
support & often too close 
to their new ventures to 
notice some of their 
failings”), VBs (“share 
ownership with 
entrepreneurs and 
employees of our new 
ventures”); VBs (“range of 
equity ownership from 
100% to single digits but 
typically we take majority 
ownership & down to 10-
20% when we exit…. The 
new ventures end up the 
same or better than other 
equity ownership models 
in the industry despite our 
taking higher equity in the 
beginning because we 
have a higher probability 
of a lucrative exit”) 
 g. Team formation 
(Clarysse & Moray, 2004) 






such as the CEO 
leader type; the 
technical CTO 
profile etc  versus 
ready formed 
teams that are 




“need a balanced team – 
understands technology, 
design and win the 
business types”, 
accelerators “recruit  .. 
teams”, VBs (“obviously 
recruiting”), “strong team 
workers”; VBs (“tends to 
fit young people earlier in 
their careers … more 
mature entrepreneurs  
tend to less tolerant of 
risk”) 
 h. Access to critical 
services such as IP 
Support provided 
to help the new 
VBs (“ put our own 






(Song, Podoynitsyna, Van 













Isabelle DA (2013) 
of our portfolio of new 
ventures”), “Accelerator is 




“community that will 
support them” “match 
with a stage seed 
investor” 
VBs (we are active 
investors and we stay 
involved in the company 
for as long as possible, we 
don’t kind of withdraw” 
 i. Depth of mentor 
network 
(Kupp et al., 2017) 





or were previous 
or existing CEOs 






“build the ecosystem” 
“build a community of 
mentors .... of Investors, 
mentors” “community 
building”, “glue in 
community”, “mentoring 






j.  Long Engagement 




learning  and 
network 






Barkema (2002) . 
“coachable”, “idea to 
investment in 100 days”, 
“change the 
methodology” 
“farm start-ups in 
quantity” “like a car wash” 
“success on your third or 
fourth venture …not first”, 
“just in time  education.. 
and mentality”, VBs 
“smaller number … longer 
period of time… more 
control” 
VBs (“used to be about 
seven years but now nine 
or ten years … common in 
industry”, VBs( we actively 
engage them when they 
are “tens of millions in 
revenue. .. and once it 
reaches hundreds of 
millions of revenue, we 




don’t really need our help 
anymore” )  

































(de Langen & 
Groenewegen, 2012) 
 







































which the new 
ventures set out 
to achieve are 
valid to the extent 




such as financial 
inclusion or social 
or vibrant 
community 
engagement.    
“ securing seed funding is 
not success, but .. perhaps 
some proxy”, “profitable 
exit”, “worth $100m or 
more”, “1 in 10 does 
well”, “promised  2x to 3x  
to investors”, “extremely 
hard to measure impact”, 
“financial success is not 













“high tolerance for 
failures”, “not tolerant of 
failures but tolerant of 
setbacks”; VB (“failures 
are fatal and doesn’t 
happen to us often 
because we’re so patient”)  
 “leaving debts behind is 
failure”, “hustler type 
entrepreneur  … and meek 
engineers”, “don’t know 
why we lost the business”, 
“VB can be too close to 
the new venture team and 
fail to notice their failings”  
 l. Psychological 
Achievement of 
personal goals or 
satisfaction 
 
(Rosemary Fisher, Maritz, & 
Lobo, 2014) 
 
(Steffens, Davidsson, & 
Fitzsimmons, 2009) 
Measurement of 




et al (2014). 
Entrepreneurial 
failure is defined 
as deviation from 
their desired 
“out of passion” 
“entrepreneurship 
doesn’t have to be 
lonely”, 
“success on a personal 
level was” “lifestyle 
choice”, “emotional 
reason”, “key thing is the 
community”, “passion”, 





Mckenzie & Sud 
(2008). 
driven”, “value system of 
an entrepreneur”, “own 
goals in life” 
 
Based on the taxonomy, the research tested the following hypotheses are depicted in Figure 
5-1 below. The ten practices were tested for their significance of their impact on new 
ventures’ success namely financial success and psychological satisfaction: 
                 
Figure 5-1. Ten Hypotheses to Test Association of Ten Practices to Successful Start-ups 
Discussion 
Besides the above key themes, it was observed in Study 1 that there was no clear definition 
of an accelerator or a venture builder. For example, one of the respondent who considered 
his model as a Venture Builder displayed essentially practices and characteristics of an 
accelerator such as a short acceleration program of not more than six months (VBs tend to 
have more than six months of acceleration often ranging from two to more than five years) 
and high volumes of thirty to sixty teams (VBs tend to limit new ventures to ten or fifteen 
over a period of five years).  However, this respondent displayed the characteristics of most 
venture builders, that is, selecting and forming the co-founders as a team.  Comments such 




tracking of potential respondents for Study 1, a university incubator director commented that 
they are a venture builder when it was clear that their practices are more fundamental 
incubation practices (such as provision of facilities; some initial funding grant and extended 
use of the facilities from one to four years and some entrepreneurship training courses) – all 
adds to the confusion in the industry. 
Another significant finding of Study 1 was the preference for VBs as a more superior model 
by founders of accelerators. In fact, one of them has ceased his six-year old acceleration 
model (Respondent R1A) and has since been adopting the VB model’s practices from 2016. 
He commented “if I were to do .. again, that’s the kind of model I would go …. as most first-
time entrepreneurs don’t have the professional and social networks to get the right team”. 
This turnabout comment was surprising given that one would expect accelerators to be bias 
towards the incubation model that they have been working on for many years. These 
respondents commented that they are aware of the emerging VB model and stated that some 
of their practices should have been incorporated in their acceleration model such as longer 
incubation period and building strong network resources that are richer and have greater 
depth. This seemed to support the negative effects of time compression diseconomies where 
accelerators’ structured programs are typically three to six months in duration.    
The psychological dimension was another insight that was not identified prior to conducting 
Study 1. This dimension essentially is a psychological attainment outcome as to whether a 
new venture perceives themselves as satisfied or not satisfied with their experience as a start-
up.  A literature search subsequently revealed very parsimonious research such as the one 
conducted by (R Fisher, Maritz, & Lobo, 2014) on “Evaluating entrepreneurs’ perception of 




Given the diversity of practices of accelerators and VBs, it makes it challenging for 
entrepreneurs to find the right fit for their new venture needs. Hence the research should 
focus on not what the incubators label themselves but focus on the practices that they indeed 
execute and as experienced by the new ventures or incubatees.  
Based on the themes discovered in Study 1, a follow-on Study 1a was performed to validate 
the actual practices as perceived by survey incubators who are primarily accelerators or 
venture builders. The survey included university incubators as they have deep domain 
knowledge of incubation practices.   
Concurrently as Study 1a was conducted with the practices validated and segregated 
according to the two  incubation entity types (accelerators and venture builders), Study 2 
which is a semi-structured online survey was conducted on the start-ups who experienced  
these practices. The research objective was to examine the impact of these practices on the 
outcomes of start-ups by testing the identified independent and dependent variables. 
The findings of Study 2 will help entrepreneurs and new ventures determine the practices 
that work and whether these practices are the ones that will meet their new venture needs. 
This should help de-risk future new ventures and achieve better performance of new 
ventures. This should provide more scholarly clarity in understanding what practices matters 
to new ventures. 
5.2 Study 1a Online Survey of Practices of Twenty-Nine Incubators 
Study 1a was a study targeted at the incubation practitioners. It was an attempt to validate 
the actual incubation practices of Venture Builders and Accelerators. Study 1a was originally 
not part of the initial research design but was advised by the dissertation supervising Chair 
to be added so as increase the robustness of the research. Hence Study 1a was developed in 




used to compare or triangulate the results obtained from Study 2 (which was the main 
research study focused on start-ups who have experienced the incubation practices of 
Venture Builders and Accelerators).  
Results 
In total, forty-three responses were obtained (only twenty-nine passed the data quality 
criteria) from the Qualtrix online survey (see Appendix XX Study 1a Qualtrix Survey 
Questions) from Accelerators, Venture Builders and University Incubators, for a six-week 
period from late May to end of June 2019. The questions were designed to measure the ten 
identified practices (predictor variables) from the earlier Study 1 using a 7-point Likert scale 
from “Very strongly Disagree” (rated as 1) to Strongly Agree (rated as 7) with mid-point 
rating 4 as “Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree”. There was an eight option for respondents 
who may choose to respond as “No Opinion/I don’t know”.  
In testing for the significance of the survey results, three key statistical techniques were 
employed. They are: 
1. Descriptive statistics  
2. Box plot of the mean of the three entity groups of Accelerators, Venture Builders and 
University incubators 
3. One-Way ANOVA with a follow on Post-Hoc test for the Tukey-Kramer statistic 
The six assumptions were validated to ensure the result validity of the one-way ANOVA 








The ten practice variables (for the purpose of this Study 1a discussion, they were referred to 
as dependent variables) were measured at ratio or interval level, that is  a 7-point Likert scale 
was used to measure the responses. This was the case for Study 1a. 
Assumption 2: 
The grouping of the incubator entities (in this case referred to as the independent variable) 
has two or more categorical independent groups. This was the case as the study had three 
entity groups of Accelerators, Venture Builders and Incubators. Hence the one-way ANOVA 
statistical test was employed.  
Assumption 3: 
There is independence of observations which means that there is no relationship between the 
observations in each of the three groups. This was the case as each respondent’s set of data 
response are measured only once in each of the 3 entity groupings. 
Assumption 4: 
There should be no significant outliers, that is, data points that do not follow the usual 
patterns. The study used box plots to identify outliers, if any. 
Assumption 5:  
The dependent variable should be approximately distributed for each category of the 
independent variable. The assumption of normality is assumed as the one-way ANOVA is 
fairly robust to deviations from normality (Liz, Keselman & Keselman, 1996). 
Assumption 6: 
The variances must be homogenous. This can be verified using Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variances. In the later part of this discussion, the results showed that this 




Hence all six assumptions have been met for the purpose of this analysis. 
(1) Descriptive Statistics 
Upon review of the data at the cut-off point of July 1st 2019, twenty-nine responses were 
selected comprising of thirteen Accelerators, eleven Venture Builders and five University-
linked Incubators (classified as Both). Refer to Figure 5-1 below. 
                       
Figure 5-2.  Distribution of Twenty-Nine Selected Respondents 
The remaining fourteen responses were discarded for poor data quality due to reasons of 
incompleteness, duplicate entries and time spent on completing the survey was too short.   
There was good diversity as these incubators are from around the world such as US, Canada, 
Denmark, Mexico, Australia, UK, Israel, Hungary, Turkey, the Netherlands and Singapore. 
They ranged from new ones that were a year old to one that was established forty-eight years 
ago. 
(2) Box-Plot Analysis 
A box plot was generated to assess how the 3 entity groups compare in terms of their means 




to look for outliers which may annul the validity of the one-way ANOVA statistical test 
results given that the requirement for the test validity is the absence of outliers. 
Overall Box Plot of the Mean of the Three Entity Groups 
The results below (see Figure 5-3 and Appendix 4) is the Overview Box Plot. The plot 
indicated that among the three entity groups of Accelerators, Venture Builders and 
Incubators, there were six variables that had a mean rating score that was at least 5 or above 
(where 5= Agreeable). These six variables were V7, 9, 6,2,10 and 4 (in descending order of 
the mean score). The remaining four variables V1, 8,3 and 5 (in descending order) had a 
mean score that were below the rating of 5 of which the lowest variable V5 was rated above 
4 at 4.31. Further comments of this diagram will be reported in the one-way ANOVA test 
section. 
 
Figure 5-3.  Box Plot of the Ten Predictor Variables of the Three Entity Groups 




To verify that Assumption 4 is met, that is, the requirement that there are no outliers, 
individual box plot of the ten practice variables were generated.   
The full results (see Appendix 5  Individual Box Plot) confirmed that the ten practice 
variables have no outliers except for V 1, 2, 4, 5, 8 (see Figure 5-4 ). 
   
    
 




For the variables identified, the number of outliers is small. Most of them are 1 or 2 outliers 
except for V5(which has 4 outliers). Given the small number of outliers impacting the 
variables, one can assume that the statistical requirement of no outliers can be considered as 
adequately met when interpreting the one-way ANOVA test statistics.  
The means of the groups are shown in Table 5- with the ranking of highest to lowest means 
for three groups (All Respondents, Accelerators, Venture Builders and Incubators). The 
highlighted numbers are for means that are greater than or equal to 5 (“Agree” rating). 
Reviewing the ranking color codes, there seems to be more agreement in the rating of the 
VBs and the Incubators (green and amber codes) as compared to VBs and Accelerators (blue 
code and green code). Overall the respondents rated seven variables as 5 and above (V7, 9, 
6, 2, 10, 4, 1 in that order). The highest seven means will be reviewed again after analysing 























(3) One-Way Unrelated ANOVA and Post-Hoc Test (Tukey-Kramer)  
Given that there were 3 groupings of the incubator entities, the appropriate test for the 
difference in means of the three entity groups was to use the one-way ANOVA statistical 
test instead of the t-test. 
The ANOVA results (test if there are statistically significant differences in the group mean) 
are shown as follows: 







Between Groups 10.826 2 5.413 4.695 0.018
Within Groups 29.976 26 1.153
Total 40.802 28
Between Groups 12.503 2 6.252 5.231 0.012
Within Groups 31.074 26 1.195
Total 43.578 28
Between Groups 0.763 2 0.382 0.337 0.717
Within Groups 29.478 26 1.134
Total 30.241 28
Between Groups 12.519 2 6.260 4.381 0.023
Within Groups 37.153 26 1.429
Total 49.672 28
Between Groups 3.225 2 1.613 0.932 0.407
Within Groups 44.982 26 1.730
Total 48.207 28
Between Groups 1.619 2 0.810 0.461 0.636
Within Groups 45.622 26 1.755
Total 47.241 28
Between Groups 0.601 2 0.301 0.362 0.700
Within Groups 21.606 26 0.831
Total 22.207 28
Between Groups 2.430 2 1.215 1.032 0.370
Within Groups 30.604 26 1.177
Total 33.034 28
Between Groups 2.121 2 1.060 0.970 0.392
Within Groups 28.431 26 1.093
Total 30.552 28
Between Groups 3.387 2 1.694 4.178 0.027
Within Groups 10.540 26 0.405
Total 13.927 28
V5 Cust Segm B2B
V6 Equity Share Signif
V7 Team Form Recruit 
V8 Access Critical Resources
V9 Mentor Depth









However, to test the reliability of the ANOVA significance, the variances were tested for 
homogeneity using Levene’s statistic. See Table 5-4 below. By reviewing the p significance, 
the results showed that all the p significance level of the mean are above 0.05 indicating that 
there was homogeneity of variances. Hence one can take the significance level in the 
ANOVA as statistically valid.  
   Table 5-4  Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances 
           




Referring to the 10 variables in the ANOVA table, the four variables that were statistically 
significant at the p<= 0.05 level are V1, 2, 4 and 10. This means that there were statistically 
differences in the three groups ratings of these four variables. However, the ANOVA does 
not indicate the differences among which of the three groups. Hence a Post-hoc Tukey test 
is needed to show where the differences lie of which of the three groups. The Tukey-Kramer 



















Table 5-5 Post-Hoc Test with the Tukey-Kramer Statistic 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Venture Builders -1.34790
* 0.43989 0.013 -2.4410 -0.2548
Incubators -0.61154 0.56504 0.533 -2.0156 0.7925
Accelerators 1.34790
* 0.43989 0.013 0.2548 2.4410
Incubators 0.73636 0.57914 0.423 -0.7027 2.1755
Accelerators 0.61154 0.56504 0.533 -0.7925 2.0156
Venture Builders -0.73636 0.57914 0.423 -2.1755 0.7027
Venture Builders -1.34790
* 0.42145 0.013 -2.4192 -0.2766
Incubators -0.61154 0.59088 0.574 -2.2528 1.0297
Accelerators 1.34790
* 0.42145 0.013 0.2766 2.4192
Incubators 0.73636 0.51086 0.383 -0.8529 2.3256
Accelerators 0.61154 0.59088 0.574 -1.0297 2.2528
Venture Builders -0.73636 0.51086 0.383 -2.3256 0.8529
Venture Builders -1.36888
* 0.44787 0.014 -2.4818 -0.2560
Incubators -1.19615 0.57530 0.114 -2.6257 0.2334
Accelerators 1.36888
* 0.44787 0.014 0.2560 2.4818
Incubators 0.17273 0.58965 0.954 -1.2925 1.6379
Accelerators 1.19615 0.57530 0.114 -0.2334 2.6257
Venture Builders -0.17273 0.58965 0.954 -1.6379 1.2925
Venture Builders -1.36888
* 0.43996 0.016 -2.4965 -0.2413
Incubators -1.19615 0.53426 0.101 -2.6047 0.2124
Accelerators 1.36888
* 0.43996 0.016 0.2413 2.4965
Incubators 0.17273 0.40698 0.907 -1.0532 1.3986
Accelerators 1.19615 0.53426 0.101 -0.2124 2.6047
Venture Builders -0.17273 0.40698 0.907 -1.3986 1.0532
Venture Builders -0.28322 0.43622 0.794 -1.3672 0.8007
Incubators -0.39231 0.56033 0.766 -1.7847 1.0001
Accelerators 0.28322 0.43622 0.794 -0.8007 1.3672
Incubators -0.10909 0.57431 0.980 -1.5362 1.3180
Accelerators 0.39231 0.56033 0.766 -1.0001 1.7847
Venture Builders 0.10909 0.57431 0.980 -1.3180 1.5362
Venture Builders -0.28322 0.43509 0.794 -1.3768 0.8104
Incubators -0.39231 0.55648 0.768 -1.9913 1.2066
Accelerators 0.28322 0.43509 0.794 -0.8104 1.3768
Incubators -0.10909 0.55644 0.979 -1.7122 1.4940
Accelerators 0.39231 0.55648 0.768 -1.2066 1.9913
Venture Builders 0.10909 0.55644 0.979 -1.4940 1.7122
Venture Builders -1.40559
* 0.48972 0.021 -2.6225 -0.1887
Incubators -1.06923 0.62906 0.224 -2.6324 0.4939
Accelerators 1.40559
* 0.48972 0.021 0.1887 2.6225
Incubators 0.33636 0.64475 0.861 -1.2658 1.9385
Accelerators 1.06923 0.62906 0.224 -0.4939 2.6324
Venture Builders -0.33636 0.64475 0.861 -1.9385 1.2658
Venture Builders -1.40559
* 0.48292 0.024 -2.6355 -0.1757
Incubators -1.06923 0.58588 0.202 -2.6245 0.4860
Accelerators 1.40559
* 0.48292 0.024 0.1757 2.6355
Incubators 0.33636 0.46900 0.762 -1.0545 1.7272
Accelerators 1.06923 0.58588 0.202 -0.4860 2.6245
Venture Builders -0.33636 0.46900 0.762 -1.7272 1.0545
Venture Builders -0.727 0.539 0.381 -2.07 0.61
Incubators -0.200 0.692 0.955 -1.92 1.52
Accelerators 0.727 0.539 0.381 -0.61 2.07
Incubators 0.527 0.709 0.740 -1.24 2.29
Accelerators 0.200 0.692 0.955 -1.52 1.92
Venture Builders -0.527 0.709 0.740 -2.29 1.24
Venture Builders -0.727 0.558 0.410 -2.14 0.68
Incubators -0.200 0.607 0.942 -1.91 1.51
Accelerators 0.727 0.558 0.410 -0.68 2.14
Incubators 0.527 0.651 0.705 -1.25 2.31
Accelerators 0.200 0.607 0.942 -1.51 1.91
Venture Builders -0.527 0.651 0.705 -2.31 1.25
Venture Builders -0.021 0.543 0.999 -1.37 1.33
Incubators 0.615 0.697 0.656 -1.12 2.35
Accelerators 0.021 0.543 0.999 -1.33 1.37
Incubators 0.636 0.714 0.651 -1.14 2.41
Accelerators -0.615 0.697 0.656 -2.35 1.12
Venture Builders -0.636 0.714 0.651 -2.41 1.14
Venture Builders -0.021 0.569 0.999 -1.45 1.41
Incubators 0.615 0.523 0.485 -0.74 1.97
Accelerators 0.021 0.569 0.999 -1.41 1.45
Incubators 0.636 0.500 0.435 -0.68 1.96
Accelerators -0.615 0.523 0.485 -1.97 0.74
Venture Builders -0.636 0.500 0.435 -1.96 0.68
Venture Builders -0.126 0.373 0.939 -1.05 0.80
Incubators 0.292 0.480 0.816 -0.90 1.48
Accelerators 0.126 0.373 0.939 -0.80 1.05
Incubators 0.418 0.492 0.676 -0.80 1.64
Accelerators -0.292 0.480 0.816 -1.48 0.90
Venture Builders -0.418 0.492 0.676 -1.64 0.80
Venture Builders -0.126 0.389 0.944 -1.10 0.85
Incubators 0.292 0.377 0.723 -0.70 1.28
Accelerators 0.126 0.389 0.944 -0.85 1.10
Incubators 0.418 0.360 0.496 -0.54 1.38
Accelerators -0.292 0.377 0.723 -1.28 0.70
Venture Builders -0.418 0.360 0.496 -1.38 0.54
Venture Builders -0.161 0.444 0.931 -1.27 0.94
Incubators -0.815 0.571 0.342 -2.23 0.60
Accelerators 0.161 0.444 0.931 -0.94 1.27
Incubators -0.655 0.585 0.512 -2.11 0.80
Accelerators 0.815 0.571 0.342 -0.60 2.23
Venture Builders 0.655 0.585 0.512 -0.80 2.11
Venture Builders -0.161 0.443 0.930 -1.28 0.96
Incubators -0.815 0.525 0.302 -2.22 0.59
Accelerators 0.161 0.443 0.930 -0.96 1.28
Incubators -0.655 0.449 0.360 -1.95 0.64
Accelerators 0.815 0.525 0.302 -0.59 2.22
Venture Builders 0.655 0.449 0.360 -0.64 1.95
Venture Builders -0.538 0.428 0.432 -1.60 0.53
Incubators 0.062 0.550 0.993 -1.31 1.43
Accelerators 0.538 0.428 0.432 -0.53 1.60
Incubators 0.600 0.564 0.544 -0.80 2.00
Accelerators -0.062 0.550 0.993 -1.43 1.31
Venture Builders -0.600 0.564 0.544 -2.00 0.80
Venture Builders -0.538 0.437 0.448 -1.64 0.57
Incubators 0.062 0.443 0.989 -1.08 1.21
Accelerators 0.538 0.437 0.448 -0.57 1.64
Incubators 0.600 0.338 0.224 -0.31 1.51
Accelerators -0.062 0.443 0.989 -1.21 1.08
Venture Builders -0.600 0.338 0.224 -1.51 0.31
Venture Builders -.74650
* 0.26083 0.022 -1.3946 -0.0984
Incubators -0.46923 0.33504 0.355 -1.3018 0.3633
Accelerators .74650
* 0.26083 0.022 0.0984 1.3946
Incubators 0.27727 0.34340 0.702 -0.5760 1.1306
Accelerators 0.46923 0.33504 0.355 -0.3633 1.3018
Venture Builders -0.27727 0.34340 0.702 -1.1306 0.5760
Venture Builders -.74650
* 0.26325 0.025 -1.4089 -0.0841
Incubators -0.46923 0.32198 0.360 -1.3912 0.4527
Accelerators .74650
* 0.26325 0.025 0.0841 1.4089
Incubators 0.27727 0.32883 0.688 -0.6548 1.2093
Accelerators 0.46923 0.32198 0.360 -0.4527 1.3912
Venture Builders -0.27727 0.32883 0.688 -1.2093 0.6548
Post-Hoc Test (Multiple Comparisons) to Identify Differences between which Groups (Tukey-Kramer test)
Dependent Variable                                                (I) Entity              (J) Entity Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
























































*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.











Looking at the table for Variable 1, there was a higher Mkt Performance score of 5.6 ± 0.7 
in the Venture Builder group compared to the Accelerator group of 4.3 ± 1.3, an increase of 
1.3 (95% CI, 0.3 to 2.4), which is statistically significant (p = .013). This was similarly true 
for Variables 2, 4 and 10 where it was statistically significant between the Venture Builder 
and Accelerator Groups.  
The results showed that the statistically significant differences from the Tukey-Kramer 
statistic were primarily between the Accelerators and the Venture Builders for the four 
variables of V1, 2, 4 and 10 (variables which were identified earlier in the ANOVA but 
which we could not pinpoint the differences are between the groups). 
Table 5-6 below shows the Effect Size (Eta squared) of the four identified variables (V1, 2,4 
and 10). Eta-squared measures the ratio of variance explained in the dependent variable by 
a predictor while controlling for the other predictor variables. The effect was significant. 
   Table 5-6  Effect Size  




V1 Market Performance * Entity Type 0.515 0.265
V2 Demand Orientation * Entity Type 0.536 0.287
V3 Market Scope * Entity Type 0.159 0.025
V4 Internationsation * Entity Type 0.502 0.252
V5 Cust Segm B2B * Entity Type 0.259 0.067
V6 Equity Share Signif * Entity Type 0.185 0.034
V7 Team Form Recruit 0.165 0.027
V8 Access Critical Resources * Entity Type 0.271 0.074
V9 Mentor Depth * Entity Type 0.263 0.069
V10 Incubation Time Horizon * Entity Type 0.493 0.243





The box plot (see below Table 5-7 Summary of Study 1a results) has shown that there are 
six practices that were highly rated (rating of 5 and above) by all three incubator groups, that 
is in order of highest to lowest ranking, V7 (Team Formation), V9 (Mentor Depth), V6 (High 
Equity Share), V2 (Demand Orientation), V10 (Incubation Time) and V4 
(Internationalisation).  
Overall the following three practices, V7 (Team Formation), 9 (Mentor Depth), 6 (High 
Equity Share) were highly agreed by both Accelerators and Venture Builders as primary 
practices of Venture Builders. However, the ANOVA analysis indicated that of these highly 
agreed VB practice focus variables, four of them had statistically significant differences 
(V2,10, 4 and 1). This would mean that there are differences in opinions or disagreement in 
how accelerators view these four practices as primarily VBs’ practices. 





The lowest rated practice variables V1 (Market Performance), 8 (Access to critical 
resources), 3 (Market Scope) and 5 (Customer Segment) have the lowest agreement (below 
5 rating) of the entire three groups, but despite being lowly ranked the lowest rating was 
above 4.    
Now it remained to ascertain which of these practices, which the incubation practitioners 
have rated as focal VB practices were indeed experienced by the successful start-ups. I used 
the results of Study 2 to triangulate the findings in Study 1a. 
The results of Study 1a showed that while there are differing practices in the industry, certain 
practices [V7 (Team Formation), 9 (Mentor Depth) and 6 (High Equity Stake) ] are 
commonly seen as the primary practices of VBs while practices V2 (Demand Orientation), 
10 (Incubation Time Horizon), 4 (Internationalisation)  and 1 (Market Performance) were 
also claimed by accelerators as their primary practices.  
This does not mean that the differing practices were not practised by the VBs, For example 
on further reflection of V10 (Time Horizon), VBs are known in the industry to spend an 
extended engagement time with their new ventures; while Accelerators are known to have a 
much shorter engagement with their new ventures. The data could be interpreted as the 
changing nature of accelerators adopting VBs’ practices – the evolving hybrid Accelerator 
model – which the Study 1 interviewees indicated as a trend in Accelerators adopting VBs’ 
practices in the recent past. 
In conclusion, Proposition 1B stated that there are specific incubation practices associated 
with Venture Builders which are highly agreed by both Venture Builders and Accelerators: 
V7 (Team Formation), V9 (Depth of Mentor Network) and V6 (High Equity Share). 
However, if you consider all three groups’ perspectives (Venture Builders, Accelerators and 




Venture builders namely V2 (Demand Orientation), V10 (Incubation Time) and V4 
(Internationalisation). Hence we can accept H1B at p=0.05 
Given the above results, while three practices have high agreement and another three have 
marginal agreement, it would be more appropriate to test the efficacy of the ten practices as 
a whole rather than trying to test any differentiated practices of  the VBs versus Accelerators.    
I then returned to Study 1a results at the final discussion section where a triangulation of the 
results of Study 1, 1a and 2 was performed to make sense of the evolving nature of the 
incubation practice space. 
5.3 Study 2 Online Survey of Forty-Four Start-ups 
Study 2 was a study targeted at the start-ups or new ventures who have experienced an 
Acceleration or Venture Building program.  
The study aimed to identify which of the ten practices (the independent variables) identified 
in Study 1 and 1a were experienced by successful start-ups.  The dependent variable, success 
(dependent categorical variable) was viewed from two perspectives, the attainment of 
financial success and psychological satisfaction.   
Results 
In total, fifty-five responses were obtained from the Qualtrix online survey (see Appendix 2 
Study2 Qualtrix Survey Questionnaire) from “for profit” start-ups who have experienced an 
Acceleration or Venture Building program. The data was collected over eight weeks from 
late April to late June 2019.  Accelerators, Venture Builders and University Incubators, for 
a six-week period from late May to end of June 2019. The questions were designed to 
measure the ten identified practices (predictor variables) from the earlier Study 1 using a 7-




with mid-point rating 4 as “Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree”. There was an eight option 
for respondents who may choose to respond as “No Opinion/I don’t know”.  
The dependent categorical variables of Financial Success and Psychological were rated on 
several dimensions by the respondents and a score is computed each for financial success 
and psychological satisfaction. Dr David Ng, a highly qualified Chartered Accountant, 
venture investor, practitioner mentor and academically qualified researcher in incubating 
start-ups, was invited for an inter-coding session at the beginning of July 2019. After briefing 
the expert, Dr Ng, performed an independent selection of successful start-ups. he final 
selection of the start-ups that were considered successful had to meet the following 
qualifying criteria viz: 
- score above the computed average of the population mean score for success rating; 
- at least one expert (the independent inter-coder and the researcher) rating of success.     
The final selection was forty-four start-up data sets. The data sets were classified as Set 1 
(financially successful and unsuccessful start-ups - twenty-nine financially successful and 
fifteen unsuccessful new ventures); and the same set was then then reclassified as Set 2 of 
psychologically satisfied and not satisfied start-ups (twenty-two were deemed to 
psychologically satisfied and twenty-two deemed unsatisfied). 
In testing for the significance of the survey results, four key statistical techniques were 
employed. They are: 
1. Descriptive statistics of the responding forty-four start-ups. 
2. Box plots of the group means and chi-square test of the relationship between 
Accelerators and Venture Builders on the Financial Success/No Success dimension; 




Success and Psychological Satisfaction and/No Satisfaction dimension resulting in a 
total of three Chi-square cross tabulation tables. 
3. Independent Samples T-test (validated with an ANOVA analysis) to compare means 
and to test the significance, if any, of the group differences. Two T-tests will be 
conducted – financially successful and non-successful start-ups; and psychologically 
satisfied and non-satisfied start-ups. 
4. Binomial logistic regression modelling on the two dependent categorical variables (DV1 
Financial Success and DV2 Psychological Satisfaction) to determine the most 
parsimonious prediction model. This test helps to identify the independent variables 
which are statistically significant in impacting the success of start-ups.  
The six assumptions were validated to ensure the result validity of the T-test and the binomial 
logistic regression. The six assumptions are:   
Assumption 1: 
The ten practice variables wee measured at ratio or interval level which was the case as a 7-
point Likert scale is used to measure the responses. This was the case in Study 2. 
Assumption 2: 
The grouping of the incubator entities had two or more categorical independent groups. This 
was the case as the study had only two entity groups, that is, start-ups incubated by 
Accelerators and Venture Builders. Hence the T-test statistical test was employed.  
Assumption 3: 
There is independence of observations which means that there is no relationship between the 
observations in each of the two groups. This was the case as each respondent’s set of data 






There should be no significant outliers, that is, data points that do not follow the usual 
patterns. The box plots did not identify any significant number of outliers. 
Assumption 5:  
The dependent variable should be approximately distributed for each category of the 
independent variable. The assumption of normality is assumed as the T-test is fairly robust 
to deviations from normality (Liz, Keselman & Keselman, 1996). Hence while the T-test 
was the main statistical tool employed for Study 2, an ANOVA was done separately for each 
of the three T-tests (see Appendix YY). The ANOVA results were consistent with the T-test 
results. However, the T-test, using an additional Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances, 
was able to detect if variance homogeneity was picked up. See discussion of Assumption 6.  
Assumption 6: 
The variances must be homogenous. This was verified using Levene’s test for homogeneity 
of variances or the modified Breusch-Pagan test of heteroskedascity. In the later part of this 
discussion, the results showed that this assumption had been met. A test of homoscedascity 
(absence of heteroskedascity) of error terms determines whether a regression model's ability 
to predict a dependent variable is consistent across all values of that dependent variable. In 
other words, the variance is equal for all values of the predicted dependent variable. Both 
the modified Breusch-Pagan test and the Levene’s tests were conducted and the test results 
indicated the absence of heteroskedascity. Referring to the table below, no heteroskedasticity 
was detected both sets of data and is illustrated by the table below where the modified 
Breusch-Pagan test showed p=0.452 and hence not statically significant at p=0.05 for the 





   Table 5-8  Modified Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity 
                       
Hence all six assumptions have been met for the purpose of this analysis. 
Detecting Multicollinearity Condition 
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated with 
each other. This leads to problem of pinpointing which independent variable contributes to 
the variance explained. To ensure that the results are not distorted by Multicollinearity, a 
review of the Variance Inflation Factor or VIF (1/Tolerance) was conducted for both the 
financial success/no success and psychological satisfaction/no satisfaction sets of tests on 
the ten independent variables. Table 5-9 below confirmed the absence of multicollinearity 









Modified Breusch-Pagan Test for 
Heteroskedasticitya,b,c
a. Dependent variable: DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
b. Tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the errors 
does not depend on the values of the independent variables.
c. Predicted values from design: Intercept + V1MktPerf + 
V2DemandOrient + V3MktScope + V4Internationalisation + 
V5CustSegmB2BCategorical + V6EquityShareSignif + 





   Table 5-10  Multicollinearity Test 
          
          
(4) Descriptive Statistics of the Respondent Data Sets 
Upon review of the data at the cut-off point of July 1st 2019, initially forty-eight of the initial 
fifty-five responses were selected based on the quality and completeness of the responses. 
The remaining seven responses from the original fifty-five total were discarded for poor data 
quality due to reasons of incompleteness, duplicate entries and time spent on completing the 






V2 Demand Orientation .280
b 1.437 0.158 0.219 0.434 2.302 0.434
V3 Market Scope .013
b 0.072 0.943 0.011 0.556 1.798 0.556
V4 Internationalisaton .119




b 0.578 0.567 0.090 0.961 1.041 0.961
V6 Equity Size Owned by 
Incubator
-.062
b -0.427 0.672 -0.066 0.820 1.219 0.820
V7 Team Formation by 
Incubator
-.178
b -1.246 0.220 -0.191 0.822 1.217 0.822
V8 Access to Critical 
resources
.013
b 0.097 0.923 0.015 0.941 1.063 0.941
V9 Mentor Depth .059
b 0.379 0.707 0.059 0.719 1.391 0.719
V10 Long Engagement .139
b 0.975 0.335 0.151 0.831 1.204 0.831
1 All Tolerance 




a. Dependent Variable: DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), V1 Mkt Performance
Multicollinearity Test for Financial Success/No Success






B Std. Error Beta Tolerance1 VIF
(Constant) -0.568 0.481 -1.183 0.245
V1 Mkt Performance -0.108 0.127 -0.215 -0.851 0.401 0.260 3.849
V2 Demand Orientation 0.278 0.097 0.651 2.863 0.007 0.321 3.116
V3 Market Scope 0.015 0.087 0.034 0.171 0.865 0.414 2.415
V4 Internationalisaton 0.103 0.074 0.247 1.387 0.175 0.522 1.916
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) -0.145 0.085 -0.244 -1.707 0.097 0.814 1.229
V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator -0.018 0.044 -0.084 -0.413 0.683 0.405 2.469
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.068 0.061 0.163 1.121 0.270 0.783 1.276
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.082 0.065 -0.226 -1.250 0.220 0.507 1.971
V9 Mentor Depth -0.012 0.051 -0.044 -0.242 0.810 0.502 1.992
V10 Long Engagement 0.016 0.109 0.026 0.143 0.887 0.520 1.924
1 All Tolerance 














However, as the primary research was focused on Accelerators and Venture Builders, data 
sets of four respondent that were incubated by university incubators were dropped. Of the 
forty-four remaining selected respondents, twenty-four experienced an Accelerator program 
and twenty respondents experienced a Venture Building program.. Refer to Figure 5-4 
below. 
                       
        Figure 5-4.  Breakdown of Twenty-Nine Selected Incubators Respondents 
There was good diversity as these start-ups were from around the world such as US, Canada, 
India, Turkey, France, Portugal, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and Australia. In terms of their 
establishment date and using the July 1st 2019 cut-off date, they ranged from new ones that 





(5) Chi-square Test of Association 
Three Chi-square tests of association were conducted to assess if there were any associations 
between: 
a) start-ups that were accelerated or venture-built and being assessed as financially 
successful or not successful;           
b) start-ups that were accelerated or venture-built and being assessed as psychologically 
satisfied or not satisfied; and 
c) start-ups that were assessed as financially successful or not successful and assessed as 
psychologically satisfied or not satisfied.         
2a) Accelerators/Venture Built Start-ups and Financial Success Association  
                     
        Figure 5-5. Financial Success of Accelerated and VB Start-ups 
Referring to Figure 5-5 above, of the twenty-four accelerated start-ups, seventeen were 
assessed as financially successful and seven as not successful; while seventeen venture-built 




A cross-tabulation analysis and chi-square test were performed and there was no statistical 
significance in the association as indicated by the Pearson Chi-Square statistic of p=0.45 (at 
p<=0.05) (refer to Table 5-11 below). Hence we reject the hypothesis of  H1aa at p=0.05. 
Table 5-11   Chi Square Test of Association of VB/Accelerator with Financial Success 
                    
                    
2b) Accelerators/Venture Built Start-ups and Psychological Satisfaction Association  
                    




Count 7 17 24
Expected Count 8.2 15.8 24.0
Residual -1.2 1.2
Count 8 12 20
Expected Count 6.8 13.2 20.0
Residual 1.2 -1.2
Count 15 29 44
Expected Count 15.0 29.0 44.0
Incubated by Accelerator/Venture Builder * DV1 Financial Success Crosstabulation















b 0.190 1 0.663
Likelihood Ratio 0.569 1 0.451




N of Valid Cases 44
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.82.





Referring to Figure 5-6 above, of the twenty-four accelerated start-ups, fourteen were 
assessed as psychologically satisfied and seven as not satisfied; while eight venture-built 
start-ups were assessed as psychologically satisfied and twelve were considered as not 
satisfied.  
A cross-tabulation analysis and chi-square test were performed and there was no statistical 
significance in the association as indicated by the Pearson Chi-Square statistic of p=0.226 
(at p<=0.05) (refer to Table 5-12 below). Hence we reject the hypothesis of  H1Ab at p=0.05. 
Table 5-12  Chi Square Test of Association of VB/Accelerator with Psychological 
Satisfaction  
                   
                   
In conclusion, Proposition 1A is not supported, that is, we are unable to ascertain that venture 
building is more effective than accelerators in developing financially successful and 




Expected Count 12.0 12.0 24.0
Residual -2.0 2.0
Count 12 8 20
Expected Count 10.0 10.0 20.0
Residual
2.0 -2.0
Count 22 22 44
Expected Count 22.0 22.0 44.0
Total
Incubated By Accelerator/Venture Builder * DV2 Psychological Achievement 


















Likelihood Ratio 1.475 1 0.225
Fisher's Exact Test 0.364 0.182
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.433 1 0.231
N of Valid Cases 44
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.00.





(6) Box Plots and Independent Samples T-test  
 3a) Box Plot and T-test for Accelerators and VBs’ Start-ups             
The box plot of the ten predictor means of the two groups of start-ups that were accelerated 
and venture built are shown in Figure 5-8.  Note that the high ownership of start-ups’ equity 
and depth of mentorship are clearly observed with venture-built start-ups. With accelerated 
start-ups, internationalisation and mentor depth were observed. A T-table test provided more 
clarity of the predictor variables.     
              
Figure 5-8.  Box Plot of the Ten Predictor Variables of the Two Entity Groups 
The T-test results were to look for any statistically significant differences in the means of 
the two groups is shown below. The T-test was selected as only two groups were compared. 
Note that the T-test must also observe the homogeneity of variances (which is indicated by 
the Levene’s statistic). The table showed that only four predictor variables were statistically 
significant namely V1(Market Performance), V2(Demand Orientation), V6(Equity Size) and 




statistics (p=0.025) showed non-homogeneity of variances, the two-tail significance is read 
from the “Equal variances not assumed” column showing p= 0.056 which is statistically not 
significant. The intention of Study Two is not to differentiate the start-ups that were 
accelerated, or venture built, hence the analysis was kept brief.  
Given that the purpose of Study Two is to determine which predictor variables were 
significant for the successful start-ups, more attention was focused on the Financial 
Success/No success and Psychologically Satisfied/Not satisfied analyses which will be 
discussed in the next section.   
Table 5-14  Independent Samples T-test Results (ACs vs VBs) 
 
Lower Upper
Equal variances assumed 0.051 0.823 2.619 42 0.012 0.7483 0.2857 0.1717 1.3250
Equal variances not assumed 2.659 41.977 0.011 0.7483 0.2815 0.1803 1.3163
Equal variances assumed 1.613 0.211 2.334 42 0.024 0.79792 0.34181 0.10811 1.48772
Equal variances not assumed 2.410 40.879 0.021 0.79792 0.33108 0.12923 1.46660
Equal variances assumed 0.006 0.940 1.927 42 0.061 0.6625 0.3438 -0.0312 1.3562
Equal variances not assumed 1.960 41.999 0.057 0.6625 0.3380 -0.0197 1.3447
Equal variances assumed 1.483 0.230 0.191 42 0.850 0.0708 0.3714 -0.6786 0.8203
Equal variances not assumed 0.192 41.636 0.848 0.0708 0.3682 -0.6724 0.8140
Equal variances assumed 6.020 0.018 1.274 42 0.210 0.325 0.255 -0.190 0.840
Equal variances not assumed 1.301 41.917 0.200 0.325 0.250 -0.179 0.829
Equal variances assumed 2.167 0.148 -10.375 42 0.000 -3.925 0.378 -4.688 -3.162
Equal variances not assumed -9.897 29.007 0.000 -3.925 0.397 -4.736 -3.114
Equal variances assumed 0.097 0.757 0.000 42 1.000 0.0000 0.3708 -0.7483 0.7483
Equal variances not assumed 0.000 37.946 1.000 0.0000 0.3758 -0.7607 0.7607
Equal variances assumed 0.228 0.635 -3.309 42 0.002 -1.267 0.383 -2.039 -0.494
Equal variances not assumed -3.372 41.987 0.002 -1.267 0.376 -2.025 -0.509
Equal variances assumed 0.103 0.750 1.443 42 0.156 0.775 0.537 -0.309 1.859
Equal variances not assumed 1.425 38.165 0.162 0.775 0.544 -0.326 1.876
Equal variances assumed 5.427 0.025 -2.052 42 0.046 -0.4952 0.2413 -0.9823 -0.0082
Equal variances not assumed -1.985 32.702 0.056 -0.4952 0.2495 -1.0031 0.0126
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
















V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator




                   Table 5-15   ANOVA Test (ACs vs VBs) & Means Comparisons 
                    
                    
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error of Mean
Accelerator 24 5.31 1.0095 0.2061
Venture Builder 20 4.56 0.8574 0.1917
Accelerator 24 5.14 1.28744 0.26280
Venture Builder 20 4.34 0.90057 0.20137
Accelerator 24 5.19 1.2231 0.2497
Venture Builder 20 4.53 1.0192 0.2279
Accelerator 24 5.27 1.2767 0.2606
Venture Builder 20 5.20 1.1630 0.2601
Accelerator 24 1.63 0.924 0.189
Venture Builder 20 1.30 0.733 0.164
Accelerator 24 2.13 0.900 0.184
Venture Builder 20 6.05 1.572 0.352
Accelerator 24 4.50 1.1421 0.2331
Venture Builder 20 4.50 1.3179 0.2947
Accelerator 24 3.83 1.373 0.280
Venture Builder 20 5.10 1.119 0.250
Accelerator 24 5.63 1.663 0.340
Venture Builder 20 4.85 1.899 0.425
Accelerator 24 4.26 0.6494 0.1326





V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator
V7 Team Formation by Incubator
V8 Access to Critical resources









3b) Box Plot and T-test for Financially Successful and Not Successful Start-ups        
The box plot of the ten predictor means of the two groups of start-ups that were classified as 
financially successful and not successful are shown in the diagram below. The standout 
predictor variables were V1 (Market Performance), V2 (Demand Orientation), V3 (Market 
Scope), V4 (Internationalisation) and V9 (Mentor Depth). A T-test provided more clarity of 
the predictor variables that were statistically significant.     
 
Figure 5-8.  Box Plot of the Ten Predictor Variables of Financially Successful and Non-
Successful Groups 
 
The independent samples T-test (Table 5-16) was conducted, and four predictor variables 
were identified as statistically significant. They are V1 (Market Performance), V2 (Demand 
Orientation), V3 (Market Scope), V4 (Internationalisation) and V10 (Long Engagement).  
Hence the following hypotheses relating to financial success outcomes are accepted at  





V9 (Mentor Depth) did not meet Levene’s homogeneity of variance test and taking the 
significance in the “Equal variances not assumed” column, it was not significant as p= 0.065 
(p<=0.05).  
Hence H2a9 is rejected at p=0.05 
A mistake in coding the question for testing  H2a5 (Customer Segment B2B) was noted after 
the responses were received. The question was erroneously coded as a categorical measure 
(B2B; B2C and both B2B & B2C). With this coding scale, it was not possible to measure 
the agreement needed to test the hypothesis. Given the time constraint and the need to launch 
the online survey in a timely fashion, it was not possible to re test this hypothesis. This has 
been identified as a weakness in this study.  
Table 5-16  Independent Samples T-test Result (Fin Successful vs Non-Successful)) 
                        
It is interesting to note that when one examines the rating of the means by the successful 
start-ups (see Table 5-17 Comparisons of Means of Financially Successful and Non-
Lower Upper
Equal variances assumed 0.073 0.788 -4.117 42 0.000 -1.1251 0.2732 -1.6765 -0.5736
Equal variances not assumed -4.029 26.802 0.000 -1.1251 0.2792 -1.6982 -0.5519
Equal variances assumed 0.152 0.699 -3.999 42 0.000 -1.29885 0.32478 -1.95428 -0.64342
Equal variances not assumed -3.935 27.199 0.001 -1.29885 0.33008 -1.97589 -0.62181
Equal variances assumed 1.073 0.306 -2.536 42 0.015 -0.8897 0.3508 -1.5977 -0.1817
Equal variances not assumed -2.264 21.261 0.034 -0.8897 0.3929 -1.7061 -0.0732
Equal variances assumed 0.180 0.674 -2.688 42 0.010 -0.9690 0.3605 -1.6965 -0.2415
Equal variances not assumed -2.581 25.482 0.016 -0.9690 0.3754 -1.7414 -0.1965
Equal variances assumed 6.382 0.015 -1.189 42 0.241 -0.320 0.269 -0.862 0.223
Equal variances not assumed -1.290 35.346 0.206 -0.320 0.248 -0.822 0.183
Equal variances assumed 1.098 0.301 1.876 42 0.068 1.352 0.721 -0.102 2.806
Equal variances not assumed 1.824 26.332 0.080 1.352 0.741 -0.171 2.874
Equal variances assumed 0.007 0.932 -0.521 42 0.605 -0.2023 0.3883 -0.9858 0.5813
Equal variances not assumed -0.538 31.020 0.595 -0.2023 0.3761 -0.9694 0.5648
Equal variances assumed 0.208 0.651 -0.936 42 0.354 -0.418 0.447 -1.320 0.483
Equal variances not assumed -0.904 25.863 0.374 -0.418 0.463 -1.370 0.533
Equal variances assumed 4.288 0.045 -2.239 42 0.031 -1.223 0.546 -2.326 -0.120
Equal variances not assumed -1.954 20.189 0.065 -1.223 0.626 -2.528 0.082
Equal variances assumed 0.784 0.381 -2.316 42 0.026 -0.5800 0.2504 -1.0853 -0.0746
Equal variances not assumed -2.113 22.368 0.046 -0.5800 0.2745 -1.1487 -0.0112
V4 Internationalisaton
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of Means













V6 Equity Size Owned by 
Incubator
V7 Team Formation by Incubator





Successful Start-ups), V9 (Mentor Depth) was ranked as the highest but the statistical testing 
at p<=0.05 indicated no statistically significant difference between the successful and non-
successful start-ups. However, if we take p<=0.1 then V9 (Mentor Depth) becomes 
significant as p=0.065. Hence H2a9 (Mentor Depth) should not be outrightly rejected as a 
predictor as it is marginally significant at p<=0.05 and definitely significant at p<=0.1. 
Hence the predictor variables that have a strong influence on financial success of the start-
ups were V1 (Market Performance), V2 (Demand Orientation), V3 (Market Scope), V4 
(Internationalisation), V10 (Long Engagement) and marginally V9 (Mentor Depth).   
         Table 5-17  Means Comparison of Fin Successful vs Non-Successful 
                 
3c) Box Plot and T-test for Psychologically Satisfied and Non-Satisfied Start-ups      
The box plot of the ten predictor means of the two groups of start-ups that were classified as 
psychologically satisfied and not satisfied are shown in the diagram below. The standout 




Scope), V4 (Internationalisation) and V6 (Equity Size). A T-table test provided more clarity 
of the predictor variables that were statistically significant.     
 
Figure 5-9.  Box Plot of the Ten Predictor Variables of Psychologically Satisfied and Non-
Satisfied Groups 
 
The independent samples T-test (See Table 5-18) was conducted, and four predictor 
variables were identified as statistically significant. They are V1 (Market Performance), V2 
(Demand Orientation), V3 (Market Scope) and V4 (Internationalisation).  
Hence the following hypotheses relating to psychological satisfaction outcomes are accepted 
at  p=0.05: 
H2b1; H2b2, H2b3 and H2b4. 
V6 (Equity Size) and V8 (Access to Critical Resources) did not meet Levene’s homogeneity 
of variance test and taking the significance in the “Equal variances not assumed” column, 
V8 (Access to Critical Resources)  is not significant as p=0.0673 (p<=0.05).  




However, V6 (Equity Size) is marginally significant at p=0.051 (p<=0.05). Hence we 
marginally accept H2b6 at p=0.1 
A mistake in coding the question for testing  H2a5 (Customer Segment B2B) was noted after 
the responses were received. The question was erroneously coded as a categorical measure 
(B2B; B2C and both B2B & B2C). With this coding scale, it was not possible to measure 
the agreement needed to test the hypothesis. Given the time constraint and the need to launch 
the online survey in a timely fashion, it was not possible to re test this hypothesis. This has 
been identified as a weakness in this study.  
Table 5-18  Independent Samples T-test Result (Psych Satisfied vs Non-Satisfied) 
      
It is interesting to note that when one examines the rating of the means by the successful 
start-ups (see Figure 5-9 Box Plot and Table 5-19 Comparisons of Means of Psychologically 
Satisfied and Non-Satisfied Start-ups), V9 (Mentor Depth) was ranked as the highest but the 
statistical testing at p<=0.05 indicated no statistically significant difference between the 






         Table 5-19  Means Comparison of  Psych Satisfied vs Non-Satisfied 
          
Hence the predictor variables that have a strong influence on psychological satisfaction of 
the start-ups are V1 (Market Performance), V2 (Demand Orientation), V3 (Market Scope), 
V4 (Internationalisation) and possibly V6 (Equity Size). 
In conclusion, the results of  Hypotheses H2a and H2b are summarily represented in figure 
5-10                        
      




(7) Binomial Logistic Regression Modelling 
As both the dependent variables, DV1 Financial Success or No Success and DV2 
Psychological Satisfaction or No Satisfaction are categorical, binomial logistic regression 
modelling technique was used to determine the independent variables that are significant and 
the parsimonious model that can predict the likely outcome. 
4a) Binomial Logistic Regression on DV1 “Financial Success”  
The Classification Table below indicates Model 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 has high prediction power 
(at 84.1% overall) for the occurrence of financial success. However, Model 5, 6 and 7 has 
better predictive power for non-success (but slightly lower predictive power for Successful 
start-ups) which is relatively more important in my view because investors and start-ups do 
want to avoid financial losses. Hence Model 5,6 and 7 are worthy models for consideration 













Table 5-20 Classification Table (Predictive Power of Fin Success & Non-Success) 
         
 
The Omnibus tests of model coefficients (see Table 5-21 below) will infer, when all the 
independent variables are considered together, whether the model is significant. The table 
indicated that all ten models are significant at the p < 0.05 level. However, the later models 
Model 2 to 10 (with less independent variables) has p <= 0.001. Hence another level of 





Not Successful 10 5 66.7
Successful 2 27 93.1
84.1
Not Successful 9 6 60.0
Successful 2 27 93.1
81.8
Not Successful 10 5 66.7
Successful 2 27 93.1
84.1
Not Successful 11 4 73.3
Successful 4 25 86.2
81.8
Not Successful 11 4 73.3
Successful 3 26 89.7
84.1
Not Successful 11 4 73.3
Successful 3 26 89.7
84.1
Not Successful 11 4 73.3
Successful 3 26 89.7
84.1
Not Successful 9 6 60.0
Successful 2 27 93.1
81.8
Not Successful 8 7 53.3
Successful 4 25 86.2
75.0
Not Successful 9 6 60.0





Step 10 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
a. The cut value is .500
Step 8 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 9 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 6 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 7 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 4 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 5 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage
Step 2 DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Overall Percentage





DV1 Fin Success Final Rating
Percentage Correct





                      Table 5-21     Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
                        
The next level of analysis (see Model Summary table and Variables in the Equation table 
below) examined the Nagelkerke R Square statistic equivalent of R-Square in multiple 
regression). It showed how much variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
model. A Nagelkerke R score that is above 0.5 is a strong predictor. Model 1 has the highest 
explanatory model where the Nagelkerke score=0.644 but is not a parsimonious model (with 
ten variables). However, if one considers the highest prediction power (Classification table) 
at 84.1% (where prediction of Success =89.7% and Non Success=73.3%);  the highest 
number of variables that were significant at the p<= 0.05 level (V1 and 2) and top five mean 
rating by the successful start-ups (V9,4,1,2,3), then Model Five (V 1,2,3,6,7,10) is the model 
of choice that satisfied the stated criteria.  
                       
 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 27.539 11 0.004
Block 27.539 11 0.004
Model 27.539 11 0.004
Step -0.107 2 0.948
Block 27.432 9 0.001
Model 27.432 9 0.001
Step -0.390 1 0.532
Block 27.041 8 0.001
Model 27.041 8 0.001
Step -2.350 1 0.125
Block 24.691 7 0.001
Model 24.691 7 0.001
Step -2.112 1 0.146
Block 22.578 6 0.001
Model 22.578 6 0.001
Step -1.460 1 0.227
Block 21.119 5 0.001
Model 21.119 5 0.001
Step -1.229 1 0.268
Block 19.890 4 0.001
Model 19.890 4 0.001
Step -1.102 1 0.294
Block 18.788 3 0.000
Model 18.788 3 0.000
Step -1.458 1 0.227
Block 17.330 2 0.000
Model 17.330 2 0.000
Step -2.592 1 0.107
Block 14.737 1 0.000










































         Table 5-23     Variables in the Equation 
          
From the above Table 5-23 (Variables in the Equation), the parsimonious Model 5 selected 
has the following logistic equation incorporating six independent variables: 
log(p/1-p) = –8.928 + 1.538*V1(Mkt Performance) + 1.172*V2(Demand Orientation)  
                    - 0.888*V3(Market Scope) - 0.291*V6(Equity Size)  
                    - 0.559*V7(Team Formation) + 1.099*V10 (Long Engagement)  




4b) Binomial Logistic Regression DV2 “Psychological Satisfaction”  
The Classification Table below indicates Model 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 has high prediction power 
(at 81.8% overall) for the occurrence of psychological satisfaction. However, Model 6 has 
higher predictive power for psychologically satisfied start-ups at 86.4% predictability but 
lower predictability for non-satisfied start-ups at 77.3% versus 81.8% and 81.8% 
respectively in the other five models.  
Table 5-24 Classification Table (Predictive Power of Psych Satisfied and Not Satisfied) 




The Omnibus tests of model coefficients (see table below) will infer, when all the 
independent variables are considered together, whether the model was significant. The table 
indicates that all ten models are significant at the p < 0.05 level. However, the later models 
Model 6 to 10 (with less independent variables) has p < 0.001. Hence another level of 
analysis was performed.  
    Table 5-25     Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
                          
The next level of analysis (see Model Summary table and Variables in the Equation table 
below) examined the Nagelkerke R Square statistic equivalent of R-Square in multiple 
regression). It showed how much variation in the dependent variable was explained by the 
model. A Nagelkerke R score that is above 0.5 is a strong predictor. Model 1 parsimonious 
Chi-
square df Sig.
Step 26.865 11 0.005
Block 26.865 11 0.005
Model 26.865 11 0.005
Step -0.023 1 0.881
Block 26.843 10 0.003
Model 26.843 10 0.003
Step -0.061 1 0.805
Block 26.782 9 0.002
Model 26.782 9 0.002
Step -0.328 1 0.567
Block 26.454 8 0.001
Model 26.454 8 0.001
Step -0.600 1 0.439
Block 25.854 7 0.001
Model 25.854 7 0.001
Step -0.800 1 0.371
Block 25.054 6 0.000
Model 25.054 6 0.000
Step -1.518 1 0.218
Block 23.536 5 0.000
Model 23.536 5 0.000
Step -2.642 2 0.267
Block 20.894 3 0.000
Model 20.894 3 0.000
Step -2.343 1 0.126
Block 18.550 2 0.000
Model 18.550 2 0.000
Step -1.118 1 0.290
Block 17.432 1 0.000









a. A negative Chi-squares value indicates that the Chi-
















explanatory model where the Nagelkerke score=0.609 but is not a parsimonious model (with 
ten variables). However, if one considers the highest prediction power (Classification table) 
at 81.8% (where prediction of Psych Satisfaction =81.8% and Non Satisfaction=81.8%);  the 
highest number of variables that are significant at the p<= 0.05 level (V2) and top five mean 
rating by the successful start-ups (V9,4,2,1,3), then Model Five (V 1,2,4,5,7,8) is the model 
of choice that satisfied the stated criteria.  
Table 5-26     Model Summary and Ranking of Predictive Variables 










              Table 5-27     Variables in the Equation 
               
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
V1 Mkt Performance -1.280 1.131 1.282 1 0.258 0.278
V2 Demand Orientation 1.959 0.766 6.548 1 0.011 7.096
V3 Market Scope 0.343 0.672 0.261 1 0.609 1.410
V4 Internationalisaton 1.198 0.678 3.125 1 0.077 3.313
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 3.006 2 0.222
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.865 1.653 3.006 1 0.083 17.549
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 21.590 40192.970 0.000 1 1.000 2377972534.801
V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator -0.249 0.324 0.590 1 0.442 0.780
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.652 0.459 2.022 1 0.155 1.920
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.664 0.453 2.146 1 0.143 0.515
V9 Mentor Depth -0.095 0.330 0.082 1 0.775 0.910
V10 Long Engagement 0.109 0.725 0.023 1 0.881 1.115
Constant -12.447 5.174 5.787 1 0.016 0.000
V1 Mkt Performance -1.278 1.138 1.261 1 0.261 0.279
V2 Demand Orientation 1.960 0.766 6.544 1 0.011 7.098
V3 Market Scope 0.368 0.657 0.313 1 0.576 1.444
V4 Internationalisaton 1.220 0.666 3.349 1 0.067 3.386
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.987 2 0.225
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.835 1.641 2.987 1 0.084 17.034
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 21.619 40192.970 0.000 1 1.000 2450295654.242
V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator -0.229 0.297 0.599 1 0.439 0.795
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.649 0.456 2.022 1 0.155 1.913
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.675 0.445 2.302 1 0.129 0.509
V9 Mentor Depth -0.074 0.299 0.061 1 0.805 0.929
Constant -12.285 5.050 5.918 1 0.015 0.000
V1 Mkt Performance -1.338 1.110 1.451 1 0.228 0.262
V2 Demand Orientation 1.971 0.769 6.565 1 0.010 7.180
V3 Market Scope 0.371 0.650 0.325 1 0.569 1.449
V4 Internationalisaton 1.200 0.663 3.280 1 0.070 3.320
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.977 2 0.226
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.752 1.595 2.977 1 0.084 15.680
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 21.480 40192.969 0.000 1 1.000 2131994006.977
V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator -0.226 0.294 0.593 1 0.441 0.797
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.630 0.445 2.003 1 0.157 1.878
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.689 0.442 2.427 1 0.119 0.502
Constant -12.138 4.930 6.061 1 0.014 0.000
V1 Mkt Performance -1.044 0.929 1.262 1 0.261 0.352
V2 Demand Orientation 2.020 0.742 7.418 1 0.006 7.540
V4 Internationalisaton 1.108 0.626 3.133 1 0.077 3.028
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.950 2 0.229
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.584 1.505 2.950 1 0.086 13.248
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 21.024 40192.969 0.000 1 1.000 1351335566.511
V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator -0.218 0.288 0.575 1 0.448 0.804
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.583 0.438 1.771 1 0.183 1.792
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.607 0.411 2.186 1 0.139 0.545
Constant -11.528 4.723 5.958 1 0.015 0.000
V1 Mkt Performance -0.625 0.718 0.758 1 0.384 0.535
V2 Demand Orientation 1.906 0.696 7.509 1 0.006 6.726
V4 Internationalisaton 0.950 0.566 2.820 1 0.093 2.586
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.674 2 0.263
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.342 1.432 2.674 1 0.102 10.407
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 20.903 40192.969 0.000 1 1.000 1197370169.171
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.596 0.440 1.831 1 0.176 1.814
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.712 0.379 3.522 1 0.061 0.491
Constant -12.494 4.766 6.873 1 0.009 0.000
V2 Demand Orientation 1.599 0.575 7.730 1 0.005 4.949
V4 Internationalisaton 0.794 0.526 2.280 1 0.131 2.212
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.483 2 0.289
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 2.195 1.393 2.483 1 0.115 8.977
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 20.375 40192.969 0.000 1 1.000 706098284
V7 Team Formation by Incubator 0.471 0.404 1.356 1 0.244 1.602
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.678 0.374 3.286 1 0.070 0.508
Constant -12.783 4.800 7.094 1 0.008 0.000
V2 Demand Orientation 1.516 0.536 7.992 1 0.005 4.553
V4 Internationalisaton 0.828 0.512 2.614 1 0.106 2.288
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical) 2.043 2 0.360
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(1) 1.793 1.254 2.043 1 0.153 6.008
V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical)(2) 20.394 40192.969 0.000 1 1.000 719527572.276
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.594 0.349 2.888 1 0.089 0.552
Constant -10.394 3.930 6.994 1 0.008 0.000
V2 Demand Orientation 1.381 0.508 7.383 1 0.007 3.979
V4 Internationalisaton 0.647 0.442 2.145 1 0.143 1.910
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.523 0.334 2.444 1 0.118 0.593
Constant -7.620 2.946 6.693 1 0.010 0.000
V2 Demand Orientation 1.535 0.485 9.999 1 0.002 4.641
V8 Access to Critical resources -0.294 0.286 1.061 1 0.303 0.745
Constant -6.017 2.475 5.912 1 0.015 0.002
V2 Demand Orientation 1.489 0.480 9.628 1 0.002 4.435











a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: V1 Mkt Performance, V2 Demand Orientation, V3 Market Scope, V4 
Internationalisaton, V5CustSegmB2B (Categorical), V6 Equity Size Owned by Incubator, V7 Team 
Formation by Incubator, V8 Access to Critical resources, V9 Mentor Depth, V10 Long Engagement.














From the above table (Variables in the Equation), the selected parsimonious Model 5 has the 
following logistic equation incorporating five independent variables: 
log(p/1-p) = –12.494 - 0.625*V1(Mkt Performance) + 1.906*V2(Demand Orientation)  
                    + 0.95*V4(Internationalisation) + 0.596*V7(Team Formation)   
                    - 0.712*V8(Access to Critical Resources)  
where p is the probability of being a psychologically satisfied start-up. 
Note: Although V5 (Customer Segment B2B) formed part of Model 5, it was not included 
in the equation due to the categorical nature of the question and the non-statistical 
significance of p=1 & 0.102. On hindsight this variable should have been captured by 
rephrasing the question from one where the respondent had to select one of the three choices 
of B2B, B2C and Both B2B & B2C to one where the respondent rate on the seven-point 
Likert scale on percentage (by band) of business focused on B2B. This will be discussed as 
one of the limitations of this research.  
Discussion 
Predictors of Financially Successful Start-ups (T-test) and Prediction Model (Binomial 
Logistic Regression) 
The T-tests showed that at p=0.05, the following predictor variables are significant: V1 
(p=0.000), V2 (p=0.000), V3 (p=0.015), V4 (p=0.01), V10 (p=0.026) are statistically 
significant predictor variables for financially successful start-ups. Note that V9 (p=0.065) is 
marginally significant if we adopt the p=0.1 significance level. 
Hence the null hypotheses of H2a1 (Market Performance); H2a2 (Demand Orientation); 
H2a3 (Market Scope); H2a4 (Internationalisation) and H2a10 (Long Engagement) are 




impact on the financial success of start-ups. Note that V9 (Mentor Depth) is a possible 
predictor if we take p=0.1. 
If we are to model the prediction of financial success, the logistic model with the highest 
prediction outcome is: 
log(p/1-p) = –8.928 + 1.538*V1(Mkt Performance) + 1.172*V2(Demand Orientation)  
                    - 0.888*V3(Market Scope) - 0.291*V6(Equity Size)  
                    - 0.559*V7(Team Formation) + 1.099*V10 (Long Engagement)  
where p is the probability of being a financially successful start-up 
Predictors of Psychologically Satisfied Start-ups (T-test) and Prediction Model 
(Binomial Logistic Regression) 
The T-tests showed that at p=0.05, the following predictor variables are significant: V1 
(p=0.004), V2 (p=0.000), V3 (p=0.013), V4 (p=0.02) are statistically significant predictor 
variables for financially successful start-ups. Note that V6 (p=0.051) and V8 (p=0.673) were 
marginally significant if we adopt the p=0.1 significance level. 
Hence the null hypotheses of H2b1 (Market Performance), H2b2 (Demand Orientation), 
H2b3 (Market Scope) and H2b4 (Internationalisation) are rejected at p=0.05, that is the 
alternate hypotheses that these predictor variables do have an impact on the psychological 
satisfaction of start-ups. Note that V6 (Equity Size) and V8(Access to critical resources) are 







If we are to model the prediction of psychological satisfaction, the logistic model with the 
highest prediction outcome is: 
log(p/1-p) = –12.494 - 0.625*V1(Mkt Performance) + 1.906*V2(Demand Orientation)  
                    + 0.95*V4(Internationalisation) + 0.596*V7(Team Formation)   
                    - 0.712*V8(Access to Critical Resources)  
where p is the probability of being a psychologically satisfied start-up. 
 
It is interesting to note that for both psychological satisfied start-ups and financially 
successful start-ups, the common statistically significant predictors for both groups are V 1, 
V2, V3 and V4. Hence incubators should pay close attention to these four predictor practices 
if they want to achieve success holistically. 
Now it remains to ascertain which of these practices which the successful start-ups are 
deemed significant matches the practices stated by the Accelerators and Venture Builders in 








Chapter 6  Discussion and Conclusion  
6.1 Discussion 
Given that the research has three sets of findings from Study 1, Study 1a and Study 2, this 
chapter will bring together the key findings from the three sets of research results. The end 
objective was to produce a coherent set of integrated findings or insights that will form the 
key thesis of this research. A summary of the key findings of each of the three studies were 
presented followed by an integrated triangulated discussion. 
Key Insights of Study 1 (Face to face Interviews of eight incubation practitioners 
representing of four venture builders and four accelerators) 
Study 1 which was made up of eight one-hour face-to-face interviews with experienced 
incubating practitioners (four accelerators and four venture builders) yielded three main 
insights: 
Insight #1: Hybrid Forms of Incubation 
There is an evolving trend of accelerators adopting more venture building practices resulting 
in a transitional hybrid form of incubation practices. This adds to the confusion when labels 
such as venture builders, start-up studios, corporate accelerators are extensively used in the 
industry. This supported the earlier hypothesis that there is confusion among stakeholders in 
the start-up ecosystem and justify the basis of this research. 
Insight #2: Ten Key Focal Incubation Practices 
The interviews elicited ten thematic incubating practices which both accelerators and venture 
builders claim they focus on in varying degrees. These ten practices (see table below) can be 
broadly classified into three major categories of market-orientation practices; resources 




fundamental practices such as the provision of basic facilities and basic education programs. 
Study 1a and Study 2 leveraged on the ten identified specific practices as the fundamental 
predictor variables for success outcomes.  
Insight #3: Success is not only Financial but Psychological too !  
Success is traditionally and narrowly defined in the industry as financial success. However, 
the practitioners mentioned that psychological satisfaction of start-ups must not be ignored. 
The rationale being that most start-ups fail in the initial ventures and may take a few failures 
before financial success is achieved. Hence unless there is some form of psychological 
satisfaction achieved, most start-ups will just abandon future ventures. Given this insight, 
two dependent variables were formulated, that is financial success outcome and 
psychological satisfaction outcome.    
Key Insights of Study 1a (Qualtrics Semi-Structured Online Survey of twenty-nine 
incubation practitioners comprising key management of thirteen accelerators, eleven 
venture builders and five university-linked incubators) 
Study 1a, which was initiated shortly after the main Study 2 commenced, was an attempt to 
measure the actual practices of venture builders and accelerators based on the ten focus 
practices mentioned by the incubation practitioners. The online outreach was global in nature 
as the final shortlist of twenty-nine respondents were from several diverse countries 
including the US, Canada, the UK, Hungary, Singapore, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, 






Insight #4: Three Distinct Practices of Venture Builders are Team Formation, Mentor 
Depth and High Equity Share   
Six of the ten incubating practices were highly rated and concurred by the practitioners as 
focal incubating practices of both venture builders and accelerators. They are in descending 
order of ranking: V7 (Team Formation), 9 (Mentor Depth), 6 (High Equity Share), 2 
(Demand Orientation), 10 (Incubation Time) and 4 (Internationalisation).  
            Table 6-2  Ranking of Means of Various Entity Groups  
        
Of the six highly agreed practices, the following three practices, V7 (Team Formation), 9 
(Mentor Depth), 6 (High Equity Share) were highly agreed by both Accelerators and Venture 
Builders as primary practices of Venture Builders. However, the ANOVA analysis indicate 
that of these highly agreed VB practice focus variables, three of them have statistically 
significant differences (V2,10 and 4). This would mean that there are differences in opinions 




Practice V7 (Team Formation), 9 (Mentor Depth), 6 (High Equity Share) certainly have 
high unanimous agreement that they are core Venture Building practices. 
Key Insights s of Study 2 [Online Qualtrics Semi Structured Survey of forty-four start-
ups or new ventures who have been incubated by accelerators (twenty-four start-ups’ 
co-founders) and venture builders (twenty start-ups’ co-founders)] 
Study 2 was the main focal research targeting at start-ups who have been accelerated or 
incubated. In all there were fifty-five respondents from locations around the world including 
Japan, Singapore, Canada, Turkey, Portugal, India and the US. However only forty-four 
start-ups who were or being accelerated or venture-built were selected as the rest of the data 
sets were incomplete. 
Insight #5:  
There is no statistical significance that Venture Building compared to Acceleration 
Result in Financially Successful Start-ups or Psychologically Satisfied Start-ups, this 
could be due the problem of self-classification by start-ups because of the non-standard 
practices of Venture Builders and Accelerators.  
The study set out to test two hypotheses namely: 
H1Aa: Start-ups that have been incubated through a venture building program will have a 
higher likelihood of achieving financial success than start-ups that have been through an 
accelerator program.  
H1Ab: : Start-ups that have been incubated through a venture building program will have a 
higher likelihood of achieving psychological satisfaction than start-ups that have been 





satisfaction for their incubatees compared to the Accelerator incubation model. 
In testing for Hypothesis H1Aa to ascertain if there was a positive relationship between a 
venture builder (as compared to an accelerator) and financial success, the chi-square test of 
homogeneity where p=0.45 (p=0.05) showed there was no significant difference between the 
accelerator and venture builder in helping new ventures achieve financial success. Hence, 
we cannot accept the alternate hypothesis of venture builders (compared to accelerators) as 
having better ability to achieve financial success for their start-ups.   
Similarly, Hypothesis H1Ab was shown to be rejected too as p=0.226 (p=0.05).  Hence, we 
cannot accept the alternate hypothesis of venture builders (compared to accelerators) as 
having better ability to help start-ups achieve psychological satisfaction for their start-ups.   
Given that the two tests were conducted with the start-ups self-classifying themselves as 
either being accelerated or venture-built (which is a problematic definition as evidenced in 
Study 1 and Study 1a), the study will provide richer insight once we test the exact practices 
that these start-ups actually experience.  
Insight #6: To groom financially success start-ups, incubators should pay focus on the 
five key practices of market performance, demand orientation, market scope, 
internationalisation and long-term engagement. 
We set out to test the ten hypotheses of the predictor practices that were formulated in Study 
1 for the two sets of success perspectives as dependent variables (financial success and 




            
Figure 6-1. Hypotheses 2a and 2b Formulation  
To achieve financial success, incubators will do well to pay close attention to executing the 
following five practices, H2a1 (Market Performance); H2a2 (Demand Orientation); H2a3 
(Market Scope); H2a4 (Internationalisation) and H2a10 (Long Engagement). 
Insight #7: To groom psychologically satisfied start-ups, incubators should pay focus 
on the four key practices of market performance, demand orientation, market scope, 
and internationalisation and potentially the equity size held by the incubator. 
Four of these practices for psychologically satisfied start-ups were the same as that of 
practices that led to financially successful start-ups.  
Triangulated Overarching Key Insights 
Insight #8: Evidence-based approach to audit incubation practices is key to success  
The table below shows the practices that incubators agree as VB practice focus (from Study 
1a) and the significant practices that makes a difference to successful start-ups (Study 2). 




the actual practices that indeed make a key difference to the success of the start-ups they 
incubate. The high frequency of matched color codes indicates that the incubators are 
meeting the needs of the start-ups. There is room for improvement to not ignore Practice 3 
(Market Scope).  
               Table 6-2  Ranking of Means of Various Entity Groups  
 
6.2 Conclusion 
This exploratory study has significantly contributed to the limited empirical studies of  the 
effective practices of the two prevailing incubation models of Venture Builders and 
Accelerators. 
The significance of the contributions was primarily in proving clarity to the characteristics of 
the two models and the identification of the ten incubation practices that are applied in the 
entrepreneurial and innovation industry. In addition, success outcomes should not be narrowly 
defined as financial but to expand to more holistic measures such as psychological fulfilment 
as this study attempted to explore. 
Finally, as this quantitative and qualitative study was an attempt to shed light on the contribution 
of accelerators and venture builders in effectively incubating new ventures, it should pave the 
way to new future research directions. 
     Highest to Lowest Ranking of Practices they Agree
Study1A What Acc/VBs/Inc Agree (Ranking of VB Practices)
Above 5 rating 7 9 6 2 10 4 1
Study 2
Key Practices for Finacially Successful Startups 
Above 5 rating
1 2 3 4 10
Study 2
Key Practices for Psych Satisfied Startups Experienced
Above 5 rating




In the next two final sections, I outlined the limitations of this study and suggest future research 
directions. 
6.3  Limitations of the Study 
This chapter identified, and discussed the weaknesses and limitations of the research, the 
mitigating measures adopted and offered some suggestions for future research. 
First, the data sample was limited for all three studies, eight respondents for Study 1, twenty- 
nine data sets for Study 1a and forty-four data sets for Study 2. Ideally if the sample size 
could be enlarged especially for Study 1a and Study 2 the results could have been more 
robust. In similar studies of start-ups comparable to Study 2, sample size of more than one 
hundred were noted ((Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012). However, the sample size used 
in the three studies are considered acceptable given the exploratory nature of this research 
and the limited time frame allotted. 
Second, there is the file drawer phenomenon where failed ventures were not willing to 
participate in the study. Hence this study had an unusually high number of successful 
startups. More unsuccessful cases would have increased the robustness of the research. This 
survivorship bias was anticipated as the researcher contacted several “failed” start-up 
founders who declined to take part in the survey. This could be partially overcome if more 
time was allotted to the study so that the researcher could persuade failed ventures to re 
consider and take part. 
Third, the selection of successful and successful start-ups was an issue given that the cut-off 
date of July 1st 2019 was arbitrarily chosen to coincide with the beginning of the analysis 
stage due to the allotted time schedule of the research. Start-ups may take four to five years 
of development before one can decide on whether they are successful or not. The sample had 




outcome. While this weakness is acknowledged, a mitigation control in the form of inviting 
an expert to provide some form of inter-coding objectivity was implemented. Relating to the 
short time frame to assess the success outcomes of the start-ups, perhaps future longitudinal 
studies can be considered to overcome this limitation.     
Fourth, the psychological satisfaction aspect of the dependent outcome measure was not 
considered earlier in the research but was incorporated mid-way in the due to the informative 
feedback of incubation practitioners arising from Study 1. Psychology is a specialised field 
of research that demands more in-depth preparation and study. Hence this study 
acknowledged that a deeper analysis of psychological research in the measurement of start-
ups’ satisfaction would add more rigour to the results. Despite recognising this as a 
limitation, I decided to proceed upon consultation with the supervisor on the basis that this 
exploratory discovery could spark further research interest and open an avenue of knowledge 
that would benefit the industry and academia.  
Fifth, there was the element of self-reporting bias as the researcher has worked in the venture 
building industry for several years with some exposure to acceleration work. To overcome 
this weakness, several mitigating steps were undertaken such as conducting an extensive 
literature review from both the research community and incubator practitioners. 
Furthermore, the validation findings of Study 1 and Study1a, to a large extent mitigated any 
bias or blind spots that the researcher may have inadvertently brought to bear in this research.  
Sixth, the common method bias ss acknowledged in Study 1 involving face to face 
interviews. This was to some extent mitigated using the more objective semi-structured 
online surveys of Study 1a and Study 2. 
Finally, while the extensive use of the seven-point Likert scale had been consistently applied 




independent predictor measures, V5 (Customer Segment), the use of a categorical measure 
(B2B, B2C and both B2B & B2C) was a mistake and made the interpretation of the results 
problematic. On hindsight, the question should have been rephrased to fit into a seven-point 
Likert scale similar to the rest of  the questions.       
Given the above limitations and weaknesses, the findings of this exploratory research must 
be treated with care in the context of the scope, the research objectives, the limited sample 
size, the drawer cabinet effect, the time-constraint of the study, the static cut-off date of the 
outcome determination and interpretation of the findings especially the psychological 
perspective. 
Nevertheless, the high number of mitigating measures employed and the use of three related 
studies to triangulate the findings do validate the strength of this research which are highly 





6.4 Future Research Directions 
Incubation models have evolved over time and that evolution has sped up in the recent years 
driven mainly from the keen interest of governments and the private sector in the pursuit of 
economic growth thought innovation. 
This is an exciting century of the fourth industrial revolution where significant human 
endeavours and financial resources are devoted in this quest for growth through venture 
building.  
The exploratory findings of this research have pointed to several areas where we do not know 
sufficiently and merits further investigation.    
First, as the innovation ecosystem is quite complex involving many diverse stakeholders, 
future research should consider, using this research as a start point, the incorporation of 
moderating factors such as the age of the start-ups, the industry sector, the support provided 
by regulatory frameworks, the size of  innovation grants does have moderating effects on the 
predicted outcomes. 
Second, longitudinal studies which track the evolution of start-ups over a longer period will 
add robustness to our understanding of the time effect of the predictor variables. Given that 
most start-ups do not survive more than the three to five-year period, studies of this 
timeframe should be worthwhile considerations. 
Third, increasing the sample size will certainly contribute to better quality findings. Future 
studies will do well if they can collect several hundred response sets across industries and 
countries and track these start-ups over time. The industry databases that were reviewed as 
part of this study showed significant quality gaps and perhaps future researchers might want 




high quality research criteria. Government agencies can be instrumental in encouraging this 
form of collaboration.  
Fourth, the innovation industry is quite unique in the sense that many stake-holders place a 
high premium on education and knowledge sharing. As such, future research would be most 
fruitful where there is deep industry collaborative effort such as in-depth qualitative case 
studies of the evolution of incubating models, identifying the appropriate metrics useful for 
measuring outcomes and the assessment of incubation education.  Hence future studies 
would be very well received if we embed the research lab into the community of 
practitioners. That would need strong tri-partite of governmental, industry and university 
research support to move in this direction.  
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This research journey has certainly been a very fruitful discovery of not just the findings 
found in the incubation practice phenomenon but more importantly the acknowledgement 
that this field of research is highly needed as there is so much that we do not know for 
effective venture building. 
The key contributions I have made in this study are: 
1) contributing to the clarification of the language of Accelerators and VBs; 
2) defining constructs that the industry believes are the differences between the two 
models and 
3) identifying incubation practices that are impactful to successful venturing finaciually 





The managerial implications are: 
1) the findings will help new ventures assess which incubator models are more 
suitable for them based on the actual practices of the incubators; and not be 
misled by what the incubators label themselves; 
2) the findings will help guide the incubation industry as to which practices lead 
to more successful ventures; 
3) and finally, the findings will help public policy makers and investors to 
prioritise funding and resource allocation to effective emerging incubation 
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Terminologies 
Term Definition 
Academics Credentialed persons who perform research; are versed in 
scholarly publishing criteria, processes, and standards; 
and provide advice and guidance based on interpretations 
of findings in current research. 
Accelerators Defined either as:  
(1) a late-stage incubation program, assisting 
entrepreneurial firms that are more mature and ready for 
external financing; or  
(2) a facility that houses a modified business incubation 
program designed for incubator graduates as they ease into 
the market 
Administrative Offices Space in the incubator facility dedicated to offices and 
other amenities for the incubation program manager or 
professional staff. This space is not leasable to incubator 
clients. 
Advisory and/or Governing 
Board 
A dedicated group of business leaders, professionals, 
stakeholders, and/or specialists that provides competent 
advice and guidance for the incubation program management 
team on a regular basis. This group may also advise clients. If 
the board is a governing board, it has additional fiduciary 
responsibilities for the business incubation program. 
Affiliate Client A client that is not an occupant of an incubator facility but 
receives many or most incubation services for a fee. See 
also “virtual clients,” as these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably. 
Anchor Tenant A business or organization that leases space from an 
incubator but does not receive incubation services. Space 
is usually provided at market rate. Resident mentors also 
may be included in this category. 
Angel Investors Groups of high-net-worth individuals who invest money in 
high-potential start-up businesses in return for an equity 
ownership position in the company. They often provide 
smaller investments and earlier-stage funding than do 
professional venture capitalists. Angel investors obtain a 
return on their investments when the companies in which 
they’ve invested experience a liquidity event; are acquired, 
merged, or have a successful IPO (initial public offering of 
stock); or are bought out by later-stage investors. 
Angel Networks Connected groups of high-net-worth individuals who are 
accredited angel investors. Sometimes these individuals join 
together to collectively invest in high-potential start-up 
businesses. Angel investments are generally smaller and 






Programs designed to accelerate the successful development 
of entrepreneurial companies through an array of business 
support resources and services, developed or orchestrated by 
incubation program management, and offered both in the 
incubator and through its network of contacts. A business 





 firms that will leave the program financially viable and 
freestanding. Critical to the definition of an incubation 
program is the provision of management guidance, 
technical assistance, and consulting tailored to young 
growing companies. Incubators usually also provide clients 
access to appropriate rental space and flexible leases, 
shared basic business services and equipment, technology 
support services, and assistance in obtaining the financing 
necessary for company growth. 
Business Incubator Facility The space or building devoted to housing the business 
incubation program of services, incubator management, 
and resident and anchor client companies. “Business 
incubation program” and “business incubator” often are 
used synonymously. However, the research team for this 
project defined a business incubator as a multitenant 
facility with on-site management that directs a business 
incubation program, as defined above. 
Business Service Providers Professional business assistance consultants who augment 
the skills of incubation program staff. These individuals – 
with expertise in specific subject areas such as marketing, 
finance, business planning, procurement, and patent law – 
often provide their services on a no- or low-cost basis. 
Along with incubator staff, these individuals provide the 
value-added service that is the core of effective business 
incubation. These individuals may also be referred to as 
“outside service providers,” denoting that they are 
professionals resourced by the incubation program but they 
are not paid staff. 
Client Companies Participants in incubation programs that receive 
incubation services from program staff and the 
program’s network of service providers. There are 
resident clients and affiliate (non-resident) clients. 
Complementary Benefits Any benefits that accru  to an incubator sponso  or 
supporter including reuse of an aban o ed facility, 
creation of student internships, access to SBA 














Equity The value of an incubator’s client company that may 
be shared by owners and investors. 
Experienced Entrepreneur An individual who has experience growing his or her own 
company or others’ companies, including a person who may 
be a serial entrepreneur. 
Financially Sustainable Having a diversity of dependable income sources, such 
that if one source of funding fails, the incubation program 
still will be fully functional. 
Full Time Persons who work 35 hours or more per week in the 
incubator or for a client company. 
Graduate Firms Clients that exit an incubation program after completing a 
set of benchmarks or goals. Exit criteria are often part of the 
client’s lease or service agreement, and they apply to both 
resident and affiliate (non-resident) client companies. 
Companies that leave the incubator but do not meet the 
required benchmarks are not considered program graduates. 
Hybrid In terms of sponsorship, a hybrid incubator is one that has 
multiple sponsors that share financial and/or governance 
commitments, with no single controlling entity. 
Incubation Program Manager The executive who directs an incubation program’s 
operations. Most managers report to either the chief 
executive officer of the program’s sponsoring organization, 
a university president or dean, or a board of directors that 
governs the program. Some incubation program managers 
have alternative titles, such as president, CEO, or executive 
director. 
Leasable Space The total amount of space in the incubator facility that is 
dedicated for rental by both anchor tenants and resident 
clients (excludes administrative offices and shared 
common space, for example). This term is used 
interchangeably with “net leasable space.” 
Limited Participants Company representatives or founders who attend training 
programs or networking meetings (or access mailboxes 
or other services) without having gone through the 
selection process required for formal admission to the 
incubation program. 
Mentors Industry experts and business service providers who offer 
ongoing counseling to incubator clients. A mentor provides a 





 one or more stages of a company’s development. Groups of 
mentors having different areas of expertise may be assigned 
to individual companies. 
Microentrepreneurs Entrepreneurs who run businesses that have five or fewer 
employees, require $35,000 or less in start-up capital, and 
do not have access to traditional (bank) financing. 
Mixed-Use Incubator An incubation program that fosters the growth of many 
kinds of companies; the businesses in a mixed-use incubator 
are not required to fit into any specialized niche. Companies 
in mixed-use incubators may include service, manufacturing, 
technology, and other types of firms. 
Net Leasable Space The total amount of space in the incubator facility that is 
dedicated for rental by both anchor tenants and resident 
clients (excludes administrative offices and shared 
common space, for example). This term is used 
interchangeably with “leasable space.” 
Occupancy Rate 
The percentage of leasable or net leasable space available for 
client lease that is actually being rented by incubator clients. 
Part Time Persons who work less than 35 hours per week in 
the incubator or for a client company. 
Participating Clients Incubation program clients who rent and/or use the incubator 
facilities, programs, or services on a regular basis and have 
not graduated from the program. 
Post-Incubation Services offered to companies that have graduated from 
the incubation program (i.e., access to specialized facilities 
as needed, consulting services, CEO roundtables, and 
networking functions). 
Pre-Incubation Services offered to companies or individuals who have not 
been formally admitted to the incubation program (i.e., 
FastTrac or NxLevel training and business plan reviews). 
Primary Stakeholders The organizations or entities that have or should have an 
interest in the incubation program’s success. In addition to 
sponsors, these could include local government agencies, 
economic development organizations, industry sector 
networks, Small Business Development Centers, and others 
whose missions are such that they should have an interest 
or “stake” in the incubation program’s success. 
Primary Sponsor Entity that provides regular financial and other support for 
a business incubation program. A sponsor may or may not 
have developed the incubation program initially, but a 
current sponsor maintains ongoing responsibility for 





 subsidies to fund program operations. In some cases, a 
sponsor may initiate the program, but if it ceases its 
financial, governance, or management role, the incubator 
likely would then operate independently with no sponsor. If 
two or more sponsors provide financial or management 
support and there is no single controlling or primary 
controlling entity, the incubation program likely operates 
with hybrid sponsorship. (See “hybrid.”) 
Professional Staff Incubator staff who might include a chief operating officer, 
information technology professionals, client business 
advisors, professional facility managers, and/or other 
management professionals who are normally paid staff of 
the incubator. 
Resident Client A participant in the incubation program that rents physical 
space in a facility-based incubator and receives incubation 
program services that may be provided for additional fees. 
Self-Sustainability Having a diversity of dependable income sources, such 
that if one source of funding fails, the incubation program 
still will be fully functional. 
Service Incubator An incubation program that fosters the development of 
entrepreneurial firms in the service industry. Firms may 
range from landscapers, graphic designers, and consulting 
firms of many types to Internet-based companies and Web 
development firms. An incubation program may target a 
segment of this sector for its services. 
Social Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs who run companies whose business model 
includes achieving a social good in addition to being 
successful in business and generating profits. Such a 
company might devote a percentage of its profits to a 
philanthropic cause, or it might devote its services or 
products to ameliorating a social problem such as hunger 
or to lack of access to clean water or pharmaceuticals, etc. 
Still in Business Businesses that have participated in the incubation program 
in the past that are still successfully operating as businesses, 
generating revenues, developing products, and/or hiring 
employees. 
Technology Incubator Incubation program that fosters growth of companies based 
on technologies such as software, biotechnology, robotics, 
nanotechnology, or instrumentation. Technology incubators 
may focus on commercializing early-stage technology, 






Total Annual Revenue The sum of all incomes generated for an entire fiscal year 
including: 1) sales; 2) Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR)/Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) or 
other grants; 3) Venture Capitalist investments; 4) Angel 
investments; and 5) technology licensing arrangements. 
Total Cash Equity 
Investments 
The sum of all the cash revenues received by a company for 
which it has offered stock, warrants, or other ownership 
instruments. Cash equity does not include ownership that is 
dependent on sweat equity (working in or for the company 
in return for an ownership interest). 
Types of Incubators Overall industry specialization of an incubation program 
indicating the program’s primary focus area. In this survey, 
we recognize the following primary types: manufacturing, 
mixed-use, technology, and service. 
Venture Capital Investors Persons or groups that give cash sums to high-potential 
start-up businesses in exchange for shares in the company. 
Venture capitalists always seek an exit strategy in which the 
company is merged or acquired, or its stock is sold on the 
public stock markets, permitting the investors to recoup 
many times their initial investments. Professional venture 
capitalists generally manage and invest large sums of other 
peoples’ money through a professionally managed entity 
such as a limited liability partnership. 
Virtual Clients This term may be used interchangeably with “affiliate 
clients” for clients that are not in residence in an incubator. 
However, it also may be used to denote clients located at a 
distance from incubation program management when the 
program doesn’t offer multi-tenant space, or denote clients 
primarily served via computer and Web-based programs that 
bring together networks of people and other resources for 
the purposes of serving client companies that are not housed 
in any central location. 
Volunteers Persons who accomplish work for the incubation program 
but are not paid staff. Anyone donating time or services 
without receiving monetary compensation is a volunteer. 
Without Graduating Clients that stopped participating in the incubation program 
without completing graduation criteria or without 



















Study 1 Semi-structured interview questionnaire  
 
    Participant Code:  ____________ (A: Accelerator; V: Venture Builder) 
Name of Participant: __________________________ 
            Title: __________________________ 
    Company: __________________________ 
    Country/Location: _____________________ 







Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
Objective: To gather background and experience of the interviewee 
Question: 
a. How long have you been in the venture industry business ? 
b. How many new ventures have you been associated with ?  Built or incubated or 
accelerated ? 
c. Do your organisation consider itself as an Accelerator or Venture Builder or Others 
(please state if others eg Accelerator primarily with some elements of VB practices)  
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
Objective: To obtain clarity of the definition “Success” of new ventures 
Question:  
a. What is your definition of “success” of a new venture ? 
b. What is your expectation for success ? 
 
c. What is defined as “failure” of your new venture ? 
d. What is your tolerance for failure ? 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
Objective:  To obtain differentiators of VBs & Accelerators 
Question: 
Ask these questions only if they consider themselves as Accelerators: 
a. What are the core competences of an Accelerator ? (ask this question if interviewee 
is an Accelerator) 
b. What are the main services of an Accelerator  ? 
c. What are the strengths of an Accelerator ? 
d. What are the weaknesses of an Accelerator ? 
Ask these questions only if they consider themselves as VBs: 
e. What are the core competences of a Venture Builder ? (ask this question if 
interviewee is a VB) 
f. What are the main services of a VB ? 
g. What are the strengths of a VB ? 
h. What are the weaknesses of a VB ? 
 
i. What do you see are the main differences between an Accelerator and a VB ?   
 






k. If you had to prioritise, what are the 5 most important things that you would do as an 
Accelerator ? 
 
l. If you had to prioritise, what are the 5 most important things that you would do as a 
VB  ? 
 
m. Is there anything recently that you discovered is NOT important as you thought it was 
? 
n. Is there anything recently that you discovered is VERY important which you did not 
thought so previously ? 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models ?) 
Objective: To determine the appropriateness of when to apply the 2 models 
Question:  
a. In what kind of situation would an Accelerator program be suitable ? 
b. What profile of people (startups) are suitable to join your Accelerator program ?  (ask 
this question if interviewee is an Accelerator) 
 
c. In what kind of situation would a VB Program be suitable ? 
d. What profile of people (startups) are suitable to join your VB  program ?  (ask this 
question if interviewee is a VB) 
 
e. If you were to advise someone about the path they should take for a new venture, 
what would your advice be  ? 
f. Would your advice be different if they already have a team ? 
g. Would your advice be different if they already have customers ? 
h. Would your advice be different if they already have an MVP (Minimum Viable 
Product) ? 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
Objective: To determine impact on new ventures after undergoing incubation by the 2 
incubation models 
Question:  
a. Why have you chosen the Acceleration model ? (question for Acceleration 
interviewee) 
 






c. What do you notice about the key differences in new ventures before and after 
undergoing your program ?  
If they are silent, suggests the following: 
▪ market awareness 
▪ market sizing 
▪ financial acumen 
▪ understanding of team/team development 
▪ appreciation of competition 
▪ go to market and going beyond their domestic market 
▪ leverage mentors better\connectivity to VCs 


















Start of Block: Introduction 
 
Q1 Thank you for taking part in this research survey.  This research focus is on the different 
practices of Accelerators and Venture Builders.  Accelerators include Y-Combinator, 500 
Startups and Techstars; the emerging incubation model of Venture Builders (also known as 
tech studios, startup factories or venture production studios) include Rocket Internet, Wesley 
Clover’s Alacrity, Obvious Corp and Entrepreneur First.Your responses will be kept 
completely confidential. The online survey should take approximately 5-10 minutes and your 
participation is voluntary.  There are no unanticipated risks in this study beyond what  would 
typically experience in everyday life. You have the right to withdraw at any point during the 
study for any reason and without any prejudice.  
 
End of Block: Introduction 
 
Start of Block: Introduction 
 
Q2 If you like to contact the Principal Investigator or the Supervisor to discuss this research, 
the details are:  Principal Investigator: Patrick Thng at patrickthng@smu.edu.sg and 
Supervisor: Professor Philip Charles Zerrillo at pzerrillo@smu.edu.sg  For any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant in which you wish to contact someone unaffiliated with 
the research team, please contact the SMU Institutional Review Board Secretariat at the 
following e-mail/phone number, providing the name of the Principal Investigator and the 
study title or else quote the IRB approval number RB-18-148-A001(119). SMU IRB 
secretariat at irb@smu.edu.sg  and phone: +65 6828 1925  
    
    
By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation is voluntary, you 
are  18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may choose to terminate your 
participation in the survey at any time and for any reason. Do note that the survey is best 
displayed on a laptop or desk computer. There may be some incompatibility with mobile 
devices. 
 
End of Block: Introduction 
 






Q3 Which type of incubator do you characterise your organisation? 
o Accelerator  (1)  
o Venture Builder  (2)  
o Both  (3)  
o Neither  (4)  
 
End of Block: Block 7 
 
Start of Block: Block 6 
 
Q4 What is your incubation model? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Block 6 
 
Start of Block: Background Information 
 
Q5 How long has your organisation been established ? 









Q7 What is the name of your organisation ? (Optional) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Background Information 
 
Start of Block: Market Orientation 
 
Q8 Venture Builder (VB) incubators are  expected to pay more attention to the 
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Q13 VBs emphasise to the new venture to sell to businesses (B2B) 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  
o No Opinion/Not Applicable  (8)  
 






Start of Block: Resources 
 
Q14 VBs take a significant equity of the new ventures (more than 10% of the new venture 
equity) 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  




Q15 VBs help new ventures to recruit the co-founders to form the founding team  
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  








Q16 VBs incubate only new ventures when the teams have already been formed 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  




Q17 VBs  provide strong IP Protection assistance to the new ventures 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  








Q18 VBs provide mentors with deep industry expertise 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  
o No Opinion/Not Applicable  (8)  
 
End of Block: Resources 
 
Start of Block: Time Compression Diseconomies 
 
Q19 VBs provide continuous active engagement with the new ventures after the formal 
training program (typically  more than 2 years). [Engagement is broadly defined as helping 
with the team development dynamics, reinforcing what was taught in the formal training 
program, connecting to business networks to help grow the revenue of the new ventures, 
active mentoring and guidance, tracking closely the progress of the new ventures, 
recommending new investors etc]  
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  








Q20 Due to the extended time spent with the new ventures, VBs help new ventures to 
consolidate the knowledge gained from the formal training program 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  




Q21 VBs provide structured training programs during the incubation period 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  








Q22 VBs have longer time horizon (4-6 years) for their new ventures to be financially 
successful  
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral: Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  
o No Opinion/Not Applicable  (8)  
 


















Start of Block: Survey Agenda 
 
Q1 Venture Building: What Matters! 
  
 Thank you for taking part in this research survey.  This research focus is on effective 
practices of Accelerators and Venture Builders.  Accelerators include Y-Combinator, 500 
Startups and Techstars; the emerging incubation model of Venture Builders (also known as 
tech studios, startup factories or venture production studios) include Rocket Internet, Wesley 
Clover’s Alacrity, Obvious Corp and Entrepreneur First.Your responses will be kept 
completely confidential. The online survey should take approximately 15 minutes and your 
participation is voluntary.  There are no unanticipated risks in this study beyond what  would 
typically experience in everyday life. You have the right to withdraw at any point during the 
study for any reason and without any prejudice.      If you like to contact the Principal 
Investigator or the Supervisor to discuss this research, the details are:  Principal Investigator: 
Patrick Thng at patrickthng@smu.edu.sg and Supervisor: Professor Philip Charles Zerrillo 
at pzerrillo@smu.edu.sg  For any questions regarding your rights as a participant in which 
you wish to contact someone unaffiliated with the research team, please contact the SMU 
Institutional Review Board Secretariat at the following e-mail/phone number, providing the 
name of the Principal Investigator and the study title or else quote the IRB approval 
number RB-18-148-A001(119). SMU IRB secretariat at irb@smu.edu.sg  and phone: +65 
6828 1925 
    By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation is voluntary, you 
are  18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may choose to terminate your 
participation in the survey at any time and for any reason. Do note that the survey is best 
displayed on a laptop or desk computer. There may be some incompatibility with mobile 
devices. 
o I consent, begin the study.  (4)  
o I do not consent, i do not wish to participate.  (5)  
 
End of Block: Survey Agenda 
 






Q2 Is your company: 
o for-profit  (1)  




Q3 What was the approximate month, year and location the company was formed?  
o Month  (8) ________________________________________________ 
o Year  (9) ________________________________________________ 















Q6 Our company primarily do the following type of sales:  
o B2B Sales only  (1)  
o B2C Sales only  (2)  













Q8 Was your company incubated primarily by an ..... (the option that you select will be 
referred to as "the incubator" from this survey onwards) . Accelerators include Y-
Combinator, 500 Startups and Techstars; the emerging incubation model of Venture 
Builders (also known as tech studios, startup factories or venture production studios) 
include Rocket Internet, Wesley Clover’s Alacrity, Obvious Corp and Entrepreneur First. 
o Accelerator  (1)  
o Venture Builder  (2)  
o Both Accelerator & Venture Builder  (3)  
o None of the above  (4)  




Q9 Our main co-founding team was formed ___ months before starting the incubation 
program. (choose 1 option below) 
o 6 months  (1)  
o 12 months  (2)  
o 18 months  (3)  
o more than 18 months  (4)  
o NA as our company was formed after we started the formal business training 
program  (5)  
 
End of Block: Part A: Background Information 
 
Start of Block: A1: Background of your incubator program 
 
Q10 What was the name and location of the incubator your company was accepted to? 
o Name  (1) ________________________________________________ 








Q11 When was the approximate month and year your company was accepted to the 
incubation program?  
o Month  (1) ________________________________________________ 




Q12 How long was your formal incubation program?  (formal means the structured on-site 
classroom workshops)  




Q13 Is your engagement with the incubator ongoing ? (Yes or No) 
o Yes/No ?  (6) ________________________________________________ 
o If Yes, skip this response. If No more engaging with the incubator, how long was the 
entire incubation in Months ?  (entire means the relationship when you first commence 





Q14 Our incubator owned ___ % equity of our company in exchange for taking part in their 
incubation program. (choose 1 option below) 
o 0%  (1)  
o 0.1%- 5%  (2)  
o 5.1% -10%  (3)  
o 10.1%-15%  (4)  
o 15.1%-20%  (5)  
o 20.1%-25%  (6)  








Q15 After you completed the structured business training, our company had a continuing 
relationship with the incubator for ____ : 
o less than 1 year  (1)  
o 1 to 3 years  (2)  
o more than 3 years but less than 5 years  (3)  
o more than 5 years  (4)  
 
End of Block: A1: Background of your incubator program 
 
Start of Block: A2: Respondent Company's Activity Profile 
 
Q16 What best describes the current status of the company? 
o The company is still in operation now and actively doing business  (1)  
o The company is not in operation now and cease business  (2)  
 
End of Block: A2: Respondent Company's Activity Profile 
 
Start of Block: Part B: REVENUE PERFORMANCE and PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 
Q17 What was the estimated Annual Revenue Run-rate (ARR) [ example US$100,000 ] of 





Q18 What was the estimated number of customers that the company had when it entered 
the incubation program? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Part B: REVENUE PERFORMANCE and PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 






Q19 After the formal incubation program, our company was able to receive 
o No further investments  (1)  
o Up to including Series A  (2)  
o Series B  (3)  
o Beyond Series B  (4)  
 
End of Block: B2: Funding Traction 
 





Part C:  SURVEY ON INCUBATION PRACTICES EXPERIENCED BY START-UPs    
  
     
 As a part of the research, the survey aims to gain an understanding of the incubation 
practices as experienced by the start-ups in the three areas of Market orientation, Resources 
and Learning.      To assist in the data collection of this aspect of the research, the following 
survey questions are posed for all respondent companies if they were accelerated or 
venture-built or a mix of both.      The requested responses for survey are generally based 
on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 reflects a very strong disagreement with the survey item; 
while 7 reflects very strong agreement. There will be cases where the respondents do not 
know or have no opinion or find the question not applicable. Hence Option 8 allows them to 
select that option.      There are altogether 28 questions spread across the three themes 
derived from an earlier exploratory study.  
 
End of Block: Part C:  SURVEY ON INCUBATION PRACTICES EXPERIENCED BY 
START-UPs 
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End of Block: A. Market Orientation 
 
Start of Block: B. Resources 
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Q24 The team we had before joining the incubation program was the same team we had 
after the incubation program (within 12 months after completion of the incubation program). 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (10)  
o Strongly Disagree  (11)  
o Disagree  (12)  
o Neutral; Neither Agree or Disagree  (13)  
o Agree  (14)  
o Strongly Agree  (15)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (16)  




Q25 Our company has co-founders with deep industry experience. 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (4)  
o Strongly Disagree  (5)  
o Disagree  (6)  
o Neutral; Neither Agree or Disagree  (7)  
o Agree  (12)  
o Strongly Agree  (9)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (10)  
o No Opinion/N.A  (13)  
 
End of Block: B. Resources 
 






Q26 Our incubator continued to actively engage with our company after the formal business 
training program. 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (10)  
o Disagree  (11)  
o Neutral; Neither Agree or Disagree  (12)  
o Agree  (13)  
o Strongly Agree  (14)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (15)  









































































Q28 We were able to apply the information we learn because we have sufficient 
engagement time with our incubator. 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Neutral; Neither Agree or Disagree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (7)  
o No Opinion/N.A  (8)  
 
End of Block: C. Time compression diseconomies 
 
Start of Block: D. Success 
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Q31 What is your email contact (optional, strongly requested in rare case where clarification 
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Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:02   
Great. Okay, thank you 
 
for taking the time for this semi structured interview. So first, just get up. So we will be having this 
discussion, the context of your role and experience when you're running [company name]. Okay, 
good. 
 
So what was your title at [company name]?  
 
R1A  0:26   
Co founder and CEO 
 
P Thng  0:28   
Co founder and CEO of [company name] 
 
R1A  0:31   
.asia 
 
P Thng  0:32   
.asia 
 
and then location?  
 
R1A  0:36   
Singapore 
 
P Thng  0:40   
would you classify yourself more as an accelerator or venture builder? 
 
R1A  0:45   
Accelerator 
 
P Thng  0:54   
Okay, so the first question I want to pose to you here is the following a bit of background. So how 
long have you been in this venture industry business? 
 
R1A  1:05   
So we incorporated [company name] from memory on the 11th of February 2010, it was either 
January or February. 
 
P Thng  1:15   
So this was about 8 years right. Good. Before that what were you doing before this 
 
R1A  1:22   
immediately before that I was running an 
 
investment and advisory company working with predominately Creative Industries SMEs in Europe 






P Thng  1:36   
Right. So you've got both European experiences. Good. Thank you. So next thing, how many new 
ventures Have you been associated with either you accelerated  
 
R1A  1:47   
the 
 
number of teams that went through our accelerator was 70, 7-0. 
 
P Thng  1:53   
So [company name] operated in 2010, and I understand that you've moved on to some other new 
business. So how long was this operation? 
 
R1A  2:02   
So we incorporated in 2010, it took us 18 months to raise funding and to test out the core 
components of the accelerator. So we actually went live recruiting in September 2011, and then we 
were actively accelerating through 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. And since January 2016, through to 
December 2018, I have been doing startup style innovation with large enterprises and corporations 
companies like Bosch Munich, re Allianz Fonterra, reason campaigner  
 
P Thng  2:44   
Right, so when you mentioned about the 70 teams does that start from around 2011, all the way up 
to now.  
 
R1A  2:50   
So yes, they the first team actively started in our program after recruitment in January 2012, and the 
last team left our program in December 2015.  
 
P Thng  3:04   
Ok, Thank you. Right. So you consider yourself as an accelerator?  
 
R1A  3:08   
Yes  
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  3:09   
Ok good. So now let's get into the meat of the research. First, I want to get some clarity of the 
definition of success of new ventures what's your definition of success of a new venture? 
 
R1A  3:25   
when we set up [company name], the startup ecosystem in Southeast Asia was very nascent. And 
our purpose was to get startups to seed stage investments. So our focus was on investment 
readiness. And we quickly realized that that to succeed, we would have to not just accelerate 
startups, but we would also have to build the ecosystem around the startups. So we would have to 
build a community of mentors, a community of investors, and we would have to substantially 
change the methodology which we inherited from TechStars who were very generous in sharing 





[company name], it was something that we did out of passion, main main one, my co founder, his 
full name is [name], [name] and I were motivated by community building, the slogan we use for 
[company name] was entrepreneurship will always be difficult, but it doesn't have to be lonely. We 
both had the experience of tremendous benefit from being part of the community when we were 
learning to be entrepreneurs. And we wanted, so a success on a personal level for us was, to be 
honest, was about building a vibrant community. Of course, we had other stakeholders involved as 
well. And in the end, after about two years, this question of what constitutes success? Who are we 
working for? What is this thing actually an accelerator? I, we went round and round in circles 
thinking, what are we trying to optimize for here? Are we trying to create a return for our investors? 
Are we trying to do the best thing for our founders are we trying to go some other [unintelligible] so 
I ended up writing my master's thesis To be honest, as a kind of therapy to explore what the hell is 
an accelerator, I think we can now be a lot more clear about those questions, because there's a lot 
more of them in the world. But in the back in 2011, 2012, it wasn't clear what an accelerator was, or 
how you would measure success. Now, I think you can say some accelerators are set up specifically 
to take companies from seed stage through to international growth, for example, 500 startups runs 
a thing called distro dojo, which is all about scaling internationally, TechStars, which originally 
inspired us has moved down stream instead of pre-seed to seed stage, most of the companies they 
work with now are around series A, and more mature businesses. And if you're trying to go for 
returns to investors than a more mature business has, you know, is better formed and in some ways 
more likely to succeed for your investors. 
 
P Thng  6:12   
So where I'm coming from in that question was referring to the startups, the new companies that 
you've built. 
 
R1A  6:19   
Raising seed funding.  
 
P Thng  6:20   
So as an accelerator, what would you consider a successful new venture that you've accelerated, 
 
R1A  6:27   
I'll try to give you some examples, right. So after the 70 startups I we always said to ourselves, we 
need to figure out what success means numerically, in Southeast Asia. And I think the conclusion I've 
come to now is, it means a business that's worth 100 million dollars or more, if we've fostered some 
of those in the portfolio, then then we've succeeded. And the reason I say that is because the 
economics of an accelerator are such that one in 10, if you do well as accelerator, one in 10 startups 
does well. So when you do the math on all of that, and exit, which happens at less than 100 million 
dollars, really doesn't move the needle and doesn't help you create a sensible return to the investors 
who found the accelerator. So that's assuming that you end up taking a typical 8% of 8, 9% of equity 
in the startups before dilution, which is what we did, I can go through the math of that in more 
detail another time you like, but as a result of that, so we ended up saying, Well, on a base level of 
success, we feel we have a fiduciary duty to our investors, of course, and we promised them two to 
three X on their money. 
 
And in order to deliver that when you work backwards through the math, you end up needing at 
least one in 10 companies to exit it, you know, ultimately 100 million dollar valuation, by which time 







if you put say, 25 to $50,000 in after say, five to eight years, if you had a 100 million dollar exit with 
2, 2% of it, you're going to end up with a couple million dollars back 
 
P Thng  8:14   
So your definition of success, primarily is about the upon exit, right 
 
R1A  8:19   
I actually find now I look back on it, it's very helpful to be asked this question because when I really 
look back now, and I think what remain and I really trying to do on a personal level, we wanted to 
innovate the process of innovation, we wanted to, the metaphor I would use is that before 
accelerators, 
 
lots of people said, entrepreneurship is important to the economy. But we were a bit like hunter 
gatherers, investors would go out into the forest and try and catch a unicorn before someone else. 
Now, this is fine as a strategy if there are not many hunters, and there are lots of unicorns, but if 
you've got lots of hunters, and not many unicorns or unicorns aren't appearing very regularly, then 
it's not really a great strategy to build a regional economy. 
 
8000 years ago, our ancestors moved from hunter gatherer to farming. And so the thing ultimately, 
the motivating main and I personally was wanting to see how can we farm startups in quantity? How 
can we understand the patterns of success and failure? How can we understand the processes that 
will consistently produce across the portfolio a reasonable return, and I think we achieved that I 
think we've achieved deep insight into that along with partners around the world. But then if I look 
at the other stakeholders, I mean, perhaps, to answering all these questions. So in the end, at the 
end of my thesis, I ended up my [unintelligible] masters. I ended up 
 
saying that when most people look at an accelerator, they think of it like a car wash, you put 30 
entrepreneurs in one end and you sprinkle magic fairy dust mentoring on them. And after a few 
months out, pop shiny investment ready startups. So most people look at start-up to an accelerator, 
like a pipe, which, and then they would measure success in terms of, well, how many of your 
startups get funded, and how, what's the quantum of investment, you know, that kind of thing, we 
took a different view, we said that an accelerator is a platform business that brings together a series 
of stakeholders, it brings together one - entrepreneurs, it brings together recent alumni who are 
trying to work out 
 
what they've just been through is an intense experience. It brings together mentors, it brings 
together startup investors. And then there were a whole series of technical vendors and other 
people who are secondary, and with no disrespect, higher education institutions are in that mix as 
well. People who are kind of ancillary to the process, but not really core to it. So what we ended up 
realizing was that as in every platform business, like YouTube, or whatever, each stakeholder group 
has its own job to be done. And so when you come to define success for an accelerator, in order for 
anything to work, you have to create success for each of those pools of stakeholders. So investors 
have to get a decent return. Mentors have to get a great experience. And the complex thing about 
managing and operating an accelerator then is that it's 
 
some of those transactions are non financial. For example, a mentor success for a mentor might be I 
learned about new technology, I learned about a new territory, I learned about a new business 
model success for a founder might be I've always wanted to try entrepreneurship. I went through 
the experience, even though my startup didn't work out, I ended up getting to know someone who 






P Thng  11:46   
What about your focus on success for the startups themmself? What do you define? If I'm a startup 
then as an accelerator? How would you define that I am a successful startup. 
 
R1A  11:57   
So they typically when startups, first time entrepreneurs, when they come into an accelerator, they, 
they think, Oh, I want to be the next Facebook, I want to be the next Google because that's what 
they read about. Those are the kind of role models after they've been through an accelerator, I think 
they realize a really good accelerator, they realize that entrepreneurship is a kind of lifestyle choice. 
And 
 
there's an enormous amount of luck in whether any particular venture succeeds or fails. And they 
end up coming away realizing that it's the community that's important, and the experience they've 
been through, not the actual venture. And we always tell them to be perfectly honest, that if you 
look at most entrepreneurs, I think people are very successful, you're much more likely to achieve 
that when on third or fourth venture not on your first. But if you do achieve some kind of passable 
result with your first or second, then that's a calling card, 
 
I come from a film and television background. I've never as it happens, never went to film school. 
But my wife, teaches, at one, when we have people making films for the first time, we do not expect 
their student graduation film to be one that wins the Oscar, you know, it's going to be a few years 
afterwards while they learn the craft. And I very much sure it's interesting that people are starting to 
use this phrase studio to describe a community of, of people building businesses, because I've come 
to believe that 
 
there is a lot of artisanship, you know, I think a lot of people talk about artistry and 
entrepreneurship. And that's different to what you learned on an MBA, if you go and work in a large 
corporation, you can measure things, things are much more controllable, there are risks, but they're 
also three years of previous accounts, and Bloody Bloody blah. So you can apply analysis. Whereas in 
entrepreneurship, when you're starting from nothing, analysis doesn't get you very far at all, 
because there's nothing to analyze. 
 
So to summarize, I think that ultimately what startups come out of an accelerator with is is a visceral 
understanding of how to apply the tools of an entrepreneur to create value out of an absolutely 
ambiguous, 
 
blank sheet of paper, 
 
and they come out with the confidence that there is method in the madness, there are patterns in 
the void, and that there is a community that will support them when they try to create value. And to 
me, that's the valuable thing.  
 
P Thng  14:27   
Interesting. So you're saying that to you, a successful new startup would have achieved success if 
they had a really good as your term - visceral understanding of  
 
R1A  14:43     
Yeah and I think what then happens interesting enough is that value comes back to us as the, the 
owners of that accelerator, because sooner or later, the the best entrepreneurs that we work with, 
will want to work with us again, on their next venture. And in fact, on the very first day of the 





next Google on this program are almost vanishingly small. But we're interested in working with you 
on your next venture and the venture after that, and, and that's absolutely true. So if the investors 
who you'll meet most of the investors who will back you are backing you because they want to get 
to know you. And, you know, you're part of this community here in Singapore, we need to build trust 
between us, we need to build understanding between us, we need to build great teams, the people 
you've come to this accelerator with, may or may not be the best people for you to build a world 
class venture with, but until you've all been through some experience together, so I guess, 
ultimately, that it was about community building and education, really, so. 
 
So financial success is not, you know, the primary goal all the time 
 
R1A  15:53   
Anyone doing early stage an accelerator is not a way to get rich, absolutely not really, really hard 
way to make money,  
 
P Thng  16:02   
Right. So based on experience, you know, if you can hit one out of 10 you know more than 100 
million, you know 
 
R1A  16:06   
You'd be doing really well and good 
 
P Thng  16:08   
Ok, thanks. Next. So what is defined as failure of a new venture 
 
R1A  16:15   
Um the what, the things that we saw is, we actually ended up 
 
drawing up a list of patterns and anti patterns, mostly anti patterns. So we looked at failure modes, 
the way that startups crash. So I, I divide failure of a startup into kind of noble failures and, and 
stupid failures. So it's a bit like the Catholic Church with, you know, venial sins and mortal sins, 
 
noble ways to fail, are that you heroically explore a new business model or a new technology, which 
is very hard to describe to users before you begin and some kind of experiential product or service 
and you try that out. 
 
And it just turns out that the market doesn't want it for reasons that couldn't be foreseen. And if you 
find that information out quickly, then yes, technically, it's a failure. But actually, it's a learning 
experience. So for example, Bosch would not mind me talking about this separate in the corporate 
environment. We together with Bosch, we set up a start-up in Vietnam to explore a new security 
device for motorcycles, anti-theft device combined with an insurance policy and we found out within 
six months that yes, we could create the device Yes, we could package it up with insurance. But the 
price point that Vietnamese consumers were prepared to pay was too low to make a viable business 
that was of interest to Bosch because they were used to buying cheap Chinese hardware and 
couldn't that they couldn't understand the intangible value of insurance component. Now, there's 
no way that we without testing that there's no way that we could have found that out and Bosch, 
were delighted, even though we spent, you know, two or 300 Euros, 230,000 Euros, exploring that 
over a six month period, we found it out probably four times quicker than they would have found it 
out internally. And so similarly with startups if you fail for that reason, that seems to be noble, stupid 
reasons to fail, are producing a product that nobody wants at all. When if you done customer 






teams blowing up. That's really unfortunate. 
 
That's a shameful way to end it seems to me going bankrupt. If you end up burning through 
investors, money, you know, seed stage investors, manual pre-seed investors money and the 
business doesn't work, but you land the aircraft gracefully. That seems to me to be perfectly okay. 
You know, you might have been handing heading for London, you only make it as far as Paris, that's 
okay. But if you go bankrupt, so you end up leaving debts behind and [unintelligible] like that seems 
or don't pay staff. That seems to me to be just bad management. So those would be some examples 
of failures.  
 
P Thng  18:58   
And then a question - just now you mentioned about typically you don't expect the first startup to or 
their very first startup to be probably third, fourth or even fifth right. And even sometimes I hear 
after the seventh or eighth so, of the 70 teams that you have built, accelerated. How many were 
their generally in percentage, how many were first time? Or all of them were first time? 
 
R1A  19:24   
I would say almost all of them half I say 80, 85% of them were first time entrepreneurs 
 
P Thng  19:32   
Good, I just want to get some sense of it thank you 
 
R1A  19:35   
Can just pick out one more piece that failure modes question. Yeah, we one of the things that we we 
catalog was if there was a series of patterns of failure. And there are some very specific patterns of 
failure that we selected against when we selected startups. So for example, 
 
Paul Graham, who set up Y Combinator, published an article about a pattern he's observed, which he 
calls hackers in a cage so sometimes you'll end up with a team that has got a very charismatic, 
 
hustler type entrepreneur at the center of it. 
 
And then maybe three or four sort of meek engineers working for them. And as the business 
develops, initially, it appears that the entrepreneur, at the center is the is the value adding person 
because they're winning all the business and getting them into an accelerator, whatever. But over 
time, it becomes apparent that actually that hustler is just a hustler and is gonna run out of steam 
and can't scale. And actually, it's the engineers who are creating a genuinely valuable product. Now, 
at that point, if the if the shareholdings in the business have been set up, such that the loud mouth 
entrepreneur has got the majority of shares, the team will blow up sooner or later. And that's a 
classic pattern. Another example of a failure pattern we saw was what we, one we call dev shop. So 
out there, there are lots and lots of struggling 
 
development shops, software development shops in Southeast Asia, and places like India or 
Philippines. And it's a slog, they have to keep winning business to develop mobile phone apps, or 
whatever, for large corporations. It's pretty tedious, and they never end up any equity. So the grass 
is always greener on the other side for them, they always fantasize, oh, if we only had a product that 
earned us money in our sleep, you know, the classic sort of IP argument, and then the mindset they 






why don't we, why don't we go on accelerator, they'll give us some money to develop that product, 
which we will then own. And if it works out, that's fantastic. It will earn us money in our sleep. But if 
it doesn't, we'll just go back to doing consulting work. 
 
And so we would, we would look very carefully at teams that apply to us to see whether if it basically 
was a bunch of guys who've been working together as a work for hire dev shop, because almost 
certainly as soon as they hit a bump in the road, they're going to go back to that work. And the same 
will be true for management consultants, with a bunch of MBAs, management consultants, if soon 
as they hit a bump in the road, they'll go straight back to consulting  
 
P Thng  22:04   
You're unlikely to want to take in this kind of performer. 
 
R1A  22:09   
And we explicitly selected against those anti patterns as we call them.  
 
P Thng  22:14   
Excellent, thanks. Thanks. In fact as often we says it's not just about studying success. I think failure 
is important 
 
Good, thank you very much.  Then, so its quite interesting. You said that you've published a series of 
the pattern and anti-pattern, would you be able to, you know, after this?  
 
R1A  22:20   
Yup 
 
Share? Yeah, I think [name] put those online. So  
 
P Thng  22:33   
Thank you, thank you very much. Okay. Next question is, what is your tolerance for failure? 
 
R1A  22:42   
Very high. 
 
we reframe quotes, failure, unquote, as feedback. 
 
It's, it's not something we aim for, but it's something that we accept. 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  22:56   
Yeah, so it's quite different from the corporates now, the tolerance for failure is so low, but you guys 
have that can kind of DNA, that something is expected. Okay, good. Now, the next question is to 
look at differentiators of venture builders and accelerators, I now want to put yourself as an 
accelerator, right? So what do you think are the core competencies of an accelerator? 
 
R1A  23:23   
To curate and align the interests of the key stakeholders around them, and I mentioned those 
stakeholders earlier. So one entrepreneurs have a series of interests and the competencies, there 






program that's appropriate for those 
 
those entrepreneurs about setting expectations with them. 
 
And if its first if it's pre-seed level, investors pre-seed level entrepreneurs, then getting them to 
investment for us, that was a key, you know, [unintelligible], one of our slogans was from idea to 
investment in 100 days. And then I think, after the program has finished 
 
supporting those entrepreneurs at their at their wish, not at our whim. So once they leave us and 
they receive full on investment, then we, they treat us like mom and dad, and they come back to us 
and they think of the communities being a tremendous source of support, but but we're not going to 
be hammering them for KPIs like a VC would, if we look at mentors, the competence that we need 
there is to select to recruit and attract and select mentors who have the right motivation. So one of 
the challenges is that the people who typically come forward most easily are 
 
one of two categories, they're either the people who basically want to sell their services, fee for time 
as a consultant, or there are people who want to use an accelerator as a sales channel to sell their 
legal practice to sell their accounting practice, whatever it is, and those motivations are not evil, it's 
just that they're not necessarily aligned with the interests of a of a startup. 
 
So we and we found that we needed to understand the motivations of mentors quite carefully. And I 
could go into that in more depth some other time if you want to about how we categorize and 
mentoring and then I think in terms of the investors who were coming to the program, 
 
we needed to attract investors, set their expectations 
 
I'm talking about investors in startups now, set their expectations, weed out the bad apples, there's 
a function of an accelerator to has been to play 
 
policeman in a startup ecosystem. There are a lot of bullshitters out there amongst the early stage 
investors, there were a lot of time wasters people who want startups to come and dance for them, 
like lap dances, you know, for their entertainment. And really, they never write a check. There are 
people who've got completely unhelpful expectations of the amount of control or equity, that they'll 
take in a startup. So there's a function for an accelerator to set expectations, and also to somehow 
redress the balance of power between accelerator between startups and a, and, and investors. So 
we, for example, would keep a little black book 
 
before our startups went into any investor pitch after they left us, 
 
we would brief them on what that's investor has asked the last three startups that we've sent to 
them how that investor behaved if the investor did follow through with a with a company how long 




typically work on information asymmetry, and use that as a power as part of a power game. So we 
try to we try to level out that to try in the best possible way, not by obviously, we have an interest in 
the startup itself. But we also have an interest in the investor community behaving well and the 





valuation, if you ask any angel investor, they'll always say that startups have an unrealistic 
expectation of valuation. Of course, they would, 
 
you know, and its their, baby. So there is a job for a kind of a market maker, I suppose there, you 
know, and in some sense, there's a market making function that that, you know, I don't know 
whether that's been analyzed in 
 
the literature, but I think that's one thing. 
 
And I could go over other kinds of stakeholders as well. But that's 
 
P Thng  27:55   
So those are the core competencies?  
 
R1A  27:57   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  27:59   
Ok, then what about in fact I wanted to ask you, generally, how long is your former acceleration 
program 
 
R1A  28:04   
100 days 
 
P Thng  28:05   
About a 100 days 
 
R1A  28:06   
Yup  
 
P Thng  28:06   
So its a three-month program? 
 
R1A  28:07   
Yup 
 
Yeah, three and a bit. 
 
P Thng  28:12   
So typically, most accelerators, what they do is, you know, they will invite, you know, open up, and 
then you'll get all this application, you interview you sieve them out, and then you put them through 
this hundred days, right. So, after going through this hundred days, what happens after that 100 
days? 
 
R1A  28:29   
So we try to match them up with a seed stage investor, who will then carry them forward, and we 
try to create that match as soon as possible. So about halfway through the program, we will try and 
start matching them up with lead investors who'd be of interest in a country like Singapore, there 
are still probably only 6, 8, 10 lead investors that I would want leading around into a pre- in to a seed 






who are not necessarily done money, but they are, but they're not necessarily either people with a 
capability or the capacity to support the seed stage startup. So for example, most corporations that 
might seek to get involved with a startup have absolutely none of the competence, capability 
capacity, to actually help that startup 
 
when it's so young, when it's the 
 
seed stage.  
 
P Thng  29:27   
So, interesting, so what do you look for in your the 6 to 10 [unintelligble] investors  
 
R1A  29:32   
typically x entrepreneurs who understand what happens at seed stage, they understand that the 
business is still pivoting that the business model will still change, they understand that the metrics 
are not yet firm, they understand that the startup probably won't have reached product market fit 
almost certainly will not yet have reached product market fit. And they have the capacity to take the 
startups through a journey, which I actually think is even harder. I my own view is that, you know, 
most of our startups when you receive a seed funding would raise enough money to give them 18 to 
24 months runway and during that time. So the gap between seed stage and series A, not only do 
you have to hit the numbers, find product market fit, you also have to change the whole culture of 
the business away from being a founder-led business where everyone's a founder to suddenly 
having employees in a multi level structure and putting in place the governance and the reporting 
and bloody bloody, blah. 
 
P Thng  30:27   
so interestingly, so you're saying that this lead investor seems to be quite critical 
 
R1A  30:32   
The [unintelligible] stage is absolutely crucial 
 
P Thng  30:33   
So probably a month or 1 in 10 are successful, this six, six to 10 whoever they are, you know, are the 
ones who really bring them to the next stage. 
 
R1A  30:41   
I think so yeah and I could name I mean, I could, I can tell you off the top of my head. So those are 




there are very few in Singapore, in Singapore, who I've seen consistently do this, there are lots and 
lots of later stage, you know, VCs who typically come from a finance background or the company 
background and they think they can play this game, and they have no idea what they're doing. And 
the problem we've got in Singapore at the moment is a bunch of people through their connections, 
raise series A funds and then found out there wasn't enough deal flow to satisfy those funds. So that 
capital has been deployed in the last two years into companies, which to be honest, are at too early 
a stage. And the funds have now thought, Oh, my God, I've only got you know, two people in this 
fund. And I'm suddenly got to these startups all coming to me asking me for advice, and I've got no 
idea. I've been up on stage at conferences pontificating about how much value I add and how much I 





when they actually had to deliver results. I haven't got a freaking clue what they're doing. They know 
how to read a balance sheet, but they have no idea how to build a business.  
 
P Thng  31:59   
I see. So you're saying the key competencies are not there.  
 
R1A  32:01   
Yup, I think that's a really critical scaling block in Singapore. We don't have investors that many of us 
who are prepared to do the, roll up the sleeves, risky, awkward business of dealing with young It's 
like being a kindergarten teacher. You know, 
 
it's university professors that get the accolades in society, not kindergarteners, 
 
P Thng  32:27   
Unfortunately.  
 
R1A  32:28   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  32:28   
Ok. So the main services of an accelerator, I guess you've mentioned, right, so during this 90 days, 
obviously, they go through a program right, so one they go through a program.  
 
R1A  32:40   
Yeah.  
 




P Thng  32:47   
The lead investors and mentors.  
 
R1A  32:50   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  32:51   
All right and you guys are typically take a certain percentage for your services, or do you take cash I 
mean a percentage of equity. 
 
R1A  33:01   
Percentage of equity and I can tell you about how we ended up coming to that number, if you are 
interested. 
 
P Thng  33:07   
Ok good, so yeah generally, what's the range of 
 
R1A  33:11   
all converge to about eight,  well we ended up with 8.88%. 
 






in if you try to do any logical, there is no logic for what percentage an accelerator should take. And in 
this culture, if we put forward 8.88% people feel shitty, if they don't agree, it feels like an auspicious 
number is somewhere between five and 10. 
 
P Thng  33:40   
OK, for the research so do you guys take cash as well as part of this deal 
 
R1A  33:44   
No  
 
P Thng  33:44   
Just your equity right? 
 
R1A  33:46   
Yup 
 
P Thng  33:46   
Ok, good 
 
R1A  33:48   
We we put cash into the startups we invest 25 to $50,000 
 
P Thng  33:51   
So you guys are getting funding from the investors who actually invest in your- 
 
R1A  33:55   
So there are two sets of investors in our in our community. One is the investor who invest in 
startups. And they are the largest number by far. And then there's a much smaller number of people 
who invest in the accelerator itself. 
 
And they and those two groups end up with very different value propositions and come in for very 
different motivations. 
 
P Thng  34:15   
I see, so that's the large one. Ok good. What are the strengths of an accelerator, what do you think 
are the weaknesses? Based on experience. 
 
R1A  34:24   
So I think the strengths are the opportunity to very rapidly give 
 
entrepreneurs the opportunity to learn by doing, you know, broadly speaking I'm not an educational 
theorist. But you know, broadly, you could say that some education is just in time. And some is just 
in case if I teach you differential calculus, because one day you might need it, that's just in case if 
you've got to go to an investor with a discounted cash flow forecast tomorrow at three o'clock, and 
you've only got 12 hours, then you need it just in time. And we find that entrepreneurs are typically 
very motivated by just in time mentality. So if we, through our program, we have a core curriculum 
that we run through the program, which is you know the essential stuff they need to know some of 
it is obvious like how to read a term sheet or, you know, the basic legal stuff they need to know as a 





week, we would have a check-in meeting with our startups where we set their objectives and key 
results for the next week. 
 
And we would build around the issues being faced by the startups the next element of the 
curriculum. So my own experience as an education, education science TV producer, is that people 
are not very interested in facts. But when they have an emotional reason to connect with those 
facts, they're much more likely to absorb them and apply them. 
 
P Thng  35:54   
So it must, being relevant.  
 
R1A  35:56   
Second, so we make the we build the education contextually around the experiences that the 
entrepreneurs are going through. 
 
P Thng  36:03   
Ok good, so that's one strength of an  
 
R1A  36:08   
Accelerator. 
 
P Thng  36:08   
Accelerator, right. 
 
R1A  36:09   
And I think, and I think the, another strength would then be the really key thing is the community 
 
P Thng  36:14   
Community connection 
 
R1A  36:18   
err and community and the, yes, I mean, 
 
TechStars, who inspired us 
 
have a thesis that they call a boulder thesis, because it comes from Boulder, Colorado. And that 
thesis is that 
 
only entrepreneurs will ultimately lead the growth of an entrepreneurial ecosystem in any location. 
So the theory goes like this that all around the world people are interested in being the next Silicon 
Valley and what happens is when economy is on the up, everyone gets very excited politicians wants 
to be seen shaking hands with pretty young female entrepreneurs outside Institute of 
entrepreneurship bankers think they can make loans lawyers think they can do deals and get paid 
fees. Angels are very happy to invest. Then as soon as there's a whiff of recession, the angels all put 
their money into gold. The politicians get voted out of office, the lawyers start doing divorces. The 
bankers get retrenched. And so the whole ecosystem collapses. So there's this boom bust thing on a 
time cycle of you know, three to five, eight years in most cities around the world. And the only 
people who truly remain interested an committed to entrepreneurship through that period are 
entrepreneurs, again, with no disrespect, higher education institutions, they tend to become very 
interested when there are grants and students who wants to learn entrepreneurship, but when the 





accelerator is to act as the kind of glue in a community, it's to act as a piece of street theater. I mean, 
one of the reasons why we only ran at sort of quarter long program is that in in three months, 
hundred days, you can create enough of a sense of the beginning and a middle and an end for the 
community to feel that there are winners and losers, there are people succeeding there is it's a piece 
of street theater, and that glues the community together. 
 
P Thng  38:12   
You mentioned about the glue, the role of the glue in the community, right. And the second was the 
opportunity to rapidly give entrepreneurs the opportunity to learn. So those are the key strengths. 
What about the weaknesses? 
 
R1A  38:27   
The weaknesses, the really big one is the for a private accelerator is the business model. If you're 
dependent entirely on you create value in the ways I've described. But if the only way you capture 
value is through a share and equity, you're going to have to wait a very long time, most of the equity 
you hold isn't worth the paper it's printed on, it's extremely difficult to track the startups after they 
leave you and to 
 
have all the following investors respect your position. And rather than trying to screw you, which 
they would typically do 
 
so actually capturing value from a purely equity based, accelerator, which is a really difficult thing to 
do. Another weakness, I think, is that an accelerator is by nature a co if you think take susan collins 
definition, it's a cohort driven thing. And there are entrepreneurs out there who are incredibly 
individualistic. [Name] and I often have questions would would Mark Zuckerberg have come to our 
accelerator? You know, would Steve Jobs? The answer is probably no. So I think one of the 
weaknesses is if you were to define entrepreneurship success, only by the kind of the outliers in 
history, 
 
the people who are now running, you know, unicorn companies, then I think you'd say, Well, how 
many of those unicorns have been through an accelerator, and some of them have, but but not all of 
them. And throughout history, obviously, they'll nobody went through an accelerator. So 
 
I think you have to say, what accelerators need to prove is that for a community, they can more 
consistently farm and educate entrepreneurs. 
 
And that value-add, and how that's articulated and how it's appreciated is not yet firm the context in 
which accelerators are operating are so varied, the purposes for which they're set up are so diverse, 
and the competence with which they're run is also very varied. And as a result, a huge weakness at 
the moment is, it's extremely hard to measure impact, and to compare apples with apples. 
 
P Thng  40:49   
So you seem to hit on this where I was also looking at venture builders, they tend to be better 
trackers of, you know, the development and then consistently hand hold them just to make sure 
they don't fall off the cliff. Or you know, bring them back. 
 
maybe there's something that we 
 
R1A  41:08   






P Thng  41:09   
The difference, thank you. 
 
R1A  41:10   
Which is all a lot easier when you're dealing with a smaller number of people for a longer period of 
time, and you have more control. And yup. 
 
P Thng  41:16   
so if you had to prioritize what are the five most important things that you would do as an 
accelerator? 
 
R1A  41:22   
Recruit great teams 
 
P Thng  41:24   
Ok, recruitment. 
 
R1A  41:28   
I would almost say, the next five things are to recruit great teams, if you start off with with really 
great teams, the rest of it is easy. 
 
P Thng  41:38   
Easy, all right, ok. So now, let's put a scenario you've now gone through this exercise, and then 
looking at really five great teams in there. So what's the next important thing? 
 
R1A  41:48   
So the next thing after that, I think will be too 
 
to set expectations with all the other stakeholders, and to align the interests of the other 
stakeholders around the accelerator. 
 
And then I think if I was going to pick a number four thing, I would say that mentoring is them is the 
value add, that's actually what the value add. But in order to deliver the value add mentoring value 
add effectively, you need to have aligned expectations for all the parties involved. 
 
And those to be honest, I think are the most important things. 
 
Integrity, maybe, I mean, yeah, integrity. And every one of the things that you tend to notice about 
successful accelerators is that they are the people who run them are very 
 
direct. They're not necessarily, you know, loud mouth and critical. But they are ruthlessly honest 
ruthlessly honest, because in 100 days, there isn't time to bullshit, no sugarcoating. So it has to be 
authenticity. 
 
And that's much easier. If you're, for example, if you don't have a corporate sponsor, if you have a 
corporate sponsor there's a load of wayang called for that 
 
suddenly is an enormous, jarring culture clash. So as soon as you know, big boss comes over, and 
you need to put on some kind of display, and then the manager that's your liaison with the 
corporate sponsor is worried about how things are going to look for their sponsor and, and then 





and meanwhile, they're thinking, you know, I've got 100 days here and I've got to raise money, and 
otherwise, I'm out of money. So that so that kind of misalignment is really uncomfortable, 
 
P Thng  43:41   
Then let me see is there anything recently that you discovered is not important as you thought it was 
as an accelerator, that you know as you look at initially you thought it was really important but when 
you look back its really not important at the end of the day. 
 
R1A  44:00   
I would now say physical 
 
space, I, I could run an accelerator at a Starbucks, 
 
it doesn't matter. It really doesn't matter at all. There's nothing special about the space I think where 
space physicality is important is in a very nascent ecosystem, very, very early stage ecosystem then 
having a hub where people come together is terribly important. And initially, when we set up 
[company name], the physical space was really important now that there are lots of CO working 
spaces and other places that startups come together, I think that function isn't so important to you 
anymore 
 
P Thng  44:35   
Then is there anything recently that you discovered is very important, which you did not thought so 
previously? 
 
R1A  44:52   
Really tediously the systems and processes to track investment. So when you have 70 startup sort of 
been through an accelerator, there's probably three or four legal agreements for each of those and 
then as they go through multi-stages of investment afterwards, each of them ends up with bespoke 
different arrangements with follow-on investors and the cost and complexity of managing the 
portfolio is something that we really had not made proper allowance for. 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  45:24   
Ok, thank you very much, ok fit for purpose who's suitable for which models, you know, I'm trying to 
figure out what kind of terminology entrepreneurs would be appropriate to go for the acceleration 
model. So my first question, what kind of situation would an accelerator program be suitable? 
 
R1A  45:49   
Can I tell you about our selection criteria? Therefore? Yeah, so our selection criteria evolved through 
several stages, but I'll give you the endpoint, we ended up realizing that we needed a balanced 
team. So the corny thing for digital startup that you need a hacker, a hipster and a hustler. So you 
know, someone that understands technology, someone that understands design and user 
experience, someone that understands 
 
what do we have hustling so i was telling those, okay, hipster hustler. I think we also realized 
another there's that corny thing, people saying any business, you need to finder a reminder and a 
grinder, you need someone who's going to win the business, someone who's going to organize 





of [unintelligible] team model kind of way, a balanced team in that sense. Second thing we look for 
would be domain insight. So if a company wants to do women shoe, retail online, is really important 
that they have a genuine insight into that domain. The next thing we look for is passion. And the 
reason we look for that passion is because the company will hit a bump in bumps in the road, 
multiple bumps in the road, and there is this picture that Paul Graham drew called the trough of 
sorrow, you know, typically takes nine to 18 months to find product market fit. And during that time, 
there will be lots of if you post it on a graph kind of wiggles the false hope. And if a company has not 
got passion for the thing that they're doing, if there's not some higher purpose, beyond just making 
money, they will go back to consulting or go and take a job or the team will fall apart there needs to 
be a higher purpose. And finally, I think the thing we ended up realizing was that when most people 
evaluate a start up, they will evaluate the idea 
 
because that feels less personal, it feels more objective. But in truth for a pre-seed startup, the idea 
is almost meaningless because it will pivot and evolve through a Lean Startup iterative process. So 
we would only give the idea itself 20% of the valuation of the the score on a team coming in we're 
much more interested in the domain insight the thing that they've the core inside that they've got 
and so 80% of our valuation with them beyond the team itself. And we look for the team to have 
integrity and to be coachable. So one of the things we do in our recruitment process would be to 
take them through 
 
an experience where we give them some advice, and then a week or two later come back to them 
and say, Well, what do they do with that advice? If they've passively aggressively said yeah yeah 
yeah yeah yeah to us? And then done nothing with it, then are they really going to be coachable? 
Can we add any value if they've taken our advice, found that it didn't work, discover something new 
and interesting, that's a really positive sign that they aren't you know, coachable and intelligent if 
they meekly accept our advice, and don't really understand it, but apply it because the big boss said, 
you know, professor who said it, and that's not a good sign either. So we look for teams that in a 
mature adult way, will engage in a dialogue around the advice they're being given, 
 
we would discriminate against any kind of lying, any kind of misrepresentation, deception, and the 
reason that was extraordinary prevalent in our teams. Finally, there were some very simple things 
that we look for, we look for teams which have read books, there seems to be an enormous 
correlation between people who, you know, if entrepreneurship success, a lot of it seems to be 
down to pattern recognition. And people who have read books about success and failure in the 
startup world have made some effort to try and learn from the patterns of the past, you know, and 
there's that quote, isn't there that those who don't understand history are condemned to repeat it, 
and and again, and again, we would see startups we'll be thinking, well, surely you must know why 
Kodak failed. If you don't know why Kodak failed, then you shouldn't be trying to do an imaging 
business. Do you know what I mean? So we 
 
looked for teams, which have done some prior art, I've done some reading and research if they 
vehemently denied that they have any that there are any other competitors to them but then in 10 
seconds, we can show them with a Google search that actually there are 20 competitors have they 
talked to those competitors have they mystery shopped them have they got some advantage over 
them and typically they wouldn't have. 
 
P Thng  50:19   
Good, so those are the kinds of qualities that you look for, thank, thank you very much. Later we 
face this question which is much easier what's your recruitment criteria and straightaway you know. 
So towards the end now let me just ask if you were to advise someone about the path they should 






R1A  50:42   
If you're a first time entrepreneur, go to an accelerator and select that accelerator based on 
conversations with its alumni, look at the statements that the operators of the accelerator make 
about the accelerators values. And it's value, you know, and it's values and its value proposition and 
look for validation of those statements by the alumni. And if those values and the value proposition 
align with you, I think that you would make much more progress quicker and to accept going into an 
accelerator, an accelerator accelerates you in two directions. This is down this comes from [name] at 
MIT, you know, he points out the accelerator either makes or breaks the business, the the objective 
is in a short period of time, if it's gonna work, get it to success quicker if it's going to fail, break it 
quicker, so that we can all stop wasting time. 
 
P Thng  51:36   
So instead of dragging them and wasting it.  
 
R1A  51:36   
Yeah. 
 
P Thng  51:38   
Ok, very good. So so that's what you advise check with the alumni and find out whether they are 
suitable, what would your advice be would your advice be different if they already have a team that 
means they come to you as a team? 
 
R1A  51:49   
Oh, so they we would only take teams so we there is are there are models of acceleration that are all 
about team formation. And for example, Entrepreneur First is a two or Anthela are both two-stage  
processes, they have a three months team formation process. And then they have an accelerator, 
which, as far as I can see, is very similar to what we were doing at [company name], I think, actually, 
that's a if I were going to do an accelerator ever again, that's the kind of model I would go if I was 
going to accelerate again, because I think what we saw was that most people don't have the 
professional and social networks have sufficient scale when they're first time entrepreneurs to get 
the right team together. So out of a team of three people, there'll be one person who's not up to 
scratch, at least. 
 
P Thng  52:33   
Ok good, would your advice be different if they already have customers that Mr. team comes to you.  
 
R1A  52:42   
We have we had plenty of teams with customers. 
 
P Thng  52:45   
In a sense it would be similar. 
 
R1A  52:45   
Exactly the same, your advice be different if they already have? 
 
And by the way, with the cast of teams that already have customers, usually, they don't know why 
they have customers, and they don't know how to get more customers. So usually, the thing that 
they're struggling with is, yeah, we want some business. But we don't know why we want that 
business. We don't know why we lost the other business, they've usually got no understanding of 





about theory and practice, you know, they've got all the practices and they've got no theory as to, to 
analyze decision making for the future said, By joining an accelerator, they can accelerate their 
pattern recognition, and they're learning of the packs required to build a successful business. 
 
P Thng  53:27   
Right. So those with the MVP and they have some customers, you know,  
 
R1A  53:30   
Exactly same advice, yeah.  
 
P Thng  53:32   
Quite interesting. Let me ask you this question about the 70 teams that so far most of them, when 
they join you, they came with ideas mainly, or they have really identified a very specific company or 
industry problem where they've spoken to the industry or the company, or do they come with I've 
got this great idea? Because I've worked in this industry. And so I'd like to tackle this problem. That 
means my question simply is, when they come to you do they have already investigated got a kind of 
a commitment from a corporate with that problem, or do they come in with this idea, and I'm going 
to conquer the world? 
 
R1A  54:15   
So I think it's a time factor here also, which is that 
 
we used to have a joke with [company name], we'd have a little box by 
 
the door, and we called it the genius box. And we say, when you arrive on your first day, we want 
you to write down your brilliant idea that's going to make you a billionaire and put it in that box, so 
we can keep it safe for you. Because the chances of that idea actually being correct are vanishingly 
small. So when we began [company name] in 10, 2010, 2011, 2012 2010 
 
that time most entrepreneurs would come up and come to us and say that I have an idea and we'd 
say to them not interested in your idea, I'm interested in your domain insight, I'm interested in your 
understanding of a customer problem. And at that time, the whole language of Lean Startup was 
only emerging I mean, around 2012, so there wasn't a design thinking was still not not widely 
understood. So the concept of empathy was, the concept was still quite not understood and the 
concept of a job to be done was not well understood. Now, those things are much more widespread. 
If you read a blog in many languages around Southeast Asia, you'll hear people talking about 
customer 
 
problems, and so on. And, and, and the language has got more sophisticated. So in recent years, you 
know, we don't talk about problem statements anymore. We talk about jobs to be done, 
 
and which are more subtle, nuanced definition of a business opportunity, and that language is sort 
of has permeated into the community now to go back to your question where you asked was there a 
specific need to a corporate in our case, 
 
none of the startups came in specifically aiming to solve a problem for a corporation. Interestingly 
enough, many of them, the most successful businesses that we backed have all turned out to be fast 
type businesses solving boring, steady problems for large corporations. So for example, [company 
name] is one of our most successful businesses, it uses AI to do KYC for banks. Now, they didn't start 





corporations, the software engineers recognize that corporations have data buried in Outlook date, 
Outlook, Outlook, emails, 
 
SQL databases is splurged all over a corporation. And if you're trying to find information relating to a 
particular customer, in a Telco, they might be in all sorts of databases. So they created a new initially 
a generic cross platform search engine. And the and people liked that, you know, they were okay 
with that. And some corporations would pay them $20 per seat per year for a cross platform search 
engine. But what they haven't done is narrowed down on the specific use case that would give them 
product market fit. And when they I really, really focused on applying their AI technology to that one 
really tedious problem KYC, then it really worked. And the pattern we ended up learning through 
that experience was that in the b2b context, if you want a start-up to succeed, it has to do three 
things, it has to make money, which pleases the CEO, it has to save money, which pleases the CFO, 
and it has to ideally address some tedious compliance issue, which will get the compliance officer so 
the three biggest blokes the compliance officer who's got to say yes to it, the CFO who's got to sign 
off on it, and the CEO all need to be, you know, preferably something that ticks all three boxes, 
that's much more likely to get adoption. And 
 
so these are the kind of patterns that emerged through and again, being part of an accelerator. As 
soon as we have an insight like that, it sounds obvious when you say it, but we can then share that 
around our community, build it into our mentoring and the whole community learns a lot quicker 
than any individual startup 
 
P Thng  58:03   
It appears you have this continuous learning of what they say  
 
R1A  58:06   
Absolutely 
 
P Thng  58:07   
They've passed the six signs was that? [name] [unintelligible], the sixth sense or whatever 
 
R1A  58:14   
I think we're accelerating all that we're learning as a community, and we're able to transfer insights 
from one domain. So if we learned that domain in banking and, FinTech then how do we apply that 
to hospitality or logistics 
 
or something else? 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  58:36   
Why have you chosen when you started the [company name], why did you choose the acceleration 
model 
 
R1A  58:42   
We, we felt that there were broadly two approaches, there was a Moneyball approach where 
statistically, if we did and we were aiming to do more startups, we were aiming to do probably twice 






We looked at it we said, there's an enormous amount of chance in this, we can't have a perfect filter 
that selects the very best stars for the future consistently all the time. So the best way to do this is to 
have as large portfolio of several hundred startups. And we weren't alone in thinking that I mean 
500 startups is cool 500 startups because that was the investment thesis. I think if you ask [name] 
now he would say to you actually probably need at least I did ask him this question online once and 
face to face also. And he reckons it's probably a couple hundred, you probably need to guarantee 
yourself a unicorn, somewhere in there in a 100 in a 200, you're going to find a unicorn. 
 
So we went for the approach that said, let's do a widespread and the reason we did that is because I 
think we were humble about our ability to pick winners that the temptation, you know, historically, 
entrepreneurs have been very vision driven. And they've said, I have taste, you know, I am an arbiter 
of taste in this world. And I believe that this issue this technology, this market is going to be 
successful in the future. And usually investors will back historically entrepreneurs, because while he 
was right, last times, I've no idea why he's right this time, but he probably will be, and there's no 
logic to it is really is about following the herd. So vision driven entrepreneurship, if you've genuinely 
got confidence, and you've got some thesis, and you can persuade investors to back you, you could 
do a venture builder, and you could build a smaller number of ventures typically clustered around a 
vertical or a business model or a technology. In our case, we thought, this is a very, very early startup 
ecosystem that we're entering. 
 
The most important thing is that we get great teams. And if we limit ourselves to one vertical, you 
know, we were the very first startup accelerator in Southeast Asia, we limit ourselves to one vertical, 
the chances of finding enough are going to be very low. 
 
P Thng  1:00:50   
So you guys were looking at them in terms of timing and it was good opportunity where this market 
was quite nascent  
 
R1A  1:00:56   
Yeah  
 
P Thng  1:00:56   
So that's why you chose that model. 
 
R1A  1:00:58   
Yes, and others at about the same time, maybe different choice and we [unintelligible] whether they 
were more successful or not.  
 
P Thng  1:01:03   
Okay, so my last final question is, what do you notice about the key differences in new ventures 
before and after undergoing your program? 
 
R1A  1:01:15   
They have vary along with the practice, they have other kinds of knowledge, there's a lady called 
Hillary Austin who wrote a paper, how [unintelligible] called artistry, I think she wrote it with Roger 
Martin from the Rotman School of Business and she suggested that maybe there are three kinds of 
knowledge that an artist has, there is knowledge that you read in books. So if you are a ceramic 
artist making art, you could read about pre-raphaelite art, or ancient Egyptian art, or whatever, 
that's the stuff that you learn the facts, then there is experiential knowledge. So if I'm making a pot, 
and I bake the clay in a fire, which looks that color, and I bake it for this long it will and when the clay 





knowledge that you can only get through experience. And then finally, is the first set of knowledge 
that she calls directional knowledge. So for example, if I'm a Islamic artist, I will probably not create 
representations of the human form, that's one of the things which the Quran 
 
forbids it's not halal, so. 
 
So Islamic art is pushed towards, you know, those geometric patterns and the things that you see 
around Mosques, and is beautiful in some way because of that. So I think in the same way, if you 
think of that applying to entrepreneurs, there's a bunch of stuff to do with how to read a balance 
sheet, how to read a term sheet 
 
duties of a director, you know, Bloody Bloody, but all that stuff is book burning, then the pattern 
recognition stuff, like the stuff I've just suggested, you know, you've got to do something that works 
for the CFO, the CEO, and the compliance officer, that stuff which you can learn as an individual. But 
it's, it's much quicker to learn as part of the group. And again, I think if you look at artists, there are 
schools of artists who come together with schools and academics who move into a new area, and 
they learn by experience, and then is that third thing, which is you set by the, the sort of 
 
belief system, the value system of an entrepreneur, so if you're interested in 
 
You know if you're a very technology-driven team, and you're obsessed with the idea of productivity, 
that's going to take you down one particular direction, if you're a team that's really obsessed with, 
with online communities, and, and optimizing human interaction on a platform that's going to take 
you down another direction. 
 
So often, I think the domain insight that people have is something that would fit into that third 
category. You know, that's what helps you choose the domain, I'm going to do a travel startup 
because I, I worked at that business for 20 years. And I really can see those opportunities. 
 
P Thng  1:03:55   
All right, so in the observation you mind, you mentioned about the 70 teans right, so they joined 
your programs and then after three, four months, you know, thye finish they leave the program, so I 
guess you did some follow up with these [unintelligible] right? And what did you notice when you 
followed up with them? You know, what was the difference in the whether, do you think they were 
much more aware of the market now, the size, did they improve their financial acumen skills did 
they have a better understanding of teams?  
 
R1A  1:04:29   
So I can answer that through several different lenses. 
 
I could look at it through the sort of the classic business lens, you know, what did they achieve, and 
whatever. And I think there, I can say that when we compare the startups that came out of our 
program to a random group of 70 
 
that didn't go through the program that applied to us 5% of the teams that didn't go through the 
program secured seed funding when we did our survey, whereas 50% plus secured seed funding 
now, securing seed funding is not success, but it's perhaps some proxy for, for success. So that's the 
business lens, if you like, the hard sort of short term metric. I think the other metric the other one 
I'm more interested in, I suppose, was the human journey that these guys were going through. And 
that was very interesting when they leave the program that kind of zonked, it's a bit like when 





been such an intense experience, they are trying to make sense of what just happened, you know, 
and their identity changes at that point, they suddenly think, Well, now, I am an entrepreneur now, I 
it's almost as if we've kind of graduate. And that's one of the reasons why we had we thought it's 
very important to have a demo day some people say, sometimes, why do you have a demo day at 
the end of an accelerator? Wouldn't it be more efficient, just to set up a bunch of one to one 
meetings with investors well, it might be more efficient, but in terms of the community is terribly 
important to have a celebration, you know, there's a reason we have birthdays, there's a reason we 
have these rites of passage in society. And then I think, picking up on that human thing, the other 
thing I noticed then was, they would then go through a period of sort of two or three months of sort 
of bewilderment, thinking, gosh, I had really intense support every day, from mentors, and so on. 
And they've been working as a totally unsustainable pace in a way that you couldn't possibly 
continue working out without killing yourself. And so they feel a bit bewildered. And typically, 
they're having a lot of investor meetings during that time. So they kind of they would keep coming 
back to us a bit like, again, undergraduates tend to come back to this and the student bar after they 
after they graduated, then there was an interesting thing that came in, I don't know if this was just 
the male entrepreneurs, but about three to four months after they graduated from us, some of the 
most successful younger teams kind of had this 
 
sort of teenage rebellion thing, they, they, they get their seed funding, and they become incredibly 
cocky. And it was a bit like, I wonder whether my son will go through this now he's just joined 
secondary school, I wonder if he will now kind of look down on his primary school and think, oh, that 
was a baby-ish experience, you know, I'm a proper entrepreneur now. And I don't want I'm ashamed 
ofthe fact that I was in kindergarten, I was in a school. So there was this period when we actually had 
real, I've seen it with several startups, when they kind of really resented us as an accelerator. And 
they were typically focus on the fact that, you know, you've got 8.88% of my equity, you took that 
away from me, and I'd sort of say to them a bit like a dad, you know, we, you know, in all honesty, 
we do give you the first money that anyone ever gave you. And we did spend a large amount of time 
curating experience for you. And they would be, 
 
they would, they would hate us for about six or eight months, some of them, not all of them hate us, 
but some of them would come back during that period. And they want to be mentors, because they, 
they would want things, I think it's an instinctive urge to do reflective practice, actually, we tried 
getting our entrepreneurs to keep reflective practice journals, and it's just hopeless, there's no way 
they're just not the kind of people who are going to do that. But they do need to reflect and we 
found after the program, they by coming back and talking to people who were kind of, they are now 
a year further down the path from the next cohort, you know, go over one that's come in, they 
would revisit their own experience, watch this, the participants in the cohort after them, or the one 
beyond that go through the same learning experience, they were kind of solidify the learning 
experience. And I noticed that pattern very repeatedly. 
 
And then there's a period after that about a year, 18 months after they left us when they sort of lose 
interest by that time they are now sort of speaking at conferences, and they've got a team of, you 
know, 20, 30 people to manage. And then their relationship changed with us. And they became 
more like 
 
that to say, they would treat us like mom and dad. So 
 
the analogy I will be giving us in the West, and it's very typical to leave home when you're 18, 19. 
And when you leave home, your relationship, your parents change, they're still your parents, but you 





they want to typically talk about issues that they can't discuss with their follow on funders, they 
wanted to talk about 
 
their own goals in life, they want to talk about relationship issues with, you know, their partners in 
business or in life, they want to talk about, was this the right business to be done doing? Should I 
give up on this thing? Or is it you know, 
 
P Thng  1:09:26   
More coming to you like a life coach.  
 
R1A  1:09:28   
Yeah, so the relationship changes very much to be a live coach, one or two of them. Just sort of 
 
[unintelligible], I mean, the some of the foreign ones just break off communication completely, and 
basically run away with our money, which is really frustrating, we knew that would be a risk up front. 
And another thing that was very frustrating. And this is going back to the disease and dishonesty 
thing we now know that there were probably three teams that went through the program explicitly 
with their own hidden agenda, to learn how to run an accelerator so they could go and set one up in 
their home country. So they took our money, they stole all of our methodology, and then they tried 
certain accelerator, they've all failed. But we know from we had an anthropologist working for us 
studying as for the first two years that we were in operation, and, and those anthropologists became 
very close to the teams. And we indirectly know through those anthropologists that that was 
actually the real agenda for a team from Indonesia, a team from Philippines and the team from 
Vietnam. 
 
P Thng  1:10:32   
Interesting, you mentioned, they run away, that means you've got equity and then 
 
R1A  1:10:37   
And it's worthless. And we, you know, so, for example, there is a Chinese entrepreneur I'm very fond 
of 
 
who I, I've spent a lot of time with mentoring. He's got an excellent product, but he's quite a 
inexperienced entrepreneur, he's gone back to China, he's got funding from some kind of 
municipality, who's put him into some kind of accelerator. And, of course, in Chinese culture, he's 
now got people who are very close to him, who are taking him out drinking and eating and 
everything else and their agenda. 
 
They have no interest whatsoever in us. And, for example, it became one point, and he told me how 
he reincorporated the business in China without telling us and was using all the IP he developed with 
our money in China. And he was very open about this, because he couldn't see that that was any 
issue. And I said to him, Well, that's a that's a bit of an issue for us. Because, to be honest, you know, 
we paid we invested that with you, and he just didn't, he didn't really understand that, that he had 
some kind of obligation to us, you know, moral or financial, and he was just wasn't part of his 
culture. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  1:11:53   
So hang on, this part I just want to pull out.  Your money that means as an accelerator, you actually 
give them some stipend? 
 





Ee invested 25 to $50,000 into each of the 70 startups. 
 
P Thng  1:12:04   
I see, I see so 25 to $50,000 per start-up 
 
R1A  1:12:08   
Yup, right 
 
P Thng  1:12:09   
And during the next three months, 
 
R1A  1:12:10   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  1:12:11   
Alright ok, ok good. 
 
R1A  1:12:13   
And that will be typical of an accelerator to invest between 25 and $100,000. 
 
P Thng  1:12:18   
And then for, facilities you charged them or? 
 
R1A  1:12:21   
We didn't charge anything. Some accelerators like for 500 startups would give you $50,000 and then 
take back $25,000 in fees because that way you can claim you had a $50,000 investment Even 
though 50 you know, we always thought that was bullshit. So, 
 
P Thng  1:12:37   
okay, good. Just give them the cash. So I think at this part its just the formal ending of the discussion, 
so I really appreciate it.  
 
R1A  1:12:45   
You're welcome. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  1:12:47   
I mean, its so expansive and you know took us about one hour, 15 minutes. 
 
R1A  1:12:50   
 Really? Wow. Okay.  
 
P Thng  1:12:51   






Background of Interviewee R2A 
 
Participant Code:    R2A 
Incubator Type:       Accelerator 
Date of Interview:   Jan  31 2019, 9am 




Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee .............................................................................. 198 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures ......................................................................... 199 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models .................................................................. 206 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) .................................................... 208 







Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:02   
Okay, so whatever we transcribe I will anonymize it, so everything that identifies your company we'll 
take it out. 
 
R2A  0:08   
I mean, I can only speak from my perspective as a Cofounder of sort of [Company name] no longer in 
Singapore, I think the timeline was 2014 to 2016 so it was, 2013, 2016. 
 
P Thng  0:28   
So I'll do the formal part of this interview. First usually there's a consent to make sure that you 
consent first... that you're above 18 years and all that stuff 
 
R2A  0:40   
Am I? Yeah, okay.  
 
P Thng  0:50   
Okay. Good so you just sign here, thanks. Its part of those ethical thing that we keep track at SMU.  
 
R2A  0:52   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  0:52   
Okay, good. So I'm going to first start off by asking the following, I've only got about five questions. 
We should get this done over in about 30 to 40 minutes at most. So, at [company name], what was 
the title and where was the location?  
 
R2A  1:12   
So, I was at [company name], London, and Singapore co founder and COO. 
 
P Thng  1:27   
Start off with the first question, first question is to get some information about your background. 
How long have you been in a venture industry  
 
R2A  1:36   
So now I mean now looking back it's been 
 
P Thng  1:38   
Yes 
 
R2A  1:40   
Only, only seven half, seven years so yeah.  
 
P Thng  1:45   
And how many new ventures have you been associated with, build, incubated or accelerated or 
invested? 
 





50, I mean hands on right so [company name] did 180, right? So under my leadership role in London 
and Singapore, I did 30 and then I did myself 10 probably now then have [unintelliglbe] for 10 or 50, 
yeah. 
 
P Thng  2:13   
So do you, [company name] consider itself as an accelerator or venture-?  
 
R2A  2:18   
Accelerator  
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  2:20   
Good so that's the first question. Question 2, definition of success of new ventures or new startups 
so. So firstly, I want to get some clarity about what's the definition of success of a new venture? 
 
R2A  2:33   
For [company name] or for my perspective  
 
P Thng  2:35   
From your perspective of those startups 
 
R2A  2:38   
In, in [company name]?  
 
P Thng  2:40   
Yes, in [company name] 
 
R2A  2:41   
So I think the way we got, we are team and the industry got measured is how many partnerships 
with corporates are being established and during the accelerator, read the key key key KPI 
partnerships can be, POCs or letter of intent or  obviously, any kind of contract that is one major 
milestone. The second one is big numbers follow on funding. So how much funding does the startup 
or the startups raise within the first 12 months of finishing the accelerator? That's I think, is one of 
the key numbers that accelerators awlays have on their flags. Say erase this and that. 
 
P Thng  3:31   
But then from the new ventures perspective, that means the start of.  
 
R2A  3:35   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  3:35   
Perspective, what do you define as successful startups?  
 
R2A  3:40   
I think, for them, it's, it's, it has several aspects. The first one is more the internal one. So the startup 
comes to get more insights on the team building, on strategy, on how to set up a marketing plan, 





that they are looking to receive in a very condensed time with the accelerator. That's one I think, 
externally speaking, it's that they are coming to find more customers they're coming to find more 
investors and also think some of them are looking for more promotion or more you know know a 
brand to be attached to, to, to increase value and so, there was always this you are one of the top 10 
startups in Asia. And so that helps them as well. So I think there's two factors - internal factor and 
external factor. So I think that's what I normally would say they will call a success if they have 
achieved most of those things. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  4:45   
Then what about in terms of financial measure? How would you sum it?  
 
R2A  4:50   
Yeah,I mean, obviously, there's a financial stipend or grant attached to being an incubator 
accelerator, the various models that a boot camp we had 15,000 pounds or SGD 25,000, that startup 
got three months of the program. Yeah, but I in return for 6 to 8 on equity.  
 
P Thng  5:16   
6 to 8 percent.  
 
R2A  5:17   
Yeah, I think that however, I would not, I myself, never told them that many of us can force it on 
them. I also think them they never really came to an accelerator, because there's money. If they 
come for that money, that they shouldn't be there.  
 
P Thng  5:32   
All right. So how then do you define after you've accelerated them? How would you consider them 
or when you say they are successful? 
 
R2A  5:44   
I think every startup has its own little DNA and its own little, you know, dynamic, every startup has 
its own uniqueness. So for some startups, it's really about when they have signed up 10 major 
corporate lines, if that were B2B, for example, if they're B2C can argue, is to have crossed the 
10,000th user mark, and others is really to hire excellent engineers, or sales staff. And that's where 
somehow everything clicks, you know I'm always about the click, when does it click, when all those 
come together. And that's for each startup is different I think, inside [company name] case we had 
mostly B2B companies, majority were B2B. So that's where I think the [unintellgible] are important 
to look into the next within the next two years time to kind of go somewhere, break-even. So have a 
B2B business model that gets you long term contracts into the door probably again five to 10 that 
 
P Thng  6:47   
So less that two years break-even?  
 
R2A  6:48   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  6:50   
And then you're looking at how do you also measure success in terms of x number of times on the 
investments? 
 







P Thng  7:01   
That means in terms of returns do you like $100 million 
 
R2A  7:06   
No no, we never had we've never had those numbers we're I think we did this model of accelerator 
is not to primarily make money as an investment venture turn, that that long term this model of 
accelerator, has like no change if you ask me to become more corporate. So the short term cash 
flows that you receive from corporate sponsors, are more valuable than, than a 5 to 10 year rise, of 
venture returns from your investment. Where Y Combinator and probably TechStars in US who 
started very early who are the only who really can claim to have them they received money from 
from from the investments, I don't have any other accelerators out there who made money from the 
extra investment. 
 
P Thng  7:55   
Let me now move into question - part of two, what is, what do you would define as failure of new 
ventures? 
 
R2A  8:06   
To fail, comes comes various ways. I always have the people 
 
P Thng  8:11   
People 
 
R2A  8:11   
People, so the co founder leaves, the [unintelligible] team falls apart. There was a there was a when 
the team falls apart for various reasons, co founder leaves, you know, the wife or the husband says, I 
want to go back somewhere. Yeah, disagreement around ownership, if you have disagreement on 
strategy, I have seen this so many times. And this is probably the most common reason why it failed 
at the beginning. Second one is certainly might sound focused. So the customer didn't sign up that 
the funding didn't come through. But to be very honest, and this is from founders don't face that 
they will sail through this. So it comes back to people.  
 
P Thng  8:49   
People, right. Strong founders are really key.  
 
R2A  8:54   
Yeah, yeah. And I, and again, I see it in our, you know, cohort, what had founders leave, co founders 
leaves and actually the team were stronger because of, the co founder left. So it's also next, right? 
That's also very good time. Three months to come. Because con, so condensed, so hyper pressure 
that some people can't stand it as it is a very good test for people who is actually endurable and 
who's not, right. 
 
P Thng  9:16   
Good test of endurance, huh.  
 
R2A  9:17   
Yeah, yeah, yeah correct.  
 





Okay, good. So now let me move on to the question three. I want to differentiate between the two 
incubation models, venture builders and accelerators you are familiar with venture builders right?  
 
R2A  9:30   
Yeah. So.  
 
P Thng  9:31   
So basically, my first question is, what do you think are the core competencies of an accelerator 
means what should you really be good at? 
 
R2A  9:41   
I also know the answer to venture builder, okay, so the core competence of an accelerator is, I think, 
to the people on the platform or whatever is need to really [uneligible] a platform so what it means 
is that you are pulling in the right resources from various knowledge pools to again, provide 
knowledge and insights to accelerator to basically build a little teaching program so that you have 
someone coming in for marketing someone coming in for finance of clients, really have your, your 
experts at hand. So you have to know those, you have a good network. Secondly, you have to 
excellent network with that customers. So industry contacts, potential clients. And again. So, 
[company name]  was sponsored by many, many banks and other institutions. I was basically 
networking the whole time with with Becky, CEOs and innovation heads and so on innovation labs to 
just say, Hey, you know, what, did you [unintelliglbe] this. So it's a mass of networking game. And 
thirdly, it has connections to the investment industry, which again, is a third said earlier, it's very 
important to get the funding so I was also networking a lot with investors, VCs family offices, so I 
think the three key things competencies, yeah, yeah, measurable as they are different things I think. 
 
P Thng  11:07   
And what are the main services of an accelerator? Typically what they provide? 
 
R2A  11:10   
so I think it's a it's an office, real estate for normally Three, two or three plus one, four months. 
 
P Thng  11:18   
One to four months.  
 
R2A  11:19   
Yeah then you have the cash cash component to it, then you provide sort of intangible like virtual 
services, all those AWS credits and marketing credits, and Google whatever credits because you are 
you are a partner of those programs, you provide these classes, master classes and workshops for 
free, then you run several events with clients and investors. That's then yeah, I think big one is 
obviously Demo Day, which is a very big component of an accelerator so we have a big demo day. 
That's a big service. I think we spend a lot of money on this [unintelligible] 
 
P Thng  12:16   
Okay, so demo day 
 
R2A  12:17   
You have it is a big one. And then we did a very good job, that's at [company name], I think, also 
expensive. But yeah, so that, and then yeah, I think that was [unintelligible], there was I mean, I can 
tell you what others are doing. But the [company name] that was that. 
 





So services, and then what do you think are the main strengths of an accelerator? 
 
R2A  12:45   
I think a very important one - that's underrated or, very often, it's inviting family and, and it's, it's 
providing a safe harbor for experiments. And for other founders to meet other founders, I think the 
best if I look back and think what were the best classes we ran if you like, and also the ones that are 
most valuable were the peer to peer classes when, you know, we had pizza and beer. And then we 
just talked about the problem with the founders, we just took the CEOs and founders out there, we 
just talk about issues with the team. And whatever there is it there I think I remember those are 
very, very valuable for and I don't think you have that much you should have it, founder any case, it's 
especially I think in an accelerator that's a very important one its this yeah is really, this is friendships 
and trust, you can establish a little family with Max is highly intense, but as, you know, founders are 
not easy 
 
P Thng  13:39   
Yeah there's like conflicts and all that stuff right? 
 
R2A  13:41   
We have a lot of fights with the people as well, I think it's a very, that's very its a core strength of 
accelerator. Then secondly, I really, I think it's, it's if you think about the this, this age of information, 
flow of age of contact, and LinkedIn and whatnot and WhatsApp I think that an accelerator helps to 
accelerate the introduction to the right people. So if you think of, if you want to sell to a bank, it 
normally takes three or four attempts to find the right person and an accelerator, maybe shorten 
this by two months, because you are saving two or three emails. That's really what I mean, it's really 
in a very efficient way to meet people that are relevant to speed, speed to market speed to clients, 
speed to investors go to market. 
 
P Thng  14:27   
Go to markets faster. 
 
R2A  14:28   
Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
 
So I got my, my, my, my day was just filled with introductions. I've sent so many introduction people, 
I just connected people every time connection. 
 
P Thng  14:39   
So those are the two key strengths.  
 
R2A  14:41   
I think, ideally, ideally, it's also Yeah, so I think there is a certain, its very tough times, right? For 
entrepreneurs and founders. And if you, I can't claim I've done a start up before successfully, that 
well, I've done but for them. But in any case, it always helped many of them were just looking for a 
home. And it's so much, we brought in also other speakers who done it before, who exit the 
company successfully, just for the founders talk to those guys to gain the knowledge around the 
tough times it was very valuable. So it's really connecting to other entrepreneurs outside. 
 
P Thng  15:41   
What do you think are the main weaknesses of an accelerator? 
 





I think they as we're living in this fast moving world, the question was, how does accelerator how 
does the model fit into those times, times are changing. So in 2000s, [3 company names] were the 
dominant, prominent and successful I would say, because there was no LinkedIn or Facebook, no, 
there was no money, there was a bit of information asymmetry, you couldn't get mentors, you 
couldn't get investors easily. But these days, everyone is a start up dude. So you can easily find 
people online or at events, I think that's where the relevance in the ecosystem is different. So I think 
that maybe we should have added sorry, another point of strength, sorry. 
 
P Thng  16:37   
Go ahead. 
 
R2A  16:38   
Maybe go back to the other point is, 
 
P Thng  16:40   
thing was that [company name], the strength was what we did particularly in London ended up more 
and more in Singapore was to build an ecosystem. I think we, we did a very good job in setting up a 
FinTech ecosystem with others with MAS and so on to bring this, bring people together really I think 
we rolled so many events organised so many meetups and events that you meet everyone came 
together finally and it's very it's a very centralized function and I think that helped me quite a bit to 
come together yeah there was a core strengths as well. Weaknesses then  yeah you weakness that 
you kind of every good founder has to go through tough times you have to go through this catharsis I 
call it you have to go through this transformation of the Cali you have to have to be screwed over so 
an accelerator is also only something is help startups to start up and those funds are not always the 
best so you can argue the best ones don't need an accelerator that's where I think want to be part of 
success story of startup in an accelerator because that's the business model like but the really good 
ones they would not pick an accelerator because they would do it themselves 'cause they have to do 
themself you have to fail in order to to win and accelerators are trying to not make you fail and that 
is a flaw in itself. 
 
So what he's trying to do is also  
 
R2A  18:26   
And yeah yeah so that also what I kind of then felt with what [unintelligible] tried you know with 
with an accelerator you always I always feel I was dancing around the core the the core the I define 
entrepreneurship as three core things, there's the company, the startup, the founder and you have 
the customer obviously visa vie whatever it's b2b or b2c and the third component is risk capital, the 
investor so you need some risk capital opinion. 
 
So these are the three core elements everything around to be doing co working spaces, accelerators, 
incubators, venture builders is just circling around and also we tried to make money from these core 
three elements and that's that's the thing also where startup and this was Silicon Valley right they 
have built this the last 50 years they have this three three core things they are very strong there. 
Everyone else just dancing around we're trying to flirt with all those guys and I felt I always feel one 
layer too far removed from all this and that's why [unintelligible] side note and doing with more 
investing, right. So again because if you're really good if you have all these two things together you 
don't need all this and an accelerator has to be damn good to play there but it's only certain verticals 
and you know if it's very tax intake was is tough enough to say right okay an accelerator can be that 
good to help you with other things is it earlier speed to market,  speed to clients but the eternal flies 
you not always get the best because if you're the best you don't need an accelerator yeah so that's 






P Thng  20:16   
So what what do you think about the fact that the program is relatively short 1, 2, 3, 4 months? You 
think that's also a weakness or you think its a strength? 
 
R2A  20:24   
I mean we can think there's a officially three months but three plus one so that's three month 
program then demo day then you have actually probably three months beforehand so you have like 
 
P Thng  20:33   
About six seven.  
 
R2A  20:34   
Yeah, so it's a six months like touch points that you were how you but there's a three months 
condensed here, yeah. but yeah, we I will view it is it is a it is short, yeah. And again, I I couldn't 
personally speaking it couldn't, you know, you have three months coming in, you're like creating a 
family and then after three months, keep them all together. And you feel like, Oh, my God, I could 
have done so much more with them and I want to be part of the longer journey and that's again, 
why I felt that I want to be an investor because you look over the  
 
P Thng  21:04   
Because that model is bringing in batches right? 
 
R2A  21:06   
Yeah in batches, its like manufacturing lines 
 
P Thng  21:09   
So that's also one of the weaknesses, too short a period 
 
R2A  21:10   
Too short 
 
P Thng  21:10   
To follow through 
 
R2A  21:12   
Yeah, right.  
 
P Thng  21:13   
Whereas venture builders tend to take a bit much longer  
 
R2A  21:15   
[Unintelligible] stakes in the company 
 
P Thng  21:17   
They've got stakes, high stakes 
 
R2A  21:19   
Just the business model, yeah. Yeah  
 





So you think having a high stakes generally 
 
R2A  21:24   
I again, it depends, it depends, depends on function. So and I started venture building model quite a 
bit as well. And [unintelligible] again, the good founders don't need an venture builder. If you have a 
good  founder and say you want Michael Gee, I want 100%. But if you if you're founder that lacks 
some scales or networks whereas, you might say okay, I compromise terms of equity 
 
P Thng  21:54   
In fact, I'm gonna come to the next point. 
 
R2A  21:56   
Yeah, sorry okay.  
 
P Thng  21:57   
What kind of personality or start-ups will be suitable for accelerators?  
 
R2A  22:02   
Yeah its a good question. 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  22:05   
What do you see are the main differences between an accelerator and a venture builder? 
 
R2A  22:11   
I think that there's a different risk profile as I said earlier, I think everything comes down to risk at 
the end of the day venture builders take more concentrated bets on certain ventures and also have 
a different risk-return turn model in there so high stakes, that's one and then accelerators are you 
know they throw money at hundreds of them and then see which one sticks but you also have less 
equity right so most of us yeah but that's key difference for me  
 
P Thng  22:42   
The key  
 
R2A  22:43   
Then there's a lot of other things around, services you provide venture builders are more focused on 
their services I think there's a the team is more involved is more of a co founder status than anything 
else I think, accelerators you know co founder you're more of a platform venture builders, normally 
invest more money accelerators certainly less. 
 
P Thng  23:08   
So accelerators,  typically what's the range of investment  
 
R2A  23:13   
So I think for the acceleration stage, you normally do 20, 20 US right up to I think these days, 50 US 
dollars and they take your 6-8% many accelerators have no business also follow on funding plug and 
play so they then invest additional $200,000 afterwards, which I like it's a good model actually, I 
think its a good model. 
 





Whereas what's your understanding of venture builders? 
 
R2A  23:38   
They they, I mean, there's this staged approach, normally. 
 
P Thng  23:41   
Equity stake, generally  
 
R2A  23:42   
So i hear everything from do they own 40% to 80% of that 
 
P Thng  23:51   
[Name] got 60% 
 
R2A  23:53   
Yeah, okay yeah.  
 
P Thng  23:54   
We find sometimes some start-ups are just not suitable for them, because we look at some of their 
background. Next, what do you see are the similarities between an accelerator and a venture 
builder? 
 
R2A  24:06   
You are dancing around the ecosystem, right. You're part of the circus. So so you, you, you're trying 
to help set start-ups start up and and you're trying to monetize or trying to profit from a start-up's 
success? I think that's very similar you are not a founder, founder itself, you are complimentary, 
ideally, part of that founder story. 
 
P Thng  24:35   
So that part is similar. 
 
R2A  24:36   
Yeah, I think its similar, yes. 
 
P Thng  24:37   
But the programs are slightly different because one is a bit longer term. 
 
Okay. Yeah. Now, as you look back, is there anything recently as you thought about it now that you 
discovered at the end of the day it is not that important as an accelerator or what you used to think 
was really important as you looked back, that wasn't important at all 
 
Let me see, you would not want to emphasize on that anymore. 
 
R2A  25:19   
I think we spend a lot of time polishing pitch decks and I would argue that these days you have to 
have a good pitch deck. I agree with that over pitch and the deck. But we spent the weeks doing 
some that I think that's just rather go out there and find customers 
 
P Thng  25:43   






R2A  25:44   
We spent a lot of time also trying to connect to investors early. I think that not always I've changed 
my view on this. I think you should only talk to investors once you're ready. Listen again, comes to 
the click. I. Yeah, I think founders are a bit too driven by money these days, especially in Singapore, 
Hong Kong, London, New York these expensive cities and less so unfortunately. Talk to customers.  
 
P Thng  26:09   
So that's something on hindsight, you think is very important, right? Yeah, my customers so 
important is to find customers. And then its important not to engage investors too early.  
 
R2A  26:21   
Yeah. 
 
P Thng  26:21   
Right okay. And then probably spend less time on pitching 
 
R2A  26:24   
Yeah, yeah.  
 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  26:24   
Okay good. Final, okay question four who is suitable for which model so in the case of a accelerator 
what kind of situation, what kind of people do you think would be more suitable to join accelerators  
 
R2A  26:39   
Compared to venture builders?  
 
P Thng  26:40   
Yup. 
 
R2A  26:40   
I mean, the different types of entrepreneurs are the ones who can do it by themselves who have 
done it before or they're just gifted. There are the ones who certainly more co founder material and 
there are the ones who are probably lost in life and need your help so so I think there's many many 
entrepreneurs unfortunately, are doing entrepreneurship because of the dominance of the different 
now so there's a lot of negative energy and you know, I don't like corporate I need to do startup I 
think it's unfortunately a wrong reaction, and I had many of them in my incubator, like accelerator. 
Well, it's Yeah, I don't think it's the right motivation to its unfortunately, a trend that everyone wants 
to do a start-up because it's apparently the thing to do anyway so so so I think in terms of what I just 
said so I think if you if you're co founder material that means you're very much aware of what you're 
lacking and what do you need to make it a success and that's for venture builders come in with. I 
think where you certainly are compared a bit with an MBA and you know, you kind of and I haven't 
haven't done one so I don't we know that but see you've done a corporate life you've done what 
other career you have and now you're doing start-up boy, while you're doing an MBA and 
accelerator is something else and basically an MBA so it's a its this kind of person that needs new 
direction that needs a safe harbor again, it's the last a lifetime founder that is is. Yeah, and I don't 





them its very difficult for me right now. I'm still on the board of them right. Um, but I saw that I think 
it's certainly people who need some stellar brainwashing 
 
What was he doing with his brainwash them? And it's like, it's either it's either young young people 
who never sort of start us off before we just need to get used to finish morally how to do marketing 
how to hire team so its basically just to startup MBA to get them to accelerate this knowledge which 
can acquire itself a particular owner or the other side, it's more the corporate folk late 30s, 40s, who 
knows of accelerator, but been in corporate for 10 years, 12,13 years. And now he's also been 
brainwashed. Yeah, yeah. So these are the 
 
P Thng  29:37   
These are the two main types, those that as you said, going for this startup MBA a bit lost and you 
know.  
 
R2A  29:43   
Yeah  
 
P Thng  29:44   
So that's those young people. And in the 30s, 40s they've done corporate negative energy. So that's 
also to brainwash so those are good whereas, the co founder material-type 
 
R2A  29:54   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  29:54   
Probably a VB.  
 
R2A  29:54   
Yeah, because also, because also venture builders, also venture builders also are run by people so 
the founder of a venture builder normally has done start-ups before, so they kind of it now as well 
for my case. I've seen so many founders, I kind of see who's good at that founder. And you kind of 
just feel it, you see it and I don't think a venture builder takes too many too many loss-in-life people 
aboard. You have very diverse. 
 
P Thng  29:55   
Very selective  
 
R2A  30:25   
Yeah, yeah. So you can, because that's more selection here. But we also have certainly co founder, 
material people in accelerators but because we have such a big numbers. Yeah, you know, it's just a 
numbers game as well. So I'm not saying they don't exist here, they also exist here its just, there is 
high diversity. Yeah, if if an accelerator is also highly selective and very, very, very good. They will 
also end up with more of those, but it's just. But the impression I got was more mainly on on the 
other side. 
 
P Thng  30:55   
So you mentioned so there's another entrepreneur called did it before?  
 
R2A  30:58   






P Thng  31:01   
So for those who did it before, likely to do an accelerator?  
 
R2A  31:07   
No, no, no, no, no, I, I suspect they should just get gets shit done.  
 
P Thng  31:11   
Okay, thank you very much that seems useful. So those are the situation an accelerator would be 
suitable for. Okay, now, if you're to advise someone about the path they should take for a new 
venture if you were to advise someone about the direction of the path. That they should take for a 
new venture what would that be?  
 
R2A  31:32   
Yeah, it happens a lot. Still, these days. I get many, many calls. Many people call me  and ask what 
should I do, what should I do? I said something earlier already, I will stand to this, spend more time 
thinking about the product and spend more time thinking about total customers and do your do 
your the [unintelligible] the markets right, you have so many tools available these days to just let me 
correct myself, I myself I build products I decide when. And so easy, I don't, I'm not a computer 
scientist. But you have so many tools online, particular to build wire frames, mockups, some fake 
apps, just do it. Got, then talk and get feedback. I I understand that more case would b2c that's 
easier. And I am unfortunately, again, biased a bit more more in b2c person than b2b, to be very 
honest, but in particular, FinTech is such a heavy b2b focus areas that tech security right I mean, you 
cannot build a security startup with 10 grand Iyou'd have to invest a million dollars straigight. So it's 
such a difficult journey where you have to have such a high upfront costs and you have to be a fairly 
wealthy person yourself to to invest that cash before you actually talk to our accelerators, my 
investors. And again, this is again, what I said earlier its people unfortunate talk to investors and 
make the start-ups early success dependent on other money. You know, I tried now, again, I come 
across so many founders say, I can only put a product now, if you invest in me. I say no I'm so sorry 
but I only invest once I've seen some products. Or you know at [name] FinTech again you have to 
have your license sometimes you can only start a company with a license. For a license, I need one 
million dollars. So can you give me money now? No, I cannot so you have to be very much aware on 
what's the product, what's the market? How do you prove the product clicks with the customer for a 
market situation. And then get money that's unfortunately there's this misperception in the market 
and we are at the end of the the know, the bull years. It's ingrained in our startup mindset right now 
that there's so much money available so let's kind of go out and raise money it will change I think it 
will be correction coming up as you all know I can't wait I can't wait because it will also reset a bit of 
this mindset there's too much money, unfortunately people are funding startups very early these 
days I mean people get funding very early with high valuations still and then unfortunately gets a bit 
of a miss it will catch up on you I mean startups will then you know, if they raise the next round if 
they haven't gotten on this right. Then they have [unintelligible] no output. Yeah, yeah. 
 
P Thng  34:24   
So if I summarize that, you know, it's take the demand driven approach meaning that figure out 
what the customers really want, what's the problem you're trying to solve and get maybe some early 
commitment of customers who are prepared to and and build it first.  Don't wait for money and then 
start building. Let's see. Next question is, would your advice be different? This advice, if they already 
have a team? 
 
R2A  34:52   






Yeah we we took, we took a few single founders on board I gotta tell you 100% [unintelligible] rate. 
Yeah, I mean, maybe, maybe one or two, not like, it's so, so obvious, as single founder. You just you 
need to convince someone else to be especially your first customer, right? Whoever, is the co 
founders is your first customer right, to be able to communicate a shared vision and be able to, to 
run them the shared vision because it reflects somewhat about your mindset, because as a founder, 
you have to and then one [unintellibile] It's too funny, right? You have to stand for your vision 
almost determined that this is right, with, otherwise, why would you do a start up but at the same 
time you have to have empathy, the compassion for customer needs. And this is so so important. I 
see so many founders in particular single founders who who are dismissing many of their customers 
requests or whatever that is because they're just so believing in themselves. And this again, is not 
necessarily then the best and you can almost get the very high correlation between these type 
people having not a co founder, because if you have a co founder, it means you have compassion for 
others using you have to be able to a bit of open-minded, you have to have a very clear swim swim 
lane and define what you want to go for in life but be open for others coming in. And this is again, I 
found this who were unfortunately, as with older corporate corporate founders, and they didn't 
have a co founder and the product failed because they were just so almost arrogant 
 
P Thng  34:53   
Oh yeah in your case 
 
Too fixated, they cannot see 
 
R2A  36:41   
Can't see yeah, so having hope on a system is just so urgh 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  36:46   
It's amazing to get that information. Then my last question on impact on new ventures after 
undergoing your program, right? So first question is, why have you chosen the acceleration model 
when you already did [company name]? 
 
R2A  37:01   
It was my personal journey right in my my personal journey is I was 24 in London and I did a few 
ventures  there something key in tech and it's something that IOT I was actually at the time still 
doing my masters in entrepreneurship at UCL, I was just a young, naive German living in big big 
London and one of my professors approached me and said, you have the energy and the passion for 
start-up building. So why don't you talk to some boot camp about setting up an accelerator in 
FinTech. And I heard of [company name] it's the biggest brand in Europe it's an accelerator brand iin 
Europe back then, I think still now there's were some programs in I think was it Amsterdam and 
Copenhagen they were not that big back then but they were quite dominant so I said yeah let's talk 
to them and and the story goes that I thought FinTech means technology in Finland and I actually 
okay I well you know Finland is a nice country you know nice nice nice nice nice people and never 
been there so let's do this then he goes it actually miss finance not Finland. What does matter I can 
also the financial now I'm engineer by training and I think I may be able to pick it up and so then 
yeah i was i was keen to a new could be the platform for me to to move level up. And it's almost in a 
way if I'm very honest with you is like I said, 10 to 20 years ago, you graduate from university and 
then you need to get Goldman Sachs JP Morgan whatever the jobs its a perfectly career move right, 





I'm taking the startup career move is if you're an accelerator, you you kind of can do almost 
everything afterwards.  
 
P Thng  38:55   
I see 
 
R2A  38:58   
And I'm probably the new type of employee or the generation, generation what is it I'm millennial 
that is having done a career in venture which is new, they new what this puzzle was North America. 
But yeah, yeah. So I started as a career stem. 
 
P Thng  39:20   
So for those who have gone through your program, those 20, 50 or how many startups that went 
through your acceleration program? What do you see were the key differences before and after they 
went through your program? Were they better at market awareness? 
 
R2A  39:43   
They were better at marketing and better at pitching. 
 
P Thng  39:50   
Marketing, pitching. What about appreciation of competition, appreciation of team?  
 
R2A  39:57   
I think the team aspect was important as well I think I again, it all depends on also who runs the 
accelerator, it depends on the MD and in this case was me, I have to be very honest and almost 
genuine and raw approach to my founders and try to make them also feel honourable. And I would 
like to think even though I was a young guy many of them were Brit twice my age they left more 
mature as people as well 
 
P Thng  40:25   
More Mature 
 
R2A  40:27   
They left as better people and many, many of them we're still very good friends and this is really I 
think you you. Yeah, I still now I mean I if I hear voice afterwards as far from each other and they're 
connected, right? And it's really powerful connection is just, yeah. You've got a lot of like, open apps. 
Yeah, that's crazy.  
 
P Thng  40:49   
Oh, no, this is a notification 
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Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:01   
Okay. Okay. 
 
First question is I'm interviewing you from the perspective of a accelerator, going to experience that 
in [company name]. 
 
R3A  0:11   
Okay, right.  
 
P Thng  0:14   
So, what was your title when you were running?  
 
R3A  0:17   
Head, Head, [Company name]. 
 
P Thng  0:24   
And, and when was the location?  
 
R3A  0:26   
Location was here in Singapore in China on Amoy street. 
 
P Thng  0:33   
So this semi-structured interview has 5 questions.  
 
R3A  0:38   
Okay.  
 
P Thng  0:38   
So the first question is just to get a bit of your background.  
 
R3A  0:41   
Sure.  
 
P Thng  0:42   
So how long it is the venture industry business? 
 
R3A  0:48   
On the venture side, not very long, so it's less strict. My answer is not gonna be streamlined. So 
basically, I was a founder Okay, in the early days of the internet when founders and VCs, it was a 
very different business, I then started a couple more companies as the this business and industry 
grew up. About four or five years ago, I started working as a mentor here at SMU, at different other 
kinds of VCs. And that kind of got me into the business. Eventually I became, three years ago I was 
the entrepreneur in residence in Singapore for [company name] accelerator which is part of sosv So 
I'd say that was three years ago, maybe four years ago and I did that for six months. Okay. At which 
point then I was hired by Telstra to run [company name] and that was from June of the 17th of June 
2018. So that eight or nine months Previous to that I was the entrepreneur in residence for 
[company name] accelerator in Singapore. All right cool.  
 





Okay, so you've been in this industry not long? Right. Cool. Okay, so you've been in industry not long 
 
R3A  2:00   
Yeah. Three, four years here on this side of the fence. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  2:02   
And how many new ventures have you been associated with?  
 
R3A  2:05   
Oh my goodness. So let's call it 1/3 that I've had active participation in. So [company name] had 10, 
okay? [company name] probably a handful, four or five. As a independent kind of mentor, there's 
probably been four or five but I love going to pitch events and early stage of it is like that. So I'll talk 
to anyone and and, you know, I'll see probably pretty are a few hundred startups and talk to them.  
 
P Thng  2:33   
Okay good. Do your organization or in this case [company name] consider itself as an accelerator or 
venture builder?  
 
R3A  2:41   
It was an accelerator very clearly an accelerator.  
 
P Thng  2:44   
So now I'll go to question two.  
 
R3A  2:45   
Sure.  
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  2:47   
So, definition of success of companies that you've accelerated.  
 
R3A  2:51   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  2:51   
So first I want to get some clarity. What's the definition of success of? 
 
R3A  2:58   
Exactly. So there is no one definition here so and within the industry when we get together with 
other other accelerator founders we talked about this a lot. So an initial success measure could be 
following funding okay and if you're at the stage that we were at, which is kind of pre-seed it would 
be you know 100,000, 150,000 something like that would be successful. But, there are also 
companies that are successful and don't need that right they're actually commercially viable and 
successful so do they even need funding so there was a company within [company name] that that 
didn't get that funding but signed a eight figure deal with an American company. Okay, and now 
they're raising a little bit of money now to do the operational stuff okay, so to me I think it's a 
combination of commercial viability success as well as follow on funding they're not prerequisites 
but you need at least one if not both, in order to be successful, considered successful.  
 
P Thng  4:03   






R3A  4:05   
Right. 
 
P Thng  4:06   
Okay good, thank you very much, then what's your expectation of success? What do you expect, you 
know as a 
 
R3A  4:12   
You mean numerically?  
 
P Thng  4:13   
An accelerator, yeah. Whether numerically or subjectively?  
 
R3A  4:19   
Sure. So, in general, from what I get out of the industry when I talk to people is that everybody is 
very happy that five years later, you'd have two of the companies out of ten that are surviving, okay. 
 
P Thng  4:33   
How many? 
 
R3A  4:33   
Two out of ten and still surviving means continuing to grow and continuing to raise funds and 
continuing on an upward path, by either of those metrics. At [company name] we're much we are 
much higher. We have about eight out of 10 right now. And it was a very successful model here the 
other [company name] cohorts were successful but not, as I would say that the very good 
accelerator program so in  Southeast Asia if if they have 50% of the companies successful in five 
years, they've done very well. 
 
P Thng  5:06   
What are the [company name] how many cohorts or how many batches?  
 
R3A  5:09   
So Singapore has three only. [company name] also had four other instances in, in Australia and  only 
two are running now, one is Melbourne one is Sydney. So there have probably been that that that 
20-ish, 22 cohorts I'd say. 
 
P Thng  5:28   
Sorry, 22 cohorts?  
 
R3A  5:30   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  5:30   
Whoa, and each cohort is roughly?  
 
R3A  5:33   
Numbers at call it eight to ten? Call it ten average. Somewhere eight, somewhere twelve. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  5:37   






R3A  5:41   
yeah, so roughly 250 companies came out 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  5:46   
Let me now go to question three, differentiating between two incubation models. So first, my 
question to you as as accelerator, what do you think are the core competencies of an accelerator?  
 
R3A  5:59   
Okay, to me, and this is extremely personal and also different from most other people. But I feel like 
the core competency of an accelerator is, is to help a company that already has a business model 
that already has a product that already has some traction and maybe some funding and the basis of 
a team, help them refine that business model in terms of product market fit, learn how to pitch and 
successfully raise money, learn how to scale the company, and that means learn how to actually 
make money, okay. And then there are some subsidiary bits and pieces to that which are, you know, 
operational, how do you hire? Where do you hire, when do you hire, when do you expand, all those 
kinds of business, operational things we talk about, but, and I hope to help with, with the core bits of 
the accelerator, or the other ones. 
 
P Thng  6:55   
Okay good thank you. And so the main services of an accelerator, what do you generally offer when 
you [inaudible]? 
 
R3A  7:03   
So [company name], or, or in general, 
 
P Thng  7:07   
[company name] first, and then maybe in general. 
 
R3A  7:09   
Okay, so [company name] did a few things, we worked very, very hard on product-market fit to 
make sure that you were doing the right thing, when you're a startup, everything looks attractive, 
everything's an opportunity, right? So cutting away the ones that aren't essential, trimming that 
down, okay, so that you know what you're doing. And then focusing on being successful in that little 
space.So in many ways, cutting the business down to, to a key core of measurable success, and then 
rebuilding from there. Learning how to pitch and learning how to pitch means learning how to 
communicate what your business does to a variety of different kinds of audiences, whether it's a 
sales audience, you're trying to sell your product, or raise money, or hire people, or the press Okay. 
So being able to communicate that. The next bit is, I'd say, those are the two key ones, really being 
able to communicate what you do, and understanding what it is that you do, then the execution part 
we help with, but I think that's less essential for an accelerator. The things that an accelerator can do 
are these other things.  
 
P Thng  8:22   
So what do you think, are the strengths of an accelerator? 
 
R3A  8:27   
Well, ideally, the strengths of an accelerator are, one - may help companies understand who they 





communicate clearly to a variety of audiences what it is they do, so that they can second - 
successfully sell, raise money, hire people promote themselves, those kinds of things 
 
P Thng  8:48   
When you say raise money? Would you consider accelerator, the strength or one of the strengths of 
an accelerator, is your connectivity to invest?  
 
R3A  8:57   
Yeah, absolutely. So so then there's the community part as well, which is not only what we are 
helping the companies learn, but exposing them to many different things. So part of that would be 
mentors, and making sure that we have a good strong, helpful mentor pool, because a lot of 
accelerators have mentors. And a lot of mentors raise their hand because they want it on LinkedIn, 
but they're not actually helping, okay, making sure we have that, making sure that they're getting 
exposed to the right kind of investors, constantly. So you know, in in for [company name], we had, 
we can pitch events where anybody could come, so that by the time we got to the demo day, all of 
the VCs knew all the companies already.  
 
P Thng  9:37   
Alright, okay, go on. 
 
R3A  9:39   
Okay. The next bit was exposing them to other startups. So one of the things I think we did really 
well was because it was vertical agnostic. Each company didn't compete with the other one, so that 
all of the companies could compare notes, what worked and what didn't work or what they've tried 
and didn't try. And if you talk to any, so that was super helpful for them. It was a FinTech-only 
accelerator, vertical. You and I are ultimately going to be competing for the same dollar. So we're 
not going to be quite as open about our companies, the vertical agnostic was super helpful, because 
everybody shares, you know, and that means you don't have to make every mistake somebody else's 
made some of them for you. And you can share the wins and losses. That was huge. And then the 
other thing that we did that I think was very, very important was we took the team, to Silicon Valley 
for two weeks, to San Francisco, the valley where they could meet and see what it was like there, 
meet VCs meet other companies that are in the same space, talk to people who are in the startup 
business and see what it's like. That was huge, because Singapore has a lot of things here, a lot of 
advantages, but that's it's not the valley. The valley's the valley, right?  
 
P Thng  10:48   
So global exposure. 
 
R3A  10:49   
Exactly. Exactly. which I think was really important that get get out of here. Get on the streets.  
 
P Thng  10:55   
See what's [inaudible]? 
 
R3A  10:56   
Yeah?  
 
P Thng  10:56   
Can I ask, at [company name] how long is your accelerator program?  
 





It was a six month program. The new versions is gonna be four months, six months is probably a 
little long.  
 
P Thng  11:05   
So the new version is going to be four months. 
 
R3A  11:08   
Yeah, I think operationally you can't run you can't raise, there's a money problem at six months. The 
[unintelligible] doesn't work with the program. Yeah. 
 
P Thng  11:18   
What do you think are the weaknesses of an accelerator? 
 
R3A  11:23   
Weakness number one is you can drink your own Kool Aid and thinking the coolest thing about on 
the block, right, and not be open to new ideas.  Okay, I see that in a lot of accelerators. There are 
probably inherent biases in choosing certain kinds of companies or founders over others, you know, 
it's not a perfect recruitment system, which is, and the same goes for mentors and investors as well. 
You know, I may like you a lot. So I'll invite you to a lot of these things. But I may not like that other 
guy or not know them. And think, heard something bad so I'm not gonna bring him in. So I think 
there's, there's a chance for a personal bias in the running of it. Not sure how to get rid of that- 
 
In-breeding, right? I mean, you know, we're cool. We're doing it so well, we must be awesome, 
right?So how do you how do you how do you keep reminding yourself of that other stuff? One of the 
things that I think structurally for, for accelerators globally, is keeping track of the alums. Okay, 
meeting other and hearing the story from other companies that have gone through an accelerator is 
incredibly helpful. It's very hard for accelerators to track those companies, even though they were 
there a year ago or two years ago. Okay. Nobody has an answer to that, that I know of, which is, you 
know, I think it's a problem in the, there's an industry of startups, which we're starting to develop 
here, that's one of the weaknesses there. And then also, other accelerators, don't talk to one 
another, the groups formally, so, you know, they might be one that [company name] and you, you 
talk to your friend at the one at [company name], but there's nothing structured so that we do stuff 
together or bounce ideas off each other, which I think could be helpful because any of those charged 
particle ideas are good. 
 
P Thng  12:08   
In-breeding? 
 
Now, you mentioned about the four months or even six months program. Do you think is that also 
one of the weaknesses of a accelerator meaning that after four or six months? You know, your start-
ups just disappear and?  
 
R3A  13:32   
Well,yeah, there's two or three parts to that question to answer. Sorry, part number one is, how do 
accelerators track their alums? Unclear. The answer is unclear everybody's trying different stuff. I 
don't think there is a successful way yet. More importantly, is and not so much here in Singapore but 
everywhere else in emerging markets that I see how do you get funded, okay, that the traditional 
funding mechanisms for success, companies that successfully exit accelerators disappearing, VCs are 
moving up hired, like, you know, A rounds B rounds those kinds of things outside of Singapore, you 
really have no formal angel community, which would be like, if you go to the States, that's where 





raise, okay, which is actually what I think that's sort of my drum that I'm beating right now, 
personally, how do we fix that problem? That's the big problem. I think. Singapore is good because 
you have very small VCs you have angel groups here. Wealthy individuals, get it, but you know, you 
gotta, you gotta [unintelligible] gotta be in Mari, got to Mongolia or Kazakhstan. There's nothing 
there. There's, there's a hole. 
 
P Thng  14:48   
So what you see are the main differences between an accelerator and a venture builder? From your 
perspective. 
 
R3A  14:55   
So I am admittedly very biased towards accelerators. 
 
P Thng  14:58   
But what do you see are the main differences?  
 
R3A  14:59   
I, to me, an accelerator takes a company that already has an idea and a plan and a team and helps 
them refine that, even though it may be pivoting, it assumes that the and encourages the founders 
to be good and strong and thoughtful, and create the best product that they can what they have, I 
think that it also takes only a little bit of money for a little bit of ownership. Okay. 
 
P Thng  15:25   
And usually when you say little bit, what's the range at [intellibille]? 
 
R3A  15:28   
[Company name] was a safe note. So it was based on the next round, so it ended up being like, 
three-ish percent four-ish percent, which was low, you know, some, some take eight, some take ten, 
some take on some sort of wacky, you know, depending on how much money you've raised, and I 
put in, you know, hundred thousand dollars, and it could be 12%, I don't know. 
 
P Thng  15:52   
Kind of range.  
 
R3A  15:54   
Yeah, yeah, it can be a big range by doing a safe note, we kept it small and it doesn't get in the way 
of our discussions. So to me, a venture builder is a little bit different, where you're trying to find you 
find an idea and build a team around the idea rather than have a team and get the right idea for the 
team. So inherently, there's a problem there, I think, is that the right idea isn't always the first idea. 
Okay so the first the first business model that you come up with, or business [unintelligible] that you 
come up with, for whatever reason, isn't the one that you you end up with? Okay.  
 
P Thng  16:31   
You think that's a danger of a venture builder?  
 
R3A  16:33   
Yeah, I think, yeah, because I think it doesn't, and I don't know so well, I don't know how they might 
morph if, if you realize, Oh, this is a bad idea its not going to work. Let's do something else. I don't 
know if it venture builders do that. In accelerators. It's encouraged. 
 







R3A  16:49   
Yeah. Okay. And so, so you have acceelrator you have the flexibility to change your company shape, 
right? I don't know about a venture builder.  
 
P Thng  16:59   
So pivoting is quite encouraged in a accelerator? 
 
R3A  17:04   
Well, I do I'm not sure all of them do. But I do.  
 
P Thng  17:07   
So what now do you see are the similarities between an accelerator and a venture builder? 
 
R3A  17:10   
I think the similarities are that we, can we go back to the venture builder for one second? Okay, one 
of the downsides, I see to the venture builder is that it asks founders to work very hard, like you 
would if it was your own company that you come up with, with less equity. Okay, so I guess I am 
skewed rightly or wrongly against that, because I feel like in some ways its taking advantage of the 
founders. Okay. Now, it may end up net, net net, but they end up with the same percentage of 
ownership right at the end of dilution of on either side, but to me going in and seems like the found- 
if I'm going to work that hard, I want it to be my company, that, that sort of sums it up for me.  
 
P Thng  17:30   
So it may meet certain, may, appeal to certain profile of folks who want to get into this-  
 
R3A  18:03   
Right, right. Exactly. There's a little bit of safety there  
 
P Thng  18:04   
Which would be the profile that [inaudible].  
 
R3A  18:05   
Yeah, yeah. And and their spouses.  
 
P Thng  18:11   
Right. So what do you see the similarities between an accelerator and-  
 
R3A  18:14   
I think they both help your companies and they both help innovation and they both help to solve, 
hopefully solve problems. I think that that's all good. I think they go about a different ways. But the 
idea of helping to build smart, strong new companies that solve problems, I think is, is the key 
similarity, and that sort of, you know, fires me up about it too, on a personal level, right, that that's 
what we're trying to do. We're not trying to have another dating site, we're not delivering coffee 
better, you know, we're actually solving real problems here, right. 
 
P Thng  18:46   
So if you had to prioritize waht the five most important things that you do as an accelerator? 
 





Five most important things, wow. 
 
P Thng  19:04   
Would market validation? Would team chemistry, which really? You know, five things. 
 
R3A  19:11   
yeah, I'm just trying to figure it out here.The most important thing to me, Well, one of the, okay, this 
is not ranked by priority, it's just five important thing. So one - exposure to other founders and other 
related specialists is huge and by that I mean accelerators by nature, have the ability to introduce 
you to a professor from SMU or a guy who started Google or something like that, where you might 
not be able to do that, ordinarily on the streets. That's huge. Okay, another thing is really working to 
validate the business model, your business model, so that you don't make any mistake out there. 
Okay, a third one is  teaching how to pitch. Pitch, pitch, pitch, pitch, pitch, pitch, pitch, because most 
startups suck and they continue to be terrible at it. And it continues to hurt them all the time. Okay, 
even if the best product and the best team, they cannot describe what they're doing if without being 
able to describe what they're doing, they're going to fail. Is that 3? 
 
P Thng  20:30   
Yep 3. 
 
R3A  20:32   
4 is exposure to investment. To good, smart and solid investment. I think, I think five is it's softer. It's 
like, you're not alone. You teach the, we teach them that it's sort of like, it's okay to fail on your own. 
[intelligible] in an industry where it's like that, and other people are like you. So you're not a failure. 
You're not alone. You're not depressed-   
 
P Thng  21:15   
Like a community?  
 
R3A  21:15   
There's a community here and that's really good, because we read all these sad stories about, you 
know, founders who feel like they failed, you know, do something drastic, and we don't want that, 
you know,  
 
P Thng  21:29   
Now, next question. Is there anything that you discovered recently? That is not as important as you 
thought it was when you first started in this industry? So now as you look back you feel its really not 
important. 
 
R3A  21:40   
Wow, really? Good question. You know, not really, I guess, like, in general, I feel like some people 
are enamored with bad metrics, and bad numbers right? I don't think that's really a problem. If 
there's a problem with too much money too soon. Yeah, that that struggle is glorious, but rather 
that you need to figure out really what you're doing. And if you have too much money up front, you 
start focusing on the kind of shares you're going to buy rather than like trying to solve the problem.  
 
P Thng  22:44   
So in that case what's not so important is you realise you chase for money right at beginning and 
then suddenly get all this money.  
 







P Thng  22:49   
It's not so as important as making sure that  
 
R3A  22:52   
You doing the right thing. 
 
P Thng  22:53   
Okay so next question. Is there anything recently that you discovered is very important, which you 
did not thought so previously, its really the key to success. 
 
R3A  23:21   
I guess I thought this before, but I know it now more is get out there and talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, 
talk, get up off your chair. You know, the key thing to being a successful business person, whether 
it's a startup or another kind of company is communicating what you're doing with other people, 
okay.  
 
Yeah, reaching out and there is a real desire within startups to stay behind your desk and code 
without finding out do people really want this? Do customers want it, do funders want it? Is it the 
right thing? Am I making a mistake? So that's kind of communication is key. It's a get on the street 
and talk to people. And I'm finding this myself as a founder again, so I, even I, I say it even more now. 
 
P Thng  23:40   
Reaching out?  
 
So I'm going to question four.  
 
R3A  24:12   
Okay. 
 
P Thng  24:13   
The appropriateness of when to apply this model. Basically, what sort of folks would you think would 
be the kind of right profile 
 
R3A  24:21   
Okay 
 
P Thng  24:21   
To join an accelerator program? 
 
R3A  24:22   
Okay, different accelerators have different thresholds, the one we had, which I liked a lot was that 
you need to have a product that works that has some traction, it can't be a napkin, you know, you 
got, you're beyond the napkin stage here. It doesn't necessarily mean it's hugely successful, or you 
have a lot of money, but you have customers, it's in the field. So that's part one. Part two is that you 
have your own engineering team, or at least engineers on staff, because as you start to go through 
an accelerator program and you're iterating quickly, if you do this on a contract, that's very difficult 
to do. You need somebody to be there working with you all night. Not like calling though, and then 






Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  25:08   
So in terms of the people, what kind of folks, generally are really suitable to join your program?  
 
R3A  25:13   
Crazy ones. 
 
P Thng  25:16   
People characteristics. 
 
R3A  25:17   
People characteristics are there are two parts to this. Multiple parts. Okay. For me, the, solving the 
problem part is very important. Okay. Increasingly, I lean towards startups that are solving a real 
problem, clean water, clean air, education, food, transport, those kinds of things, okay. So you need 
to be passionate about that, not you know, I mean, some of the stuff is really not sexy at all. But you 
love it. That's cool. I like that more. So, you need you need to be passionate about the problem you 
are solving. Okay. Number two, is you have to realize this is not like, anything else you've done, you 
know, it's it's a full time job. It's more than a full time it's an ultra full time job. You know, there's 
going to be nights and weekends and you're not, you know, there's a there is a social cost, and you 
need to be at least cognizant of it. When you walk in the door, that there will be the social costs. 
 
P Thng  26:21   
That's what you say about the wife, right, making sure that the wife supports. 
 
R3A  26:23   
Yeah yeah yeah, it's very true. It's very true. And, you know, we've seen so many families blow up 
over this. I mean, it's like, sad, but true. And I think you need to be have a, maybe this is something 
you learn, you know, you need to be able to fail, okay, that does, it doesn't crush you, because 
you're going to fail a lot. You're gonna mistakes a lot. People are going to say no, a lot. And you 
 
P Thng  26:49   
have to be able to get back up and do it again. I mean, you know, I had roommates when I lived in 
San Francisco who are actors, okay. And they go to hundred auditions before they got a commercial, 
right? You got to be and I thought how do you do that? How does your ego do that? You get better 
at it if you do this, but you need to have that resiliency.  
 
In fact, we're starting to see some people using venture builders equivalent, like a similar to studio? 
 
R3A  27:14   
Yeah  
 
P Thng  27:15   
Because you get all these actors pitching.  
 










Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  27:18   
Now I'm going to ask the last question. Impact on new ventures, that means the impact on new 
ventures after undergoing acceleration in your model. So first, why have you chosen the acceleration 
model? 
 
R3A  27:34   
To some extent, it chose me. Okay, to be honest, but I like it more. Because I think I personally can 
have more of a positive impact on companies and their growth. And their founders growth, both 
business and personal, okay. I, I believe that, that journey is preferable than a venture builders 
journey. Okay and so I thought I thought about it, because, you know, there's some jobs out there 
for venture builders, and I just don't feel like it's like the fit for me, you know, I like this more and 
some of it is sort of unknown internal, but just that that's what I'm responding to.  
 
P Thng  28:18   
Alright, so its appeals to because what you see a bigger range? Ability to influence more?  
 
R3A  28:26   
Both, both of those things, venture builders tend to be a little bit more narrow, because they have to 
be in a in a vertical to, you gotta have some focus, I mean, I get it. But, you know, you know, if you're 
building an airplane and I'm building a diet drug, and the other person is like, making better corn its 
not going to work in a venture builder work, could work in an accelerator, right? 
 
P Thng  28:50   
What do you notice about the key differences of those new ventures that you've accelerated before 
and after going through your program?  
 
R3A  28:58   
Okay, they're more confident, okay. They know what they're doing. In general, most of them still, 
there are a couple of them, they're still struggling to figure it out. But, you know, one of the things 
I'm most proud of is these companies know what they're doing, and they can articulate it well, and 
they can talk to anybody about it, okay. And they know what success is at this level. They, you know, 
they understand what they want to be doing and what will make them bigger, better, stronger 
companies now. And then they're not shy to talk to people. You know, a lot of lot of the startups are 
very hesitant when they come in. And, you know, we want to make sure their not heistant at all. 
 
P Thng  29:42   
In terms of, let's say, market awareness, market sizing, financial acumen, understanding the 
appreciation of competition, you notice that your companies you have accelerated have a better 
understanding of those things? 
 
R3A  29:57   
They have a better understanding of the ones that are important to them now. So it's a subset of 
those, okay, you can't worry about everything. Oh, my God, the Russian economies are collapsing, 
don't worry, it's not your problem. You know what your problem is? How are you paying the 
engineering team next week? Or that's your problem? 
 





What about making use of the resources now that they know the ecosystem better, the use of 
mentors, advisors, do you think they improved as a result?  
 
R3A  30:25   
Yes, totally, almost all of them had multiple mentors and benefited from them, many of them still 
talk to those mentors, even today, a year after, okay, the same thing with angels, and they know 
who's real and who's not for real. They can smell the BS now.  
 
P Thng  30:41   
Okay good, I see. 
 
R3A  30:42   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  30:44   
Be more discerning.  
 
R3A  30:45   
Be more discerning. Yeah.  
 
P Thng  30:47   
Discerning of investors and that. Okay, very good. 
 






Background of Interviewee R4A 
 
Participant Code:    R4A 
Incubator Type:       Accelerator 
Date of Interview:   Feb  7 2019, 10am 




Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee .............................................................................. 228 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures ......................................................................... 229 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models .................................................................. 229 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) .................................................... 235 







Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:05   
Okay, {block}, thank you for taking this time to, for the study one discussion. And I would like to ask 
you a few questions to help us in this research. So the first a little bit of yourself. Your full name 
{block} is.  
 
R4A  0:25   
{block} 
 
P Thng  0:27   
And what's your title? 
 
R4A  0:29   
Founder. 
 
P Thng  0:31   
And your company name?  
 
R4A  0:32   
{block} 
 
P Thng  0:34   
And your location?  
 
R4A  0:35   
Singapore, Thailand and Japan.  
 
P Thng  0:38   
All right, and you're based in?  
 
R4A  0:39   
Singapore.  
 
P Thng  0:40   
Singapore, all right. So you have three operations? 
 
R4A  0:42   
Yes. 
 
P Thng  0:42   
Okay good. My first question is to get a bit of your background experience. How long have you been 
in the venture industry business? 
 
R4A  0:59   
In general in the high tech industry, I'm 20 years. 
 
P Thng  1:05   
And how many new ventures have you been associated with? New companies, startups after you 






R4A  1:14   
Over 100. 
 
P Thng  1:20   
Whoa. So does the {block} consider itself as an accelerator or venture builder? 
 
R4A  1:24   
Accelerator. 
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  1:34   
Okay. I'll go into question two. So I want to get some clarity about the success. How do we define 
success of startups? So what is your definition of success of a new venture? What do you consider a 
startup as successful? 
 
R4A  1:59   
I think that success is it means that the start-up is keep on growing toward told his initial vision so 
he's he's actively working and creating value.  
 
P Thng  2:20   
And how do you know they’re creating value? 
 
R4A  2:23   
It's a very subjective, subjective parameter but usually as long as the teams keep on operating and 
keep on progressing according to defined KPIs. This is mean that they are keep on growing. The firm 
KPIs are not necessarily financial KPIs, it can be of course the, related to the stuff that's going to be 
subscribers can be, keep on the releasing new versions. Attracting investors etc. But it can be one or 
more of some measurable KPIs. 
 
P Thng  3:10   
What would be some of the financial KPIs that you typically see? 
 
R4A  3:14   
Financial KPIs is something that we try not to deal with in the start-up world because it can be, it can 
it may not reflect the actual reality. If we're talking about revenue, there are startups that done 
great but not generating revenue yet, such as Uber or not revenue generating profit. If we talking 
about investment there are great start-up that generate self funding so if we go to the from the 
negative parts, all those traditional measurements, financial measurement do not always give you 
the full picture. 
 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  4:00   
Then I would now go on to question three. Looking at the differentiation between venture builders 
and accelerators. So I'm going to ask you these questions from the perspective as an accelerator. So, 
first, what do you think are the core competencies of an accelerator? What should they be? What 






R4A  4:30   
Placing the individual startup environment that is very positive to him in {block} It is very 
constructive to him, on top of providing him unique knowledge that will shortcut his, his progress 
maybe you can also explain put, by nature Singapore and startups is not in an environment of 
entrepreneurs is in environment of his friends family etc which not always are the right environment 
for entrepreneur. Accelerator give him the right environment. Second is, startup is required to know 
many things on many topics and he's lacking of a lot of those knowledge and he's lacking of 
resources actually to pay to get them. An accelerator give him all those missing parts. 
 
P Thng  5:32   
All right, like a departmental store. So placement of this new ventures in a positive environment and 
then adding unique knowledge to fast track. What about connection? Can you maybe describe about 
some of these resources that an accelerator have that these start-ups need?  
 
R4A  6:03   
Yes. Specifically from our perspective, our accelerator is divided to 16 modules and these 16 
modules provided him with three layers of knowledge. One is how skills for example legal, 
marketing, finance etc second, soft skills which deal with leadership, negotiation, storytelling etc and 
the third part is inspirational content. Inspirational content is meeting like-minded people can be 
you know as role models as inspiring. I think those are the three secrets ingredient to success of a 
program. 
 
P Thng  6:52   
What about the investment community? 
 
R4A  6:55   
Connection to, in general part of the accelerator job is to connect the start-ups to resources sources 
can be knowledge as well as funding and I would say also the two new business and business 
opportunities. In most cases accelerator network as a whole is larger than the individual network 
and any individual start of the journey, the network actually is increasing the entire network of the 
accelerator itself. So each machine that actually evolved by itself by its members. 
 
P Thng  7:42   
So what are the main services of an accelerator? What are some services that you provide and 
 
R4A  7:50   
[Unintelligible] acknowledge, the right environment and connection. 
 
P Thng  7:59   
What about do you provide physical facilities? Like a space?  
 
R4A  8:04   
Yes usually we do.  
 
P Thng  8:06   
So that's part of the environment right?  
 







P Thng  8:08   
So space plus the network of people. You've been an accelerator for how long?  
 
R4A  8:20   
For three years.  
 
P Thng  8:21   
Three years, so what are the main services of an accelerator so earlier you hold classes right? You 
provide facilities.  
 
R4A  8:31   
Yes we, eventually, an accelerator's program same as you take a program in a university but gives 
you things that you're not learning in Universities. 
 
P Thng  8:44   
How long is your program?  
 
R4A  8:44   
Is structured four months program. 
 
P Thng  8:46   
Four months structured program. So usually do this, do you open up invitation and then teams bid to 
come in to your program? 
 
R4A  8:59   
In most cases, yes.  
 
P Thng  9:01   
Right? And then at the end of four months, you have a demo day?  
 
R4A  9:04   
Most cases yes.  
 
P Thng  9:05   
Okay all right. And what about how is your business model? Do you take equity? Do you take cash, 
or do you pump cash into it? 
 
R4A  9:15   
We do not take cash from from from startups. It's a combination of equity as well as providing 
knowledge and value to the industry because an accelerator you know, the {block} do not deal only 
with accelerating startups, we actually provide value to the ecosystem. 
 
P Thng  9:41   
So an equity? Do you normally take less than 10%?  
 
R4A  9:44   
Listen than 10%. 
 
P Thng  9:51   
Since you said that you started this about three years ago, what, what do you see are the strengths 






R4A  10:09   
Is it a general question or it's about {block}?  
 
P Thng  10:12   
About {block}, what are your strengths? 
 
R4A  10:14   
One is focus on the soft skills, second for, focus on connecting between people. 
 
P Thng  10:24   
So these are some of the key differentiators. And then when you say 
 
R4A  10:29   
And I think the, last thing maybe a differentiator is, we are ourselves, entrepreneurs. I see a lot of 
accelerators that are not run by accelerators and I think that they may be lacking something. 
 
P Thng  10:43   
When you say a connection, you're talking about connection beyond Singapore?  
 
R4A  10:48   
Talking about two aspects. One is connection between teams, you need to create certain 
atmosphere and it's not by nature, you need to work on it that people will start to expose 
themselves share and really enjoy the value of each other. You're putting 10 people inside the room, 
the magic will not happen and we not start to share their issues, problems and challenges and this is 
junior [unintelligible] of accelerator to start peeling them like onions that they will reveal their true 
kind of nature, the true issues and problems and when the integrity comes out then good 
discussions about to happen rather than an environment where everyone just show off on his 
successes and nothing good comes out of it.  
 
P Thng  11:34   
So you'll see one of the thing about connections is between teams. 
 
R4A  11:37   
Yes, connections between the internal connections between the teams. And of course, as we 
mentioned, the external connection of the teams of the individuals with the with the external 
industry resources. 
 
P Thng  11:53   
What are the weaknesses of an accelerator, or limitations?  
 
R4A  11:58   
Limitations of the, you need to deal with multiple teams which are completely different from each 
other in terms of their, their age, they experience sometimes their industry.  
 
P Thng  12:14   
And you're saying, what accelerator doesn't have the big bandwidth to cover so much diversity? 
 
R4A  12:23   
I mean, this is this, this limitation is also the advantage. Okay, so it's advantage to have, you know, 





also one size fits all. So a lot of the content fits some and less fits others. Rather than working 
individually which separate group you know, not a cohort base which you can really tailor to each 
group exactly what they need. 
 
P Thng  13:04   
What about the short duration? Given that its about four months? Do you find that also a limitation?  
 
R4A  13:11   
No, I think actually, the fact that is that there is a pressure of time, I think pressure create very 
positive outcomes. 
 
P Thng  13:27   
So what happens to your companies that you accelerate after four months, they do the demo day, 
then you help them to connect with some investors?  
 
R4A  13:37   
Yes, they are always part of the {block} community which they keep getting support, and keep also 
supporting the other generation of startups.  
 
P Thng  13:47   
So how long has this impact community been around?  
 
R4A  13:49   
Three years? 
 
P Thng  13:50   
Three years. So this 100 over companies? 
 
R4A  13:54   
Yes, three years. 
 
P Thng  13:57   
Okay, let me now ask what you see are the main differences between an accelerator and a venture 
builder? 
 
R4A  14:06   
Venture builder usually we solve existing problems. Accelerator may deal with problems that do not 
exist today. Accelerator deal with the completely unknown. 
 
P Thng  14:32   
What about the investment approach of venture builders versus accelerators? 
 
R4A  14:42   
I think in Singapore, unfortunately, too much is dealt with funding rather than with working, if 
entrepreneurs would start to work more, rather than knock on every possible door of funding, the 
success rate will be much, much bigger. 
 
P Thng  15:01   
Okay, so you think there's too much focus on funding.  
 





We we initially in the accelerator focus on bringing value and make sure that the startups generate 
value, will start to generate value. Money exists. If accelerate or incubator put as a goal to bring 
money to the startups, this is a recipe to failure for the program and for the start-up. 
 
P Thng  15:36   
What do you see are the similarities between an accelerator and a venture builder? Where do you 
think are the same that- 
 
R4A  15:46   
Most deal with empowered people and creating shortcuts in their journey. Most deal with people.  
 
P Thng  16:05   
Okay good so if you have to prioritize as an accelerator, what are the five most important things  
that you think they must do? 
 
R4A  16:22   
Focus on soft skills, create meaningful relations between, trust relations between the members, 
provide practical knowledge rather than theory. You can see in bracket, things that you cannot see in 
YouTube or hotels. 
 
P Thng  17:00   
Which means that you musn't appear on TED at all. 
 
R4A  17:04   
Because you probably will not see me there and generate meaningful network which is really open 
to assist the startups and not just list of logos. 
 
P Thng  17:28   
So which kind of network that are open to assists, you know? 
 
R4A  17:33   
Depends, industry leaders, founders, especially select law firms, specialists from the research areas 
such as in AI or manufacturing, so you have a pool that is quite versatile to assist different start-ups 
that may join because you never know what will happen as you have a bigger pool, your value is 
much bigger. But you need to have those to maintain those close relationships with those industry 
leaders. Because otherwise just a nice logo. But then you are talking. What about what can I do with 
it? Its meaningful, its meaningless, but so.  
 
P Thng  18:15   
So focus on soft skills, create trust relationship between members, provide practical knowledge, 
generate meaningful network. Anymore priorities? 
 
R4A  18:26   
Maybe the fifth one, maybe focus on the individuals rather than looking at them as a start-up. 
 
P Thng  18:45   
Now. So now you've done about three years and you've been in the industry quite some time. Is 
there anything recently that you discovered is not important at all as you thought it was earlier when 
you first started this journey? Now as you look back, this is really not so important. 
 





The founders academic knowledge is not valuable. 
 
P Thng  19:18   
And what do you think that you discovered recently that is very important that earlier you didn't 
really thought maybe early you thought that it was important but as you look back now you say, this 
is really important to be successful.  
 
R4A  19:31   
Resourcefulness of the start-up, of the founder. We found the resourcefulness by far the most 
important characteristic in the character of entrepreneur by far and a start-up that do not, cannot 
demonstrate some kind of resourcefulness it will be very challenging for 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  19:54   
Okay good, now let me go to question four. Now I'm trying to find out who is suitable to be 
incubated by your model. So what kind of situation would an accelerator program be suitable for, 
what kind of people what kind of situation? 
 
R4A  20:20   
There are the people that need to be coachable.  
 
P Thng  20:22   
Coachable. 
 
R4A  20:24   
Demonstrate resourcefulness, come with some kind of problem to solve.  
 
P Thng  20:37   
When you say come with a problem to solve, you're saying that someone who has take a deep look 
into the problem or they come up with an idea to think that this problem may exist, we say a 
problem to resolve. 
 
R4A  20:51   
Every start-up starts with an assumption. So we wanted the assumption will be that they are, that 
they found the problem that is quite big and meaningful. Without finding a problem, it's like 
developing a key and looking for the door. 
 
P Thng  21:12   
So they are coachable, demonstrate resourcefulness, they've got some substantial problem to solve. 
So those are the kind that will be suitable for your program, right. And what kind of people their 
personality, characteristics will be useful for your program. I mean some of them you mentioned, 
right? They 
 
R4A  21:33   
Mentioned coachable and and resourcefulness but I believe its people that have strong social skills, 
it's easier for them because as as as an entrepreneur, you cannot do things alone and you need to 






P Thng  22:00   
Okay, good, okay. Then generally when they come to your program they already formed a team, 
right?  
 
R4A  22:07   
Yes.  
 
P Thng  22:08   
Okay good, so now if you were to advise someone above the path, they should take for a new 
venture, what would your advice be? If someone comes to you and says, you know, I want to start a 
new venture what would your advice be? 
 
R4A  22:20   
Identify a problem.  
 
P Thng  22:24   
Okay, and do you care whether it's a b2b type problem or b2c, no difference.  
 
R4A  22:29   
And make sure the problem is big enough, it's likely that people will be willing to create to solve it. 
What we, we measured. We, from our perspective input that we it's very important for us that the 
solution we create positive impact on us as a society.  
 
P Thng  22:55   
So supposing you got a team and already have one or two customers. would your advice be the 
same different? If they already have a team, you have some customers.  
 
R4A  23:07   
Yes?  
 
P Thng  23:07   
Would your advice be still the same? Identifying problems? 
 
R4A  23:11   
It seems like that if they already found the problem, customers, it seems like they identified a 
problem. 
 
P Thng  23:17   
Okay. 
 
R4A  23:18   
Otherwise they would not have customers. 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  23:22   
So your advice would be the same, make sure that the solution now is rich for, to solve this problem. 
Now question five. It's the last question, after undergoing your acceleration program, we want to 





your program it could be 4, 6, 8, 12 months down the trial, or even some of them two years now. So 
after they've gone through your program, what differences did you see, did you observe about these 
teams, before and after undergoing your program. 
 
R4A  24:05   
We want to see a change in their approach to the start-ups and we want them to play to win rather 
than play to play. We want them to have a global perspective. 
 
P Thng  24:25   
Do you notice these changes when you? 
 
R4A  24:28   
Absolutely. 
 
P Thng  24:34   
I've got some suggestions, like their market awareness, market sizing, financial acumen, their 
understanding of their team, chemistry of team, appreciation of competition, go-to-market, beyond 
domestic market. Are they able to leverage mentors better now, are they able to connect to VCs 
better, do they have better business acumen?  
 
R4A  24:56   
Yeah, all of the above of things those are characters let's call it feature ingredients which part of the 
journey in accelerator they receive, but all over all a thing, we wanted to give them a strong toolkit 
which they can use as and when they come to a certain situation. In addition, we want to give them 
kind of virtual safety net to know that there is an address that they can always approach when they 
have new challenges or questions.  
 
P Thng  25:24   
Right. So increase their confidence? 
 
R4A  25:25   
Yes. 
 
P Thng  25:29   
And you observed, that right? After the four months. 
 
R4A  25:32   
Absolutely, yes, on a weekly basis, we are being approached by our alumni with questions, with 
requests, with issues and our door was very open and 
 
P Thng  25:40   
So you still keep track [unintelligible] 
 
R4A  25:43   
[Unintelligible] as and when they need 
 
P Thng  25:45   
Okay, so after this program, you see the benefits or some of the changes like the way they now have 
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Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
R1V  0:00   
Happy to run you through that. But you should also know that [company] did a study in this area to 
learn how to beat the market in the business of venture and they will have studied by now over half 
a million investment rounds over about 200,000 companies and they have a good understanding of 
what practices or what elements go over to helping one to beat the market in the business of 
venture so I can tell you from my own perspective but excluding that study. 
 
P Thng  0:37   
Will be useful so I just go through quickly you know, so how long have you been in this business of 
venture building?  
 
R1V  0:45   
Over 10 years.  
 
P Thng  0:45   
Okay, and then the second question is how many new ventures have you been associated with? 
 
R1V  0:55   
About 15 
 
P Thng  0:56   
15 ok and were they mainly built, venture-built or accelerated?  
 
R1V  1:03   
All built 
 
P Thng  1:06   
Ok, so [company] considers itself as an accelerator or venture builder? 
 
R1V  1:10   







Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  1:11   
ok ok, so now what's your definition of success of new ventures? 
 
R1V  1:21   
depends on which point. I think it takes at least two years for a company to show its promise. Or to 
start delivering on its promise. Anything less than that and you can't really have a sense of whether 
your input has been accredited to their success. So I will actually take a longer time view, say take a 
four to five year view and if the company is A - still around, B - still has dynamic and task-appropriate 
individuals working for it, has managed to work its way to or pivot its way to a product market fit 
and has launched its product or service on the market and is at least revenue positive, if not 
profitable. I'll say that's a successful venture.  
 
P Thng  2:34   
Ok so 
 
R1V  2:36   
I deliberately don't talk about multiples, of like revenue or earnings in terms of its valuation because 
I think the venture capital gain is different from the venture builder gain like a venture cap, a VC, to 
report a successful investment going in very early slipping to somebody else in the subsequent 
rounds and getting out for multiple of their input, even if that company subsequently fails. Right, so 
venture cap is a toxic game it is hugely inefficient. And that is amongst the things that drove the 
impetus of the [company] team as we closed off our first portfolio to study the venture market, you 
understand what it took to consistently build success. Because we, we're just not enamoured with 
the very wasteful model of deploying capital  
 
P Thng  3:37   
right so what is your definition of a failed venture 
 
R1V  3:42   
Doesn't keep to its objectives. Where you misidentify the product or service that you thought was 
needed which is more a function of not doing enough research going in, where the team was unable 
to work together. Where you find a product market fit, but you can't make enough money from it or 







Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  4:20   
Then now let me ask you this question: practices of venture builders, what do you think are the core 
competencies of a venture group? 
 
R1V  4:30   
Ok other than raising funds which is like a hygiene factor so you have to be able to either put in 
funds or raise funds for the businesses. Very important for venture builder is to identify good 
executive teams. Then, to be able to work with these teams to refine the product snap off the 
development effort then work with a team to lay out a distribution strategy or a sales strategy and 
work with the team to time and execute successive funding rounds at the right time introduce, 
introduce board members and or advisors as needed and then help the company think through exit 
options whether its on the public markets or create sale to a strategic party. And and then also help 
the team to think through their own outcomes and outcomes of the staff. So good venture builder or 
do all of this. And as a result, you see good loyalty amongst the executive teams to do the venture 
builders so after they exit, when they move on, they typically tend to come back and say, Okay, let's 
move on. 
 
P Thng  5:59   
Then err. So what, what do you think are the main services of a venture builder? 
 
R1V  6:05   
All of those. 
 
P Thng  6:06   
Ok, so those are also their strengths. So what do you think are the weaknesses of a venture builder? 
 
R1V  6:13   
you're tend to get too involved with companies, sometimes where it's hard to maintain distance, you 
know you're almost in the trenches with the team. And sometimes you need this distance to give 
perspective on whether you should cut the rope on the company or encourage the team to wind it 
up, move on. 
 
P Thng  6:35   
Right. So do you say that the venture business tend to be longer term compared 
 
R1V  6:38   
Much much, its in the years’ time frame, not weeks or months. It’s in the time-frame of years.  
 
P Thng  6:44   
And actually what is the range? 
 
R1V  6:45   
I say 4 to 6 years. 
 
P Thng  6:51   
So [company], how long has [company] been around? 
 





Since 2013 I think but some of the ventures predate that 'cos we will yield individual investments 
that later coalesce 
 
P Thng  7:03   
And where did [company] start from, which location was it from the USA or Singapore? 
 
R1V  7:09   
Singapore 
 
P Thng  7:09   
Singapore is it? So who was like the brainchild said that let's like, you know do a venture- 
 
R1V  7:14   
So [name] and I 
 
P Thng  7:15   
[name] and you? 
 
R1V  7:16   
Yeah, my friend [name] and I. And then we later we roped in some 
 
P Thng  7:22   
So what inspired you to take this model instead of you know building another 
 
R1V  7:27   
Because I'd seen that that in Singapore we didn't really have any coherent system for achieving 
outcomes in venture, Government was interested in venture but the first round of early stage 
venture funds have been rather poorly selected most of them were, had weak leadership and people 
that were not appropriate for venture, I don't know how they managed to hoodwink, err the 
relevant, I think it was NRF is it, I don't know how they managed to convince NRF to give them 
money. Most of them were- 
 
P Thng  7:59   
There were five groups right, jungle ventures and whatever right 
 
R1V  8:02   
No jungle came much later, early stage like you can just go and google, there were 6 or 7 funds. It 
was a disastrous waste of government money. 
 
P Thng  8:17   
In fact they did a study you know- 
 
R1V  8:19   
and we could have told them that also you know the people 
 
involved at NRF you know one or two of them, at least one of them was way more [unintelligible] at 
personal profiling then actually achieving any outcomes for the system and managed to file in that 
for himself into a successful career, but really has not achieved any outcomes for Singapore. 
 
P Thng  8:44   






R1V  8:48   
We could have told them that two years 
 
P Thng  8:50   
Two years 
 
R1V  8:50   
We could told them that one year in front, this a problem right until some foreigner comes here and 
tells us something we don't believe it right this is the consistent issue with many of our efforts in 
venture where the government involvement there are good people to tell you exactly what's going 
on but you don't bother listening to them and then you keep shoveling money into a pool 
 
P Thng  9:11   
What's the saying like the Prophet, your home prophet you don't listen to him.  
 
R1V  9:17   
Unless you come wash in salt water. 
 
P Thng  9:20   
Okay. So [name], what do you see are the main differences between an accelerator and a venture 
builder 
 
R1V  9:27   
same accelerator, can provide tips or suggestions and techniques. accelerator can also be a meeting 
place where founders can meet cofounders potential team members, right? When you can meet 
other companies who provide complementary services that you might need, but it's not a substitute 
for a team that can help you build a business that's a very, very different you can provide one or two 
things. But really, it's not about long-term involvement and nobody should fault the accelerators for 
not doing that. Because they never promised that they were going to build a business. I don't know 
any accelerator that says we will help you build a business because that's not their problem 
 
P Thng  10:12   
so their intent and model is different 
 
R1V  10:15   
whether they say or whether they realise it or not 
 
P Thng  10:19   
And so generally they are shorter term too right? The accelerators 
 
R1V  10:22   
Always 
 
P Thng  10:22   
3 to 6 months and off you go 
 
R1V  10:24   







P Thng  10:32   
Next question is, what do you think are the similarities between a venture builder and an 
accelerator? 
 
R1V  10:39   
None, there's no overlap 
 
P Thng  10:42   
so you think there's- so if you had to prioritize as a venture builder what are the top five most 
important things that you would do? 
 
R1V  10:54   
find people to give the exact  
 
P Thng  10:57   
Ok the cofounders you mean? 
 
R1V  10:59   
So put together a solid team in Singapore, I'd say raise funds, because unfortunately, accessing 
money here is a real problem by anything that's new or interesting, doesn't get fund people here, 
just want to fund the same old stuff that's been done. And most of the government money that 
shovelled into the space just builds more similar stuff that people with limited imagination can 
understand. Right? So I think in Singapore it’s a really key thing to do to for Venture builders to keep 
raising funds. Okay, it should drag much lower more right. Thinking through the product  
 
P Thng  11:48   
thinking through ok 
 
R1V  11:56   
you would expect the team to then map out a path to develop it so it's okay if you're not day to day 
involved in building out right or in the development? but I think it's finding advisors and board 
members we can assist the team to make the step up. And then the last one is helping the team 
think through their funding rounds and exit options 
 
P Thng  12:26   
and then is there anything recently that you discovered is not important as thought as you earlier 
thought it was in venture building 
 
R1V  12:39   
nope in fact we've only learned more and more that some things are very important  
 
P Thng  12:44   
okay. So is there anything recently that you discussed is very important? 
 
R1V  12:54   
I think in the teams in their anchor shareholders very important to have adversity quotient that 
means no business really unfolds exactly as planned. In my experience, they all have events where 
you need to think through or change strategy and avoid blaming each other. And just the ability to 
roll with the punches to deal with surprises is hugely important. So this is something that I've 






P Thng  13:36   
So this is starting to come naturally 
 
R1V  13:38   
You look for team members who have resilience  
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  13:42   
resilience, okay thank you. Okay, fit for purpose? Who do you think, what are the type of people that 
are suitable for incubation by venture builders? 
 
R1V  13:56   
So I would very much like if I were to do more work in the venture building space I'd very much like 
to work with people who have experienced failure before and draw lessons from them. Then I think 
the hygiene factors are you must have some subject matter knowledge of the area, you want to 
build the venture in  
 
P Thng  14:24   
the domain expertise  
 
R1V  14:25   
Yup some domain expertise is a hygiene factor, you have to handle it right? You need to be able to 
sell so at least someone on the team needs to be able to sell or they need to be able to through their 
personal qualities they need to be able to attract subsequently members who can play that role. 
 
P Thng  14:55   
So can I ask you typically venture builders based on experience, how much equity do they take? 
What's the range?  
 
R1V  15:02   
So at [name], we we function very differently to normal accelerators or early stage funds, because 
we understood the importance of making sure the founders have enough equity. So our objective 
will be satisfied. Even if we started out as a minority shareholders and subsequently ended up with, 
say, a 20% stake in the business. We were quite happy with that. 
 
P Thng  15:37   
Alright, because we've covered a few other venture builders they tend to take significant- 
 
R1V  15:42   
and that model doesn't work, that's just greed at work and and ask those venture builders how 
many of the companies the exec after they exit come back and want to work with them because of 
this [unintelligible] so you have to optimize the outcomes of the team they are creating the value 
you are helping them create the value and you are providing money in Singapore context money is 
very important because there's there's always new stuff coming around right. So raising funds, 
unfortunately, or fortunately, here is a big issue right and so people put too much of a premium on it 
I've seen morons right, offer money to very smart exec teams and ask them for 70% of their business 
and what value is there in that 
 
P Thng  16:29   






R1V  16:31   
Simply encourage, see people who build business are at a premium because they generate 
employment so they create value in the economy and our venture circuit here is still not mature 
enough to generally realize that. It's more about I have the money or I managed to convince some 
government agency to give me money. And so I'm the big boss now, right? So I call the shots. It 
shouldn't be about that. So [name] practiced a very, very differently ethos to taking equity in fact, 
because we limited our own ass and because we went in early and then we followed on we were in a 
strong position to exert moral pressure on subsequent long investors not to ask for unreasonable 
terms for example, liquidation preferences right which is a mechanism where you're supposed to 
build in downside protection for an investor to whom you give that assurance right so say a company 
gets liquidated and an investor has a liquidation preference right firstly this [unintelligible] can be 
multiples can be one x two x three x right. We personally don't believe in anything more than one x 
[unintelligible] because if you want downside protection you're not supposed to profit from it yeah 
you're not supposed to get two x repress or three x repress right, second it's supposed to be 
downside protection not upside that means in an exit scenario where there's money they're not 
supposed to use it to grab more than your share. Third, because it's supposed to be downside 
protection we reason with the incoming investor to say that once your total returns from the project 
equals your investment that means let's say we put in 300,000 once your total return whether by 
equity distributions , distributions of dividends or earnings from the project and see the structures 
sometimes like this or let's say you sell down your stake and you get some money back or there's an 
exit right, once your total returns equal your investment more one x right you've got your money out 
right your [unintelligible] will fall away, will disappear. So we set those terms firstly we never ever 
asked for leg breadth in any investment so secondly when people ask well he stood on the side of 
the entrepreneur to negotiate these away or to limit these 
 
P Thng  19:18   
 so you generally a lot of loyalty amongst your team 
 
R1V  19:20   
100%  
 
P Thng  19:21   
So what's your fund size and how many teams have you built? 
 
R1V  19:26   
so we've done and [name] I think 12 projects and raised well over a 100 million dollars for them 
combination of debt and equity 
 
P Thng  19:37   
 but then your own your own fund put in there  
 
R1V  19:41   
so we never set up a fund we just invested as a holdco, investment holdco. using the final model 
puts you at odds with your fund investors because you are incentivized more by fees than by actual 
return so we said look let's just have 100% alignment with all the investors 
 
P Thng  20:03   
so i need to understand this model okay I'm actually doing some work with another group I don't 
know whether you're familiar the [name] global group [name] has been building ventures for the last 





philosophy is similar 10-15 companies in a period of four to six years okay but the our model in 
terms of funding is we try to get about ten investors each one put in about 2 million and set up a 
kind of micro fund 20 million 
 
R1V  20:38   
yup so you can do that 
 
P Thng  20:40   
that's one model so I am trying to figure out the [company] model 
 
R1V  20:43   
So you can do that part of our model was also dictated by the limitations of people here not 
understanding venture  
 
P Thng  20:49   
that's right  
 
R1V  20:51   
the funds here did not understand venture building they didn't understand anything out of the 
ordinary anything new creative innovative was a bridge too far for them so we stopped going to 
them so as and when we met interesting people who were interested in venture building we invited 
them to join 
 
P Thng  21:09   
I see and their contribution or the one two million of fund or roughly 
 
R1V  21:13   
half a million to two million 
 
P Thng  21:16   
Ok ok yeah I tell you I've been hitting my head against the wall up this industry is too nice 
 
R1V  21:22   
so you know, having done venture in Singapore for 10 years I would not continue to do it I will not 
do it it's a thankless task so you know the outcomes that I get now I will look at doing overseas in like 
Indonesia 
 
P Thng  21:40   
So when you say doing ventures overseas you mean building ventures overseas 
 
R1V  21:43   
Yeah investing behind projects that- 'cause there's market size and you don't have to deal with you 
don't have to deal with the same challenges as here.  
 
P Thng  21:58   
so you're that Indonesia is a good market for venture building is that what you're saying? 
 
R1V  22:01   
Yes, that's right 
 





Okay, thank you. If you were to advise someone about the path they should take for new venture 
what would your advice be 
 
R1V  22:15   
I think base yourself in a a big market and Singapore is too small. So any entrepreneur here, I'd 
encourage them to not just base in Singapore as a test market I'd say don't based here. I'd say you 
can set up your business here because it's easy to administer. But but go and position yourself in a 
much bigger market you immediately become more interesting for investment go to Vietnam go to 
Indonesia go to Thailand if you have a Thai speaking team. 
 
P Thng  22:48   
Would your advice be different if they already have a team? 
 
R1V  22:50   
Here? 
 
I will tell them to move the team overseas or or rehire, like keep the core people and then rehire the 
rest in the market. 
 
P Thng  23:01   
then would your advice again be different if they already have customers.  
 
R1V  23:05   
Yes. 
 
P Thng  23:05   
In what way? 
 
R1V  23:07   
No, my advice would be the same right, if they had customers put that part of the business in a box 
because there's a ceiling to how much you can grow in Singapore. Right and and make sure you get a 
good administrator running that part of the business. So this applies and then look at new markets 
outside.  
 
P Thng  23:26   
So if, again, would your advice be different if this team have already an MVP? 
 
R1V  23:33   
So the same thing, right, see what direction you can get in Singapore? Don't let that be your main 







Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
 
P Thng  23:40   
Last two question impact on new ventures after undergoing incubation, first try to assess what's the 
impact on new ventures after undergoing venture building, why have you chosen the venture 
building model. 
 
R1V  23:56   
So I don't know any other models, I never did the accelerator model, I never offered that to people 
that work with us, because we never from the start we never believed in it because I've grown up in 
a business family. I know that it takes time to build a business that things don't happen in staccato 
every few weeks.  
 
P Thng  24:15   
So you came from an entrepreneur background right? 
 
R1V  24:18   
I understand that it takes time to build a business 
 
P Thng  24:20   
whereas accelerating is just compressing 
 
R1V  24:24   
you know, a team that is being built out for a venture that is being built out in a venture builder may 
even experience some benefit going through a strong accelerator program to pick up certain 
themes, make certain contact ways have a different look at their business. I really do love that there 
is value there. But that accelerator model, alone cannot supply everything a business needs I think 
this is something that we lose sight of we think that you just go to set up a program to fund 
ventures. And we find some people who put their hand up and say, Yeah, I want to make more 
money, it doesn't translate automatically into success. You have to have people that understand 
what it means to grow the business. And the trick in this economy is to match the pools of capital 
that are allocated to support building businesses, to to people who have experienced doing 
businesses that they can help you deploy the money and also help build the resources so that in that 
middle link is missing, yes. 
 
P Thng  25:39   
and then what do you notice about the key differences in the new ventures before and after 
undergoing your venture building.  
 
R1V  25:46   
So right now you got the middle answer just 'cos you know, we've only just seeing them from 
beginning all the way right, so they've only ever been with us it's not that they came in from 
somebody else's model. And then 
 
P Thng  26:00   
OK, so now I'm trying to figure out whether those co founders that you built, the team members 
that you  built, I mean, before they joined your program before you got them together did you find 






R1V  26:20   
I think generally, they all came back to us that they learned, they picked up things 
 
P Thng  26:24   
so there [unintelligible] 
 
R1V  26:26   
Some of the things they learned about how to navigate challenges and in the business, how to hire, 
how to engage board members how to do the 14 also how to think through exits 
 
and structure these so the consistent feedback I get from the guys I trained with is that they've 
learned all these things whilst with us.  
 
P Thng  26:55   
So finally, my my last question going back to just now you mentioned equity we see that unlike most 
where okay, I've seen as I said quite a few of the venture builders typically keep between 20 even up 
to 60% so for you guys at [company] in what you started up with 5% of it and what's the incentive 
for starting that low? 
 
R1V  27:15   
so so we we typically aim to end up with 20% and exit right and in most cases is is probably below 
that means so when we achieve 20 is like wah very good right and it's not 10-12-15% is okay so to 
get that say you start out with maybe say between 30 and 40 and you expect to be diluted sorry and 
if you end up at 20 is very good already usually you're somewhere between 10 and 20 
 
P Thng  27:54   
Ok, ok right, so your starting point was what 30-40?  
 
R1V  27:57   
so unlike most people who rely on it we understand that if you take too much the entrepreneur has 
no incentive right also because of our selection of the people we are comfortable being minority 
shareholders right so if you don't trust the team then you don't want to be a minority shareholder 
right? 
 
P Thng  28:20   
so just based on your track record you mentioned how many teams did you built to date  
 
R1V  28:25   
so about half have exited or are on their way to exit which is industry leading  
 
P Thng  28:31   
correct. 
 
R1V  28:31   
-success number  
 
P Thng  28:32   
So six have exited and the other six are on the way right?  
 
R1V  28:36   






P Thng  28:39   
Oh written off, ok  
 
R1V  28:40   
Okay half have either exited or on the way to exit. So 60% is an unheard of number in venture right, 
Yeah, but you never hear [unintelligible]  
 
P Thng  28:52   
usually like 95%, but venture builders generally from my observation success rate, definitely much 
higher.  
 
R1V  28:59   
It goes without saying it must be otherwise something wrong  
 
P Thng  29:02   
Yeah, thank you so much 
 
R1V  29:05   
no worries 
 
P Thng  29:06   
and I really appreciate your time. 
 
R1V  29:10   
Goodbye now 
 
P Thng  29:12   
You're probably one of the best that I've met. And tested I mean, you're so concise, you know  
straight to the point  
 
R1V  29:19   
I came about this stuff. 
 
P Thng  29:21   
No, one of these days, when [name] is here I really got to get him to you know, he he's more he's a 
telco main expertise is in telco, he invented quite a few things and very entrepreneurial. So when he 
first saw me three years ago, he said, I asked him about his success rate, he says, Oh, Patrick , I'm 
going to tell you this, if you don't believe I'm going to open your books to show you he says at that 
time 3 years ago he's invested in 140 companies [unintelligible] obviously, the earlier model was 
different. But the last 10 years was towards the venture building model he said after 140 at that 
time 8 did not do well I said you mean 8 did well and yeah he says no 8 did not do well and 8 of them 
did not go bankrupt with [unintelligible] or debts so I said how did you achieve that so he went 
through many of those things you just said to me so I visited our head offices in Ottawa so I started 
to look at the books and you know and frankly you know, it had generated what you just mentioned 
- loyalty the guys who were with them I spoke to them 15 over 20 over years with their group. And 
so they circulate and then the go-to-market and 
 
R1V  30:35   






P Thng  30:36   
Exactly. So I find eh this models works why are we not doing more of this in Singapore? 
 
R1V  30:40   
we this is my big frustration right with this market that we built, that the people that dispense the 
money that run the government program seemed to know everything and unfortunately when you 
have that kind of agenda anyone who's willing to stroke your ego can manipulate the system to get 
tremendous advantage. 
 
P Thng  31:17   
These are civil service KPIs, different from what we mentioned 
 
R1V  31:19   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  31:21   
so just one last point generally I need to get your consent to make sure so the consent could be just 
drop me an email I consent to this or you just want to just save time you just sign this here on this 
I'm above 18 years of age and all that nonsense so what our commitment is we will keep that the 
data confidential every participant will be coded no names no organization so we just code it 
 
R1V  31:43   
so as long as my recording does not go floating around 
 
P Thng  31:46   
We we will destroy the recording after within one year of the publication on the results and when 
we publish the results we don't actually say who it is 
 
R1V  31:55   
so you will not name  
 
P Thng  31:56   
no name in fact that's part of our ethical consideration if not our PHD can be thrown away. Ok so 
they're very strict on this so they will check on us and they audit on us 
 
R1V  32:05   
Ok great thanks  
 
P Thng  32:10   
Because this SMU I heard someone whole piece of research was thrown away because he sent his 
secretary to send the survey using the secretary's name 
 
R1V  32:26   
Oh no. 
 
P Thng  32:28   
I tell you in was my cohort so the guy was told either we fail you or you redo the whole thing again 
 
R1V  32:32   






P Thng  32:34   
So for me I personally do to this interview something about six or seven you're the second or third 
one I'm doing so I'm trying to do three or four more in so yours is the venture builder [name] was an 
accelerator so another  
 
R1V  32:51   
[name] has actually done really well with his accelerator model.  
 
P Thng  32:55   
so he he's actually also moving into the venture building model so I know that 
 
R1V  33:01   
[name] time was shaped by his earlier partner as well right I mean just so happened that they 
intersect their interest to do an accelerator model I think [name] also sees the benefits of doing a 
venture building model 
 
P Thng  33:14   
So I'm starting to see this as a growing trend so I thought I better hit this piece of research 
 
R1V  33:19   
but you know here's the thing right, people like us who have done it for long enough we really 
understand how to grow businesses but now we're not interested doing that  
 
P Thng  33:26   
Yeah because you've passed that phase right  
 
R1V  33:28   
because I'm past the the point dealing with the investment funds here who are cashed up while 
don't want to invest in anything viable 
 
P Thng  33:39   
copycat quick stuff that's what they want I spoke to a few I find they're really because they've got 
some pot of money you talk to them they are really clueless 
 
R1V  33:52   
Like for example in Indonesia one of the thing I'm funding now is very traditional business  
 
P Thng  33:57   
which one? 
 
R1V  33:57   
Cooking oil just local distribution of cooking oil 
 
P Thng  34:01   
right right right 
 
R1V  34:02   
but but within a year should be making about 3000 USD a day, profit 
 
P Thng  34:11   






R1V  34:13   
I went there I checked it out I saw the what needed to be done right I put together I say go there I 
will give you the initial seed capital go and start it 
 
P Thng  34:20   
Oh nice 
 
R1V  34:23   
So they're start it now  
 
P Thng  34:23   
that's good that's good  
 
R1V  34:24   
so traditional businesses you know there's still a a lot of [unintelligible] 
 
P Thng  34:26   
No in fact I find this in Fintech too those that tackle the sexy stuff, don't survive those who tackle the 







Background of Interviewee R2V 
 
Participant Code:    R2V 
Incubator Type:       Venture Builder 
Date of Interview:   Jan  30 2019, 4pm 




Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee .............................................................................. 256 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures ......................................................................... 258 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models .................................................................. 260 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) .................................................... 268 







Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:00   
The formal process for ourselves is to get your consent of the course. So consent could be done in 
two ways an email from you or just, you know, you read this part of the consent to say that you're 
above 18 years old, because.  
 
R2V  0:11   
Yeah. 
 
P Thng  0:12   
Yeah.  
 
R2V  0:12   
Of course. Yeah. Do you want to sign something like this? 
 
P Thng  0:15   
We just sign here to say okay. 
 
it's just part of the university ethical rules. 
 
R2V  0:20   
Of course. 
 
P Thng  0:21   
And now I'm interviewing someone in Europe, and I've got to comply with GDPR. Lucky you're here 
and not in the EU 
 
R2V  0:29   
I mean also in the US. We also have implemented GDPR and [unintelligible] on our website. 
 
P Thng  0:35   
So what I'm going to do is to keep this up. I'm know you're short on time so I'm going to keep this 
sweet, short and simple.  
 
R2V  0:40   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  0:40   
So normally about 30 to 40 minutes, I should be able ot get more intimate questions.  
 
R2V  0:44   
Awesome.  
 
P Thng  0:44   
Good. So first question, I'm going to ask this to get a bit of your background and experience. And 
number one, how long have you been in the venture industry business? 
 
R2V  0:53   






P Thng  0:59   
About 14 year old  
 
R2V  1:01   
Yeah, 14 years, 
 
then in terms of kind of venture building, yeah you know, I guess, kind of rocket internet era was 
like, 5, 5, 6 years and afters, one and a half years now. So you know 
 
P Thng  1:15   
Okay, so its about there so how many new ventures Have you been associated with either you've 
built, or incubated or accelerated? 
 
R2V  1:23   
[Unintelligible] this, you know, four where I was a co founder probably invested in another like three 
or four plus them in [company name]. We currently built 30, and we're now building probably, this 
year we'll build 200.  
 
P Thng  1:41   
So all in about what? 
 
R2V  1:44   
So, so far. 20, I say.  
 
P Thng  1:47   
Okay. So now let's put 20 
 
R2V  1:49   
And then this year will be 200 
 
P Thng  1:53   
Amazing yours is really.  
 
R2V  1:54   
But that's just because, I mean, 
 
we started out recently.  
 
P Thng  1:57   
Your, your model seems to be able to scale up fast. Excellent. 
 
R2V  2:02   
I guess you can actually you can write 25. 
 
P Thng  2:04   
25, okay. in terms of, do you, your organization, consider yourself as an accelerator or venture 
builder? 
 
R2V  2:13   






P Thng  2:15   
Generate, okay  
 
R2V  2:15   
Which is it's closer to venture builder. It's definitely not an accelerator 
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
 
P Thng  2:24   
Okay good. Right. Okay. So now, question two, definition of success of the new ventures that you 
build in? Yeah, so I want to get like some clarity. So what's your definition of success of a new 
venture? 
 
R2V  2:41   
So our definition of success is, we believe that we have A - an exceptional co founder team working 
on a business model that is really scalable, and that, you know, receives external validations into 
[unintelligible] if not start generating real revenue and customers and get, you know, external 
validation through family that then kind of our, you know, part of the picture is done, then, of 
course, you know, long-term success with the startups means that, you know, they are either 
regional or global influential company that reached, you know, higher than 100 million dollar 
valuation.  
 
P Thng  3:34   
This Is US right?  
 
R2V  3:35   
That's yeah, that's the long term.  
 
P Thng  3:37   
Okay. So, when you say long-term, you're looking at roughly how many years? 
 
R2V  3:42   
So, you know, I mean, to achieve that, we expect the best ones to reach it within two or three years, 
you know, you know, there's some who will spend you know seven to 10 years to get there 
 
P Thng  3:52   
So the average is somewhere between somewhere between  
 
R2V  3:55   
Yeah, somewhere between  
 
P Thng  3:56   
Okay, so what's your expectation for success? 
 
R2V  4:01   
So we exist  
 
P Thng  4:01   






R2V  4:03   
So we want 80% of our ventures that we built to be successful. What I see as the only reasons for 
not succeeding is one out of three items. So it's, we believe, people can succeed if there's some sort 
of macro-economic shock that leads to their business dying, right, that can happen, or there's a 
major competitor that pumps billions of dollars into, you know, 
 
competing against them, and they can't compete or that somebody happens with the founding 
team, right? It could be, but that needs to be something like deeply personal, 
 
but apart from that we eliminate we want to eliminate all other reasons for not succeeding. 
 
P Thng  4:57   
I guess, that leads on to the next question. So what's defined as failure of a new venture? 
 
R2V  5:03   
Failure of a venture 
 
mean, there's a lot of reasons why ventures face I can answer that saying like, Why, what is the fate 
of venture? Or what do we, you know, 
 




P Thng  5:23   
What do you define as failure? 
 
R2V  5:26   
I mean, failure for me is, if we are not putting together an exceptional team, 
 
if we have not gone deep enough on their business model to understand that there's actually a real 
need for the business that they're building and solving 
 
and that technology is available to execute on it 
 
And if the exceptional team working on the right business model is not able to scale it into regional 
overall success? 
 
P Thng  5:58   
What is your tolerance for failure? 
 
R2V  6:01   
20%? 
 
P Thng  6:03   
What, what do you mean by 20%? 
 
R2V  6:06   






it's okay to fail. If you've done anything, everything to succeed. So I always try to say that failure is 
not an option. 
 
But of course, you know, let's say, you know, I was training I was in the Navy SEALs before, of course, 
if you fail on the Navy SEAL selection period, because you broke, broke your legs, 
 
that's, that's an accepted reason to fail if you fail a billion business, because, you know, 
 
Google decided to do the exact same thing. And they put $3 billion and 200 AI engineers into doing 
the same 
 
P Thng  6:53   
Yeah 
 
R2V  6:54   
Then that's okay. But if you fail, because you didn't complete enough on the business model, or you 
didn't think through the team that you're putting together or you didn't give it all?  
 
P Thng  7:06   
Yes  
 
R2V  7:06   
Then that's unacceptable. failure.  
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  7:08   
Okay, good. Excellent. OK, now I'm going to question three. Differentiators of the two incubation 
models. So you consider yourself as a VB what are the core competencies of a venture builder? 
 
R2V  7:21   
I think the number one competency is attracting amazing talent.  
 
like really ambitious people with a clear spike, a lot of drive and tenacity.  
 
P Thng  7:37   
Okay 
 
R2V  7:37   
Number one. Number two is pulling together exceptional teams as it doesn't matter if you have a 
bunch of amazing individuals if you can't put them together into exceptional teams. And that 
requires looking at skill sets, chemistry, a lot of different things. 
 
Third, is them 
 
ensuring that they're working on the business model, which really make sense to work on. And how 






consult experts within that field to get their point of view, don't listen to everyone, I mean, take 
their advice and improve your model. Validate with your potential customers. This is something this 
is, is this something a consumer will buy? 
 
And then third, you know, deeply check the unit economics and the kind of, you know, economical 
value to the idea, right. And then fourthly, ensure that this business idea is scalable. So those are  
you know the three main success factors, 
 
P Thng  8:48   
Right. So, so for a venture builder like yourself, right, so as you said, your ability to attract one of 
your core competency, then two your ability to grow and form exceptional teams. And finally, your 
ability to quality control and make sure that your business model is robust. Sustainable that's right? 
These things are important right?  
 
R2V  9:06   
Yes.  
 
P Thng  9:08   
Okay, good. So what are the main services of a venture builder? What kind of services do you 
normally provide? 
 
R2V  9:15   
So the number one thing I mean, it relates back to number one thing is we provide access to other 
amazing cofounders. Secondly, we provide the tools and the know-how to turn those into 
exceptional teams. Third, we provide a partner team with knowledge on how to go very deep into 
different types of business models and aspects of those business models. We provide an advisory 
board of [unintelligible], 150 Global Advisors, academics, successful entrepreneurs, great business 
people. So if you want to go deep on robotics, you can talk to the right people who have build things 
within the robotics area. If you want to do something with an AI, then go deep with people in AI, you 
want to do something with health tech, we can provide that those competencies, so those are the 
core right, then, of course, we provide sorts of those. For me, are like the core factors. And then for 
me, there are hygiene factors, you know, hygiene factors, I think, is 
 
functional support on legal HR, recruiting, growth, marketing, storytelling, PR, you know, 
 
product architecture, technology architecture, all these things that are the hygiene factors to 
building a great business then I even provide office space, and, you know, various types of social 
activities.  
 
P Thng  11:01   
What about a connection to investors? 
 
R2V  11:04   
Yes, that was the key points.  
 
P Thng  11:06   
So, is that under core or did you put that more on hygiene? 
 
R2V  11:10   







P Thng  11:17   
So what do you think are the strengths versus weaknesses of a venture builder? 
 
R2V  11:25   
Versus accelerator? 
 
P Thng  11:26   
No, So let's look at the strengths first, strengths of a venture builder then later I'll talk about 
weaknesses of venture building 
 
R2V  11:32   
okay, so I think the strengths of venture builder versus any other type of investments, it is you're 
actually that the team and the individuals behind the team, the founders become the focus. And we 
strongly believe that great companies are built by great people, it doesn't matter how great an idea 
you have, or a great you know, understanding of technology you have, what really matters is the 
execution of that which is done by people. So, we, and eventually, [unintelligible] starts building 
companies from scratch needs to start with individuals. So that I think is the number one strength 
the other strength is you don't have, you haven't, you don't get caught on this legacy, customer IDs 
and business models. Right, you start from scratch which means that you can spend a lot of time 
ensuring that when you start building in business you start in the right way. And you're starting on 
the right business model. 
 
But when you invest in a company, people who have been building for a while, and they might have 
started in the wrong place or the wrong direction. So I mean, I won't go into the  
 
P Thng  12:52   
So the ability to really start right at the beginning  
 
R2V  12:55   
Start right 
 
P Thng  12:55   
And make sure and if the environment has changed you start resetting 
 
R2V  12:57   
Yeah, exactly. And then since that is your focus, people trust venture builders, if you do them well, 
right, because they know that, you know, for example, if [company name] is great at attracting the 
right talent, you know, that they will have exceptional teams, if they know that we have spent a lot 
of time on on the right business model, our portfolio companies will be attractive for other investors 
to come in later. So that I think, is a third advantage that, you know, through focusing on those two 
you build a lot of trust in the  
 
P Thng  13:34   
Okay good, so do those are the you think, are the key strengths of a venture builder. So what are 
some of the weaknesses of a venture builder or some limitations that you feel? 
 
Success builds on success and trust right? 
 







I think the limitation I think the formal kind of real big limitation of a venture builder is you come in 
so you come in earlier than anyone else. So there's naturally the earlier common valuation, the 
higher the risk 
 
P Thng  14:07   
Yeah 
 
R2V  14:07   
Right. You know, putting money into grab now we're spitting money into grab six years ago, yes, you 
know, that now that, you will most likely get some return before it, you could have gotten a lot of 
return, but also money could have gone to zero. So, of course, I think that's the, you know, the only 
kind of key disadvantage of venture builders that you don't, you invest in people's track record or 
not the track record of the company that you're investing in. 
 
But, you know, that also gives you like, much lower valuations and, you know, there's, there's more 
upside than downside, but, you know, for some investors, that's the big downside. 
 
P Thng  14:55   
Yeah, depending on the the risk  
 
R2V  14:59   
Their risk profile. The other one to mention is, it's hard, right? So 
 
P Thng  15:06   
I like to hear that you're the second or third person that talked about hard, I want to hear that 
 
R2V  15:11   
It's much harder to build businesses from scratch than to invest in existing businesses. 
 
It's also, why I think there are much less venture builders than there are accelerators and venture 
capital companies, because it's easy to sit down two or three people with a good track record and 
set up a fund, start investing or also start an accelerator. 
 
It's hard to kind of recruit a 100 amazing individuals every year and build companies from scratch 
with them. So you need to put in a much larger infrastructure. 
 
P Thng  15:53   
Okay, next question is, what do you see are the main differences between a venture builder and an 
accelerator? What are the key main differences? 
 
R2V  16:00   
I think the main differences, accelerators invest in existing companies, they need to be amazing at 
selecting the right companies, venture builders need to be amazing at selecting the right individuals 
and business models. That's one key difference. The other key difference is accelerators when they 
brought companies in they've already made the decision to invest in them which means that if they 
made a wrong selection they have already committed. Venture builders really only select which 
moles and business they're going to invest in a bit further into the process of building so you will 
have very strong familiarity with the people you're investing in and the teams you're investing in 
before you make the investment decision, you have, you know, information you have way more 






P Thng  17:18   
What about the time period? How long do you normally take to incubate? Your startups as a venture 
builder versus an accelerated? Normally, those programs are quite short.  
 
R2V  17:32   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  17:33   
Between I heard as short as one week to about three four months for accelerators right  
 
R2V  17:37   
Yeah  
 
P Thng  17:38   
So in 
 
R2V  17:38   
Of course its much longer  
 
P Thng  17:39   
So I mean, you know 
 
R2V  17:40   
For Android six months  
 
P Thng  17:42   
Yup, Android six months right  
 
R2V  17:43   
For Rocket internet they will typically is anything from like 12 to 24 months right?  
 
P Thng  17:48   
Right, that's right. So for six months in your model Rocket, is how long 
 
R2V  17:54   
12 to 24 months  
 
P Thng  17:55   
12 to 24 months, huh, right. So in your case [company name] I mean out of curiosity, why did you 
decide the six month route rather than 12, 24 months? 
 
R2V  18:05   
Because we're different from the Rocket, Rocket model takes very few business models and then 
they hire a team to execute on those models and then they will take a high equity share in those 
businesses? 
 
P Thng  18:19   
What's the range of equity share that they take? 
 





It will vary between you know 40% and 70% 
 
P Thng  18:32   
40% to 70% 
 
yes about 10, 20 
 
R2V  18:34   
[company name] takes a lot more we focus on talent first we bring in amazing talent then we work 
with them finding the right business model and then we invest smaller share for 10% of the business 
so we literally build way more businesses every year so we'll bill while Rocket would  you know 
wraps roll out I don't know the exact number of it like 10 to 20 
 
Yeah we will roll out if you look at a kind of global scale you know next year we'll do in 2019 we'll do 
200 companies 
 
P Thng  19:18   
And we'll say 200, you have how many operations? 
 
R2V  19:22   
so that will be across eight locations 
 
P Thng  19:27   
Eight locations so roughly eight times 20, 25 which is towards a higher end of a 10, 20 per location. 
 
R2V  19:37   
But Rocket also have multiple locations right yeah rocket in Europe got Rocket in Asia you have 
Rocket there. So probably in Europe alone, they will probably roll out five to 10 businesses a year. 
 
P Thng  19:49   
Oh, so in Europe alone, it's only five to 10.  
 
R2V  19:52   
Yeah.  
 
P Thng  19:52   
And then in Asia roughly also about?  
 
R2V  19:54   
Five to ten  
 
P Thng  19:55   
Oh, it's actually quite small for them five to ten 
 
R2V  19:59   
It's very focused I mean there's a lot of venture builders who are very focused like in HR venture 
group. For example, 
 
P Thng  20:05   






R2V  20:12   
Yeah 
 
P Thng  20:12   
10 to 15, yeah.  
 
R2V  20:13   
So they're even more focused. 
 
P Thng  20:14   
Yeah more focused, because he believed that he could be [unintelligible]. Yeah. So. So when you say 
10%, then the cofounders take 90%. So but by the time you what they call you dilute you have less 
than 10%?  
 
R2V  20:29   
Yeah, for sure.  
 
P Thng  20:30   
For sure.  
 
R2V  20:31   
But we have that in hundreds of companies. 
 
P Thng  20:37   
I'm surprised that you actually take such a low because usually the accelerators is aboyt 8% to 10%.  
 
R2V  20:42   
So we can take more. The reason why we don't take more is we want the best talent. So we want 
the people who are otherwise with the [unintelligible] business. We are not really in the business of 
turning people who wouldn't be founders into founders we're in the business ofenabling great 
founders to be more successful. 
 
P Thng  21:08   
So main differences. Now what do you see are the similarities now, between an accelerator and a 
venture builder what's similar about these? 
 
R2V  21:17   
I mean the similarites is half of the venture business program, or whatever you want to call it is 
actually accelerating a business, right? So there's, like 50% overlap, right? I mean, in terms of the 
time spent in the program, I don't think in terms of what kind of the importance of what you're 
doing but in terms of time spent in the program. So we also focus on like, when we have invested in 
the business, you have the team in place and they started building the business, then we actually do 
more or less exactly the same as an accelerator, but we've chosen in [company name] in Rocket of 
course, they supported them all the way. So none of the rocket companies would ever join an 
accelerator program. 
 
P Thng  22:02   
Yeah 
 





But some of our [company name], portfolio companies says when we leave them they're, still quite 
early on right they're three months old companies, some of them will also join an accelerator 
program later to continue the journey. But you know, probably not that many, but if you will, 
 
P Thng  22:28   
okay. Okay. Next question is, if you had to prioritize, what are the five most important things that 
you will do as a venture builder? Five most important. 
 
R2V  22:41   
Exceptional recruiting, exceptional team composition, or putting teams together deep focus on 
finding the right business models and going deep and validating those business models for ensure 
that you have kind of a stellar venture builder team to support these processes, and then five, have 
the right investors and more in your thumb and who want to invest in your portfolio companies that 
are supporting businesses?  
 
P Thng  23:21   
Okay, so Okay, so have you recently discovered that in venture building, you know, there is 
something that you used to think is important, but after you know, you've been in this business for a 
while you realize it's really not important at all?  
 
R2V  23:36   
Yeah. So, I mean, we spent a lot of time kind of diagnosing stuff in advance. What is not important... 
I don't think it's so important what are these people come into the program with, as long as they are 
open-minded about what they're gonna build which probably was a bit a bit more important for  
 
P Thng  24:14   
Cause in the early years probably, you're looking for those ideas, and now it says look you know son 
you're bright, you're driven, you've got the passion. 
 
R2V  24:22   
Yes, I guess that's one learning 
 
P Thng  24:27   
And then is there anything recently that you discovered is very important, which you did not thought 
so previously, that means, you know, compared to the past right now, say [name], now that I know, 
this is really important. 
 
R2V  24:38   
Yeah, it's incredibly important to maintain momentum throughout the program. This, I think, is one 
kind of important part. So it's with programs with milestones, there's typically people work 
incredibly hard towards a milestone. And then they will, so for example, they work real hard until 
they have a team in place, and then there's [unintelligible] and people relax a bit. And then they 
have to work very hard until they start a business and then they relax a little bit and, then they're 
very hard until the investment committee, and then they get the money and then relax. So one thing 
that we really don't decide, how do you call like a really high level of energy throughout that whole 
journey 
 
P Thng  25:23   
How to sustain  
 





Sustain it. And a lot of that is done through the way we operate, right, because, of course, you know, 
it's easy for our partner as well, to be tired after having worked really hard to reach a milestone. So 
you need to constantly kind of reset and get started on the next phase. And this, I think, is similar, 
like any startup life, right? This when you sign your first customer, you can't go out and drink 
champagne, you go straight back to your prison, and you create the best possible product for a 
customer 
 
P Thng  25:56   
To support the customer and all right? 
 
R2V  25:58   
Yeah, that's right 
 
P Thng  26:00   
Sometimes I say, you know, this is much difficult than certain sports, in a in a marathon, you tend to 
pace yourself, right? But this, you guys are really sprinting, and then take a short rest and then 
spring again and y'know is quite tough to go through.  
 
R2V  26:14   
It's like, you know, some of the great marathon runners, they will walk through the aid stations 
sometimes to hydrate greatly, but then you gotta go  
 
P Thng  26:25   
Really go for it. 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
Now, last 2 questions. Question 4 all right. Who do you think is suitable for which model? So from 
venture building perspective, what kind of people what kind of situation would a VB programme be 
more suitable compared to a accelerator? So what kind of people you think the profile are the ones 
that you think are more suitable for your programme? Because not everybody will want to join a VB 
right? 
 
R2V  26:53   
Yeah, I think actually, for us, there's no real difference on whether you should come join an 
accelerator or us it's more about phasing, what time of your company building you're in. For us, 
anyone who has an exceptional spike, a lot of drive and tenacity should join our program, it doesn't 
matter if you could kind of build your own business without our help, we actually want the ones who 
would build it anyways, we want them to come and join our program. If you already have like an 
amazing co founder or two amazing co founders and is built your business for like six to 12 months, 
then don't come and join us, then you should join an accelerator or just get a VC investment or get 
another investor on board. 
 
For some other venture builders. You know, I think it's different. They are also sometimes just you 
don't necessarily need to either be like, founder material to join them because they're more 
sometimes they're more interested in like management for hire but we are not that type of venture 
builder. 
 
P Thng  28:07   






R2V  28:12   
Closer to the second than the first. I mean, there was a lot of it depended a bit on the type of 
business that we're building. But of course, a lot of people came in there as founders was more kind 
of management style. 
 
P Thng  28:28   
Then if you were to advise someone about the path they should take for new venture, what would 
your advise be? 
 
R2V  28:37   
A - find one or two great co founders B - ensure you have the right chemistry and ask each other all 
the difficult questions you would ask. Now consider it more important than your marriage decision, 
'cause you're gonna spend a lot of time together, then go very deep on the business you want to go. 
And if you are excited about two or three different business models, this try to go deep on all of 
them. And in the end, listen to your mind. But also listen, listen to your gut in terms of where you 
should go. 
 
I think that would be my and then when you made a decision execute like failure is no option 
 
P Thng  29:27   
sounds like your navy SEAL training 
 
R2V  29:33   
Unless you break both 
 
P Thng  29:34   
Exactly, unless they send airstrikes in [unintelligible]. 
 
R2V  29:40   
Exactly 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  29:42   
All right, okay, so okay, I'll go into question five, which is the last question. Why? Why did you 
choose the venture building model versus an acceleration model? 
 
R2V  30:01   
We chose this because we believe it's a superior model 
 
P Thng  30:06   
Superior in what sense? 
 
R2V  30:08   
So it's focused on the most important part of building an amazing company, which is, it's, it's the 
talent and the people building the business, the founders and the teams, we get to spend 







Sales one part. And the most important part. The other part is, there are just way more accelerators 
there then there are venture builders there's also quite a lot of venture capital companies, we 
believe that there's a real need for what we're doing there is there's a gap in the market, it's, it's 
something that will really positively influence all the ecosystems that we're in. And the work. I think 
the third aspect is, there's something exciting about building things from scratch. And not only with 
investing in things that already exist. So we believe that we will profoundly impact the world through 
bringing people out of less productive jobs and make them innovators. 
 
P Thng  31:26   
So now, the very, very last part of this question is, what do you notice about the key differences in 
new ventures before and after undergoing your program? But in your case, I mean, the people have 
no business before right, before, but after going through your three or your see, okay, six months, 
right? What do you notice about this people? In terms of the market awareness, their financial 
acumen I mean. What kind of differences do you notice? 
 
R2V  31:55   
I mean, of course, the key difference is, they go from being excited about being building a business 
to becoming kind of real founders of a great business. And with that comes a lot of confidence, right. 
So it's, you know, you're actually kind of done with your stream, though. So. So, that is one part, I 
think the other part is, you know, a stronger belief that they are the ones that can give you the next 
big thing. 
 
And the third I think is just I get a much clearer understanding of what is required to succeed, which 
gives a certain level of humbleness. And I think this is interesting, right, because you can compare 
humbled confidence, I think people like confident for me, is being confident in terms of what you are 
that you can accomplish things. Humbleness for me is not that you are kind of nervous or anything 
like that is just you know what you're great at and what you're not great at and what it will require 
you to get there. You're also humble in the way that you know how you can trust other team 
members to do a job better than you do because they know that better. You don't feel like you have 
to do everything yourself humble in the way that you would perhaps outsource a part of your 
business because you know, it will be cheaper and better to do with someone else. So, you think you 
know, I think this kind of humbleness is like sometimes its used in like a negative connotation but I 
think really in kind of in this world especially when you start a company if you are not a little bit 
humble you can run into a lot of traps so I think this confidence 
 
P Thng  33:48   
Is important .Did you notice anything about the better market awareness, better business acumen, 
better appreciation of competition, appreciation of team and all that once they finish your six month 
program? 
 
R2V  34:02   
Yup, I mean for sure. So that for me is more I think in terms of so I think there are two parts that 
happens one is like the personal development path and the other thing is the learning path another 
learning path of course all of these things they will be better at like so much stronger functional 
knowledge across all the key functions HR, recruiting, legal technology, marketing. You know much 
stronger market awareness in terms of different types of business models, how they work, different 
understanding of your, the core kind of geographical reasons that they want to go in with their 
businesses, I think better understanding of P&Ls, unit economics, better understanding  of things like 
operational efficiency. Also, on the personal development side, by the way, I think a better 





most optimal way. So there's like a number of things there are some of the personal development 
side 
 
P Thng  35:17   
So you noticed this is some of the positive aspects  
 
R2V  35:20   
Yeah for sure.  
 
P Thng  35:21   
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Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:00   
So I want to explain to you the nature of this study so that you understand the background. So 
earlier I sent to you two documents. The first one is to describe what the intent of this research is 
about. And then the second document is actually the series of five questions, which I'm going to ask 
you is a semi structured interview. So the purpose of the study is to test my hypothesis that there 
are certain practices of venture builders that are quite effective that seem to result in successful 
startups. So I'm looking very specifically at venture builders, which is I assume that the [company 
name] is adopting that model versus accelerators. So in study one, I mean to interview about six to 
eight entities and all data captured, will be anonymous, and this data will be destroyed within a year 
after we publish the results, when we publish the results, all the data will be anonymised there will 
be no one identifed, including the transcription that means the company, the person will not be 
identified in order to keep the confidentiality of the company.  
 
So that's study one therefore study two we will then issue or I will design a online questionaire that 
will be sent to the startups that were either accelerated or venture built and these startups we will 
then select those who are successful as well as we'll pick some that are not so successful so that we 
can see whether those practices make any difference when you look at those who are successful and 
not so successful. So for the second study, what I'll be doing is I'll send you just an online link and 
send it to you. And if you could distribute to our portfolio companies, and then ask them whether 
they are willing to participate so that's study two and that questionnaire will be sent out somewhere 
third week or fourth week of February. 
 
Okay, so there'll be two studies. So what I'm doing right now with you is you study one just to get 
your views and your experience as a venture builder. Okay, so great. So with that, I assume oh, let 
me see I'm in the note that I sent to you. I needed a participants declaration so I guess over the line. 
So basically, participants to declare that participation is voluntary refusal to participate will involve 
no penalty, I can assure you that and I declare or you declare that you're at least 18 years of age and 
I assume that you're at least 18 years of age. And if you're affiliated with SMU, your decision to 
participate, decline or withdraw from participation will have no adverse effect on your status and or 
future relationships with SMU and you have read and fully understood the contents of this form and 
thereby here give consent to SMU research team and its affiliates for this project, to collect and use 
the data for the purpose described in this form. 
 
Okay, thanks. [name] . Ok. So now just start off the series of questions. So the first one is so [name]. 
What's your title? 
 
R3V  3:35   
My title is managing director global investments for [company name] corporation. [company name] 
international. 
 
P Thng  3:43   
Okay, good. Thanks. And where is your location? 
 
R3V  3:48   
I'm based in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.  
 
Okay, good. Thank you. Okay, so [name]. I'll go straight into question one. So question one, the 
objective is to get a bit of your background and experience in terms of this industry. So first question 






20 to almost well 21 and a half years. 
 
P Thng  4:18   
Thank you. And how many new ventures have you been associated with either built or incubated or 
accelerated? 
 
R3V  4:29   
That's I'm going to say 75. 
 
P Thng  4:38   
75, okay and do your organization that is [company name] considered itself as an accelerator oor 
venture builder? 
 
R3V  4:48   
Both. 
 
P Thng  4:49   
Both accelerator and venture builder. 
 
Okay, good. So for this particular part of the study, I we have to take a particular angle so in this 
angle we will focus as a venture builders. Is that okay? 
 
R3V  5:10   
Sure. Okay. 
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  5:11   
So question two. Okay. So to obtain some clarity of the definition of success of new ventures, that 
means those new co that we that you've built. So what's your definition of success of a new 
venture? 
 
R3V  5:30   
Well, the the ultimate definition is a profitable exit. But you know, there are interim steps where we 
consider a venture is showing success or gaining success, those would include measures related to 
the how rapid the revenue growth is, and when they are able to obtain investment by outside 
investors. In other words, unrelated investors not not, [company name] so that that for us is a proof 
point that the the venture has reached a point where somebody else sees value in it. And so that's 
often a strong indicator of success for us as well.  
 
P Thng  6:24   
Okay, okay. So in terms of a profitable exit, is there kind of a target? Or is there a kind of an indicator 
to say that is considered as a profitable? 
 
R3V  6:44   
I wouldn't say that there's a metric that we try to target. I know, a lot of investors would have a 
target multiple that they would they would seek to obtain, come on, we don't really, we don't really 
work that way. For us. It's more about finding the right timing for an exit and getting the best value 
possible at that time. We have a history of over over 100 company hundred and 20 companies, our 






P Thng  7:34   
Okay good, thank you.  
 
R3V  7:35   
That doesn't necessarily mean that's our target. 
 
P Thng  7:37   
Sure. And what's your expectation for success? 
 
R3V  7:45   
How is that? Can you expand on that question? How is that different than the first question?  
 
P Thng  7:52   
Right. So the first question was, how do you define success? Right, which you mentioned, you look at 
profitable exit, but what do you expect, you know, for success from your startups that means, you 
know, are they any other factors that you just mentioned that, you know, says, Uh huh. This are 
some other important criteria as well. For example, let's say, you know, teamwork coming up from 
the program, you know, as a more confident group of entrepreneurs.  
 
R3V  8:33   
So, are you are you asking from the perspective of what are the characteristics of a successful 
company versus the outcomes?  
 
P Thng  8:43   
Yes, yes.  
 
R3V  8:45   
Okay. All right. So, so, yeah, then in that case, you know, strong leadership in the management team, 
strong, a strong product with defensible intellectual property, good product market fit and that, that 
leads in turn to, you know, a strong sales engine, like a wide functioning sales engine. Key criteria.  
 
P Thng  9:32   
Okay, so.  
 
R3V  9:33   
Team and market.  
 
P Thng  9:36   
Okay, team and market. So, [name] the next question, what is defined as failure of your new 
venture? 
 
R3V  9:49   
Well again, you know, we're a different type of investor. So we tend to be very, very patient and 
tolerant of not necessarily tolerant of failure, but tolerant of setbacks. Because new ventures by 
definition, will incur, encounter a number of challenges as they are as they're building their product 
and entering the market. So,you know, for us, failure is failure is a is a very final fatal blow to a 
company and it doesn't happen for us very often, because we're so patient, we will give 
management teams and companies a lot of attention, a lot of extra resources and support to 
execute pivots if necessary, until they find the right the right Product Market Fit and, and achieve 





profitable exit. So, is that a failure? You know, it we have had very, very few outright loss of 
company where the company has been shut down, but we've had many unprofitable exits. 
 
P Thng  11:34   
Right? So, when you say  
 
R3V  11:35   
I guess the definition of failure is somewhere in between those two, those two measures, right.  
 
P Thng  11:41   
Okay. So [name] when you say you're as a patient investor, typically, when you take when you form 
new companies, how long do you build them them means, how long did you stay with you? Three 
months? Six months? Two years? Five years? 
 
R3V  11:59   
That's an excellent question. So it used to be back in the 1990s and early 2000s our full period on an 
investment was about seven years 
 
P Thng  12:13   
Okay.  
 
R3V  12:15   
In the last 15 years or so, our whole period has stretched to the point now where it is it's nine and 
maybe even 10 years. In some cases, that's also not uncommon in the industry. But a yeah, that's, 
that's certainly our experience, right? 
 
P Thng  12:41   
So you're saying in the last 15 years, your investment period is about 9 to 10 years. But in terms of 
active coaching, active mentoring of these companies is it usually a one year thing? Or is it a two 
year thing? 
 
R3V  12:58   
No, we are very active investors, so we stay involved in the company for as long as possible, you 
know, we really don't kind of withdraw from an active role  
 
P Thng  13:08   
Right. 
 
R3V  13:09   
Until the company's very mature, either publicly publicly listed, or, you know, a very, very large 
company. So, as long as it's a company that's in the, you know, in, I will say, in the range of, you 
know, anywhere from a start up into many 10s of millions of dollars a year in revenue, we will be a 
very active investor 
 
P Thng  13:37   
I see. 
 
R3V  13:37   
Once it reaches hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue then we know it's a mature company, and 






P Thng  13:48   
So [name] do you think this is something that's very unusual in your group, or is this something yup. 
 
R3V  13:55   
No, its very unusual. most investors aren't as active as we are. For as long as we are.  
 
P Thng  14:00   
Okay, good. So earlier, you mentioned that you're very patient. So and your I guess your tolerance 
for failure is very, very, you're highly tolerant, right?  
 
R3V  14:11   
Yes.  
 
P Thng  14:11   
Okay, good. So [name] I'm going to the next question differentiators are sorry, before I going into 
next question. like to just follow up, you mentioned just now about the last 15 years, about nine to 
10 years, kind of duration. That's unusual. Now, is that, would you consider as one of the critical 
success factor of the [company name] because of this extended period that you're actively engage 
with them? One of the 
 
R3V  14:39   
Absolutely, one of our key differentiators is our our willingness to be a patient investor.  
 
P Thng  14:47   
Right 
 
R3V  14:48   
And, and to put our own resources at the disposal of our portfolio companies erm so we wouldn't be 
nearly as successful if we didn't, didn't make those kind of contributions to the companies. 
 
P Thng  15:07   
Okay good, so [name] in terms of the next question, I'm trying to now, to get some differentiation 
between venture builders and accelerators. So I'm not asking you from the angle as a venture 
builder, what do you think are the core competency of a venture builder? 
 
R3V  15:36   
Certainly, I would, I would think that core competencies would include things like a broad 
understanding of technology, not necessarily deep, but certainly broad a, an openness to learning 
about new market opportunities and an interesting innovation a venture builder needs to have a 
core competency in recruiting and a an understanding of new business models, whether that's, you 
know, whether that's fast delivery models or mobile or whatever market they their technology, their 
10th they're trying to focus on, they need to understand the business model to exploit it. 
 
P Thng  16:48   
What about the provision of of funding of facilities? Do you think those really core or you think those 
are not as critical? 
 
R3V  17:01   
Maybe not the direct provision of funding necessarily, so I mean, you need to do some of that, but 
access to sources of funding? I mean, that's so I would have, I would have said that sort of table 





funding, then then, then they're going to fail. Okay, in our case, we are both a venture builder and, 
and, and an investor. Okay, so we kind of we kind of combine the two. But, you know, we also put a 
lot of effort into developing and maintaining a global network of investor within the investor 
community so that when a company in our portfolio needs funding, we're able to tap into sources of 
funding to help them. 
 
P Thng  17:59   
Right. What about network of advisors, mentors, you think that's one of the core competence? 
 
R3V  18:09   
Yeah, so I would have said that falls under the point I was making about having competencies in 
either technology 
 
P Thng  18:23   
Oh I see  
 
R3V  18:23   
Or, you know, market mechanics or recruiting when you have that internally or within your advisor 
network you know you need to have those you need to go brand those that experience to bear to 
support your companies  
 
So a strong advisor network, it is necessary for sure, you know, typically the advisor network is built 
to supplement areas of expertise that you don't have internally. 
 
P Thng  18:52   
Okay right. Next question is, what are the main services of a venture builder? Main services. 
 
R3V  19:05   
So that would include obviously recruiting.  
 
P Thng  19:14   
Mm hmm. 
 
R3V  19:18   
We will say that there are there's a lot of mentoring that needs to go on. So that speaks to your 
question about advisor advisory bodies, but a lot of mentoring and coaching of the team on on 
business fundamentals, you know, the development of their go-to-market strategy and their product 
strategy erm, you know, other challenges that a young company would would encounter along the 
way, some coaching and mentoring recruiting. Um, you know, in, in our case, we provide services 
related to intellectual property and legal support, we provide services on the marketing side, we 
provide HR and payroll services, because a young company typically doesn't have that sort of 
internal resources, you know, for themselves, it's expensive. We, we also, you know, if it's a venture 
builder that operates like an incubator, where the companies they are building are housed together 
within a facility, then, you know, you can include things like space and network resources as other 
other services that the venture builder would offer.  
 
P Thng  20:51   
Okay, good. so [name] now, I'm going to ask the next question contrasting. What do you think are 
the strengths of a venture builder, and what are some of the limitations or weaknesses of  a venture 







R3V  21:10   
Oh strengths are all the all the support and resources they can bring, to support a company that a 
company that is standalone and trying to grow organically will struggle to, to match. So that's a 
competitive advantage for companies that are supported, but within a venture builder model. But 
the, the, the negatives are, that a venture builder can often become blind to some of the failings of 
their companies and hang on too long, be too slow to act, because they're too close to the to the 
venture builder team, and they don't want to, you know, they're afraid to interfere or, or cause 
disruption. So, you know, they can hang on too long to to let the company go down the wrong 
direction, which can slow down the progress of the company.  
 
P Thng  22:23   
Right, good, thanks. [Name], earlier you mentioned about recruitment. So in your model, you recruit 
co founders, is that right? 
 
R3V  22:33   
Co founders and then over the life of the company we'll assist with with recruiting, whether it may 
be a special special requirement or special set of skills where we can tap into our global network 
again, and, and help source talent often that ends up being in a later stage of the company within 
the executive ranks.  
 
P Thng  22:57   
Okay, so this  
 
R3V  22:59   
Or at the board level.  
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  23:00   
Okay, good. So these are quite senior and experienced folks, okay good. So now what do you see are 
the main differences between an accelerator and a venture builder? 
 
R3V  23:14   
So in our mind a adventure builder creates the company  
 
P Thng  23:21   
Mm hmm. 
 
R3V  23:24   
So where a company did not exist before, and they're involved in all that, that entails whether that's 
recruiting the team, identifying the market opportunity, working with the team to, to identify the 
right product strategy, establishing, you know, initial, you know, governance and banking 
relationships, everything that's involved in setting up a company and getting it on its feet and an 
accelerators job is to take an established company that has a product and has initial customer 
traction and help that company grow to a point where it's attractive to to a venture capital 
investment round. Okay, so that's, you know, typically, we would say that's, either late seed or, or an 
A round. A venture builder works with the company up to that point. 
 





Okay, good, thanks. And then accelerator offer those incubation-type programs sorry, acceleration 
program, so usually three months, four months, does a venture builder offer those programs as 
well? 
 
R3V  24:47   
Some do, again, it depends on their model. In our case, we offer a one month boot camp program, 
which is pretty intensive, there's a lot of you can almost think of it as classroom activity, a lot of 
working sessions, a lot of meetings with within the, within the entrepreneurial portfolio. So, you 
know, we, we do that 
 
P Thng  25:30   
Right 
 
R3V  25:30   
Not every, not every venture builder necessarily would go through that type of, of an exercise. 
 
P Thng  25:37   
Okay, so this one month boot camp, the idea is to be able to network or link up to some of the 
portfolio companies that that you have, is that right? 
 
R3V  25:50   
So that's certainly part of it. That's a big part of it. But there's also a lot of education that goes on in 
that boot camp, where we, we bring in subject matter experts, and try to give the entrepreneurs 
kind of a state almost like a mini mini MBA. 
 
P Thng  26:08   
Okay 
 
R3V  26:09   
Where we develop some of their business skills, some of their management skills, we expose them 
to subject matter that they may not be familiar with but is important in running a young company,  
 
P Thng  26:24   
Right, okay good. Then,what do you see other similarities between an accelerator and a venture 
builder? 
 
R3V  26:36   
They're both working with young early stage companies, they both have to be, both have to be 
focused on the entrepreneurial end of the business scale, rather than the more bureaucratic and this 
a systematic end of the scale of a more mature companies. So, you know, they, they will tend to be 
encouraging risk taking, will tend to be encouraging, you know, a lot of experimentation and a lot of 
learning a lot of coaching. Working with an older company and more mature company, you would 
tend to focus on things like governance and, you know, establishing internal processes and all that 
sort of thing. When you're dealing with venture builders and accelerators, companies can't afford to 
be worrying about that type of thing. They have to be reacting fast and learning a lot on the fly.  
 
P Thng  27:53   
Okay good, so I finished question 3, let me see. Oh, is there anything recently that you discovered? 
That is not as not important at all, as you thought it was? In your experience? 
 





That's a really good question.   
 
P Thng  28:19   
After all these years of experience, if you look back, and then say, earlier, you know, I thought this 
was important. But as I look back, it's really not important at all. 
 
R3V  28:29   
I'm giving that some thought. 
 
P Thng  28:41   
Okay, take your time. 
 
R3V  28:42   
Well you know, certainly in the age of software as a service, the role of face-to-face sales meeting is, 
is much less important than it used to be. So the role of a traveling salesperson is is almost gone in 
that in that particular industry, you still need sales people, but they tend to do a lot, most of their 
work by phone and by, you know, by web chats and webinars, and you know that that remotely.  
 
P Thng  29:37   
Right, okay. Then my next question is, is there anything recently that you discovered is very 
important, which earlier, you know, you did not thought was important at all? 
 
R3V  29:52   
Yeah, so that one's easy, we call it now, customer success. So, it used to be what you would think of 
as customer support, but now it's customer success. And it works hand in hand with your sales 
organization. That's the piece of the organization that's responsible for onboarding a new client, 
training the client and supporting them in their use of the of the product and that role is now far 
more important than it ever has been. It is critical to the success of a company and you almost can't 
hire those people fast enough in a growing company. 
 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
P Thng  30:44   
 Okay, great, thanks. Okay, so now, I'm going into question four - looking for fit for purpose, for fit 
for purpose, which type of individuals, team or whatever is suitable for which model? So that is 
determine the appropriateness of when to apply the two models. So in what kind of situation with a 
venture builder program be suitable for what kind of individuals, what kind of situation? 
 
R3V  31:17   
It's, it's a pretty flexible model. I mean, if I've seen it employed in our industry, which is, is enterprise 
software, I've seen it employed in, in the medical industry, I've seen it employed in environmental 
technologies, I've seen it employed in, in agriculture, believe it or not, it obviously each industry 
would drive a different implementation. But venture builder really is about taking people that are 
experienced at starting companies and lending their their experience and knowledge to other people 
that are trying to start companies so that they don't make they don't make unnecessary mistakes, 







P Thng  32:28   
Okay, good, so across industries that our model is quite suitable. Now, in terms of the people, the 
kind of profile of people or the that means of those new companies, the co founders and all that, 
what kind of profile personality or characteristics are the type that you think would be more suitable 
for your model? 
 
R3V  32:50   
So they need to be highly entrepreneurial, very tolerant of risk, they need to be incredibly strong 
team workers, they should, should have,they should have a high level of expertise in the industry 
that they're trying to address and I would suggest that the profile tends to be, tends to fit better the 
young people earlier in their careers.  
 
P Thng  33:44   
I see.  
 
R3V  33:45   
So and that tends to be more because of the risk profile and a willingness to take risks. People that 
are more mature tend to be less tolerant of risk, because they got too much to lose. But that doesn't 
mean that you know it's, it's exclusively young people you would occasionally find older people that 
would fit the profile as well. 
 
P Thng  34:11   
So next question, [name], is, if you were to advise someone about the path should take for new 
venture, what would your advice be? 
 
R3V  34:24   
Take the time necessary to thoroughly understand the market problem you're trying to solve and 
identifying an achievable first first step to solving it, you can't solve it all in one go. But you need to 
be if you blindly jumped into it, then you're you're blindly jumping into a black hole, it's better to 
understand the problem you're trying to solve and how you think you're going to solve it before you 
start the hard work of building the product and that means the first thing, second thing, the third 
thing you have to do is talk to customers. 
 
P Thng  35:16   
So talking to customers is something that is a real critical and mass. 
 
R3V  35:22   
Critical and it's the first thing you have to do.  
 
P Thng  35:24   
Okay, right. 
 
R3V  35:26   
Even to the point of spending time if possible working in the customers environment  
 
P Thng  35:33   
Right. 
 
R3V  35:34   






P Thng  35:40   
Sorry, its my barking dog. Okay, then. 
 
R3V  35:44   
Would the barking be part of my answer? 
 
P Thng  35:46   
Your transcription? I think it's smart enough to say, "bark bark". And now, would you advise, be 
different if they already have a team? Same advice about?  
 
R3V  35:58   
Exactly the same advise. 
 
P Thng  36:01   
Okay. 
 
R3V  36:02   
If, whether they have whether they have a team or not  
 
P Thng  36:04   
Right. 
 
R3V  36:06   
They need to know the end of the problem they're trying to solve. And if they can't, it often will be 
very different than the customer will describe it to you in a meeting 
 
P Thng  36:18   
Okay?  
 
R3V  36:18   
Which is why I suggest you need to spend time working in the environment, because you will, you 
will, in all likelihood, see the problem differently than the customer sees it.  
 
P Thng  36:29   
Okay.  
 
And that will lead you to a solution that they may not have considered. 
 
Okay, good. Now, what your advice again, be different if they already have customers? 
 
R3V  36:42   
If the  
 
P Thng  36:43   
The advice for someone who wants to start a new venture, but they already have customers?  
 
R3V  36:47   
Nope. 
 
P Thng  36:47   






R3V  36:47   
It would still be the same. 
 
P Thng  36:49   
Okay right. 
 
R3V  36:50   
Because, and the reason I will still be the same is because a couple of customers is good. But a 
couple of customers is not a scalable, successful business, a scalable, successful business has has 
thousands of customers that willingly paying a month and paying their bills every month without 
complaints. A couple of customers is good. But it's not proof that you that you've solved the problem 
all of this proof that you talk to customers that you've convinced a couple of customers to try your 
product 
 
P Thng  37:30   
Right  
 
R3V  37:31   
It doesn't even necessarily mean mean that they're using if they may have bought it, but not, not 
even be using it. 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  37:37   
So [name]. My last question of the impact on new ventures after going through the venture building 
program. So my first question is, why have you chosen the venture building model as your, your 
main or primary vehicle? 
 
R3V  37:55   
Because we've had 40 years of success with this particular model. We know it works. We know, we 
are world class experts in in, in this business model. And, and and we know how, how to make it 
successful. So I mean, that's a little bit of a it's not it's not necessarily a very good answer for you. 
But but that's why that's why we use that model.  
 
P Thng  38:34   
Okay, so now the final part, what do you notice about the key differences in new ventures before 
and after undergoing your program. In terms of they're market awareness in terms of market sizing, 
financial acumen, team and all that. So, do you see any key differences, you know, when you first 
take them in and then, you know, after you know, that 5, 10 years that they are, been with you, 
what do you see are key differences? 
 
R3V  39:05   
Well, they, they come out knowing their market better than anyone else, better than, than any 
competitor would know the market and being able to speak to that in a way that is clear and concise 
and understandable and that investors and customers are likely will understand what the company 
does for them. That's a level of sophistication that our entrepreneurs have to have in order to win 
investors and win customers to be able to explain the problem you're trying to solve and how you 
solve it and why there's value in that whether from the investor's perspective or the customers 





which is important to us. Because, you know, we have always believed in sharing ownership with the 
entrepreneurs and employees of our companies. And if their ownership delivers value to them in 
terms of wealth, then, you know, then we've been successful in helping them achieve, achieve a 
personal goal as well. Yeah go ahead. 
 
P Thng  40:49   
Okay, good. So, [name], when you mentioned about the share of success, typically, as a venture 
builder, what's the range of equity that you take for your new companies? 
 
R3V  41:01   
Well, that's a that's, that's going to require a much larger or longer answer err, it depends on the 
stage of the company, Patrick, and how long we're invested in the company. So it really is a pretty 
dynamic scale, it can range anywhere from 100% down to low single digits. And typically we're at a 
much higher percentage ownership when the company is founded. And early stages as a young 
company, we would typically be in the either majority ownership position, or for a high minority 
position and as the company matures, and grows and brings in other investors, which, which we're 
happy to see happen, our ownership will decline and over time, by the time we get to an exit, you 
know, we'll typically be in the probably between 10 and 20%, sometimes even in the single digits. 
 
P Thng  42:29   
Right, now, someone that I interviewd in the industry made this comment, that sometimes taking a 
significant majority, or sorry, a majority or high minority may impact the motivation of these new 
companies, co founders. So as a result, only certain profile of co founders are prepared to go 
through it through this model. What's your take on this? 
 
R3V  43:01   
Yeah, that's entirely true. But, you know, our view is that we'll end up getting them to a higher 
likelihood, a higher probability of a lucrative exit then they would have with other investors  
 
P Thng  43:22   
Right.  
 
R3V  43:23   
And, and even so, by the end of their life with us, they'll probably still end up with an industry 
standard level of equity in the company for for a founder. They may start out at a lower point but 
they'll end up at the same or better. 
 
P Thng  43:48   
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Question 1: Experience level of the interviewee 
 
P Thng  0:05   
Thank you [R4V] and [R4AV] for you know taking the time for this interview. Perhaps maybe the first 
part of question is to get a bit of your background experience and, you know, just now you're 
describing to me about the [R4V Coy]. So maybe just little bit of the background of this company and 
then yourself, your background, how long have you been involved in the venture industry.  
 
R4V  0:27   
Okay, so [R4V Coy] is a venture capitalist, primarily it has aspects of both a venture builder but at a 
later stage venture builder and an investment holding company. The scope of where we play is that 
we focus on early stage technology companies as well as SMEs in emerging economies with a view 
to unlocking, unlocking the potential of this economies and the means with which we have found we 
are able to do so or the optimal use of technology in this case, is in the areas of economic 
empowerment. So that's where we've been at topics like trade finance, supply chain management, 
credit management. Second thing is environment, environmental sustainability. So this would be in 
terms of agricultural technology, improving yield or perhaps looking at new generation irrigation 
solutions, stuff like that. Alternate energy sources, storage of energy, stuff like that. And then the 
last one of course is the underpin of existing industry that's digital transformation. So how can we 
improve the efficiency, trust within existing industries? So that's 
 
P Thng  1:52   
Okay, thank you. So how long have you been involved in the venture industry business? 
 
R4V  2:00   
From many different lenses I've been involved I'd say since 2002 then so this, 17 years, I started in 
South Australia, the South Australian government. I was a second-year university student and I 
managed to find a good mentor who was the CEO of a software company, fast-growing software 
company that was on the path to listing. H,e he brought me into a government strategy group that 
was mapping out the IT industry strategy for South Australia and it was part of my job, it was to 
interview all the CEOs in the industry and to understand what their strategy was, why they were 
doing what they're doing and how could them based in South Australia, actually approach their local 
domestic Australian market as international markets. So that informed me of how government 
actually supports industry. 
 
P Thng  3:03   
My next question is how many new ventures have you been associated with?  
 
R4V  3:07   
New ventures, personally, many. 
 
P Thng  3:15   
Either you build or you mentored or you incubated or venture built or invest in? 
 
R4V  3:25   
Erm, well. From my role in government, in Singapore government there was over 20. I was then in a 
company that did not, did well in it, didn't do well. I was then involved in MIT incubator so it was a 
games incubator and that probably seeded let's say, 10 companies and then my own venture with 







P Thng  4:07   
So about 30-40 companies. [Unintelligible] So, um, so [R4V Coy], you consider yourself as an 
accelerator, venture builder or?  
 
R4V  4:21   
I'd say more towards the venture builder side. 
 
Question 2: Definition of Success of New Ventures 
 
P Thng  4:27   
So that's question one. Just repeat [Inaudible] and then question two, definition of success of new 
startups. So what's your definition of success of new startups? 
 
R4V  4:39   
There's a few metrics that we use, one is of course, we do have a traditional return on value of value 
of company and from our point of entry then we look at three x returns seems reasonable and that 
will be within a three to four year time frame. Yeah, we are working out our more impact metrics 
and that way, I mean, when you we're about a year old [R4V Coy], so we're working out some of 
those metrics beyond financial funds. 
 
P Thng  5:23   
Would you be, what some of these metrics that you're thinking about, when you say considering? 
 
R4V  5:29   
Businesses impact, cost of capital, reducing ability to reduce overall cost of capital for some of our 
portfolio? I don't know [Unintelligible] it is energy related then. [R4AV] has done some research in 
Indonesia, so 
 
R4AV  5:48   
Increasing access to [Unintelligible] essentials like water, electricity and the amount of coverage in 
terms of population percentage. So these are matrices that are quite similar to what the World Bank 
will be using as well. And, so in terms of looking at agriculture as well, there is also about improving 
the yield and helping to reduce the occurrence of famines and things like that. 
 
R4V  6:21   
One of the things that I think because of our view and designing indicators beyond financial ones and 
we've been quite methodical about it we don't want to just spray in product patent that we think is 
and and, also we need to find the companies that are receptacle of our support right, we're not, 
we're not the primary entity so. 
 
P Thng  6:49   
Okay, so in terms of your investment also you typically, if you venture build, what is your model like, 
do you assemble cofounders and uh, I mean how does it work? 
 
R4V  7:03   
Okay, so we we typically look for, for whole series A companies, small to medium enterprises, then 
veteran executive teams, typically aged 35 and above. That's what we found is exposure to different 
cycles of businesses and technology. And these companies would have assets whether its 





have an exit potential of 10 to 50 million or above and so we in that sense we wait sorry, can we get 
back to the question?  
 
P Thng  7:48   
Oh my question was, what is your model like, of venture building? Meaning that do you typically for 
example venture builders they, assemble cofounders they form the team for business problems, 
right? So how's your model like in all these things? 
 
R4V  8:04   
Okay, so there's two things. So we talk about the supply, supply side and what we do, and then the 
demand side. So in terms of the supply side of capital, basically when we work with when we work 
with investors so one it's about rallying together an investor base that has shares the same mission 
and we've and also is able to facilitate exit outcomes. So for us, we've, we've, we happen to have a 
strong Japanese base of investors and that's been cultivated through previous previous life cycles of 
the team. Next one, in terms of what we do and the macro site we map, facilitate mapping a 
strategy, structuring of entities securing strategic partnerships, recruiting the C-suite that 
supplements the founding team. We facilitate the fundraising and we may facilitate M&A. That's 
cause of our capital network as well as our team structure. The next thing is that we deploy capital 
of between 100K, 50K to 500K. Then on the micro site we actually facilitate the product and 
Technology Roadmap and then we can also [Unintelligible] that technology suite, so you'll see later 
because of our team structure, we can facilitate the tech team of the companies. So to do with some 
of these, how do we approach production technology. 
 
P Thng  9:48   
So with the deployment of 50 to 500K, typically as a venture builder is that equivalent to a significant 
equity share or is that a minority, typically? What's the range?  
 
R4V  10:04   
We're comfortable with anywhere from 5% actually that's why we, I say that we're a mixture of an 
investment holding company as well. We're not a fund, investing holding company and venture 
capitalist, almost. So we have in terms of our current portfolios so we are comfortable with either 
anywhere from 5% up to 80%.  
 
P Thng  10:27   
80%? 
 
R4V  10:27   
Yeah, yeah. 
 
P Thng  10:28   
Okay good, the majority are above 50 or?  
 
R4V  10:32   
We only have 2 portfolio companies 
 
P Thng  10:34   
Oh right now?  
 
R4V  10:34   






P Thng  10:41   
Sure 5 to 80? 
 
R4V  10:43   
The 80 is a unique case, that that is one of our 
 
P Thng  10:47   
But going forward, normally your prepare to take? 
 
R4V  10:50   
20 something, 20 is okay.  
 
P Thng  10:52   
Okay.  
 
R4V  10:53   
I think 10 to 20 is okay. 
 
P Thng  10:56   
Because I know some venture builders typically take between 20 to about 60 or 70 that kind of range 
 
R4V  11:02   
However if we do start the entity. I think so if it is a deeper question of incentive design. So and we 
are more of the participative and equitable incentive design. So while the and the differentiation 
between decision rights and economic rights, I think we would. I mean we will be more flexible of 
economic rights and then along the way as the team is attuned, then decision rights, slowly, because 
I think that, that differentiation then helps us. We're very flexible with economic rights. 
 
R4AV  11:49   
Just to add-on with regards to our model as well, in terms of how we get the companies in or like the 
founders and things, we also base our selection of what we call the key cultures, what culture keys, 
sorry. so these are some things that the partners all have come together and agreed upon which is 
[Unintelligible] so the six main culture keys that our company focuses on especially these are things 
that we look out for the founders or for manifest themselves in the company that we want to take 
under our wing. So yeah, mainly there's ethical compass, communication fidelity, the keenness to 
have impact, self-awareness of the founders, Swiss Army Knife, humility and security.  
 
P Thng  12:35   
Okay, so something like your core values that you look for? 
 
R4AV  12:39   
Yes, yes exactly. So this is, somewhat guides us to the sort of the company, companies, the 
companies that we will try to invest in or try to build up. There are certain very strong veto factors, 
for example, like the lack of communication fidelity or the lack of an ethical compass, where the 
companies are just out to flash and burn, yeah just to disrupt the economy and make a profit and 
things like that. So we tend to stay away from those and we stick to companies that actually want to 
help transform the economy and build towards a sort of united better future. 
 
R4V  13:15   






P Thng  13:21   
So [R4V] just now you said definition of success there's a financial part and a non-financial part 
right? Then what do you define as failure? 
 
R4V  13:34   
Yeah, so really, frankly, we have not discussed that in our partnership 
 
P Thng  13:43   
In this one. But what about in your past experience when you were. So when you see those, what in 
your mind is ah, I've seen those, those are failures? 
 
R4V  13:43   
Okay.  
 
P Thng  13:47   
So what are the characteristics of failure that you see? 
 
R4V  13:56   
Total lack of market understanding. Lack of for that definition and clear product definition, normally 
that's a symptom of lack of market definition. Lack of market understanding is actually that that has 
been the key because the perspective then would get too narrow then you start to [Inaudible] 
solution. The problem definition, yeah that and then the next one tends to be team structure. So, 
understanding of what leadership composition the company needs to move forward. Understanding 
when the founders need help and how to supplement their abilities and how to actually make best 
use of their abilities. Then down to organization practices that's typically where it fails [Inaudible]. 
 
P Thng  14:52   
What's your tolerance for failure? 
 
R4V  14:54   
Wah. 
 
P Thng  14:56   
Low, high, medium. 
 
R4V  14:58   
Well I mean, I have been in massive debt before. [Inaudible] I have been in significant debt 
[Inaudible] about 30K or so and I've had to work my way out.  
 
P Thng  15:11   
So you've got high tolerance for failure. 
 
R4V  15:12   
I guarantee you, man. 
 
P Thng  15:14   
If not I think you shouldn't be in this industry. 
 
R4V  15:15   






P Thng  15:21   
Well, hopefully this study will tell you some practices that correlate to more to [Unintelligible], 
better chance of success. Okay. So, next question is I want to differentiate between the two 
incubation models - accelerators and venture builders. So coming from the venture builder 
perspective, my question is, what do you see are the core competencies of a venture builder? 
 
R4V  15:44   
The basic understanding of the full spectrum of the business or the way [Unintelligible] because 
venture builders probably, I think as we had discussed earlier, identified teams first right, markets 
and teams that resigns, resound of that, what do you call that? We resonate, resonate, yes teams 
that resonate with specific markets and then understand the, I guess the product range or offerings 
that can fulfill these and then look at look to assemble teams, or I guess assemble or support teams 
to fulfill these and then have a very methodical process of facilitating the team, its operating cycle 
through to different stages of the business. And then I guess at the end is handing over the keys to 
their business. 
 
P Thng  16:52   
Typically when you hand hold the companies that you venture build, typically what kind of time 
frame are you looking at because you see accelerators usually 3, 4, 5 months and off you go, right. 
So for your model what do you plan to that?  
 
R4V  17:07   
Oh we have been in one cycle for about eight months now, from starting with a technical team I 
guess the company was a technical team and then assembling the management team and then now 
facilitating a capital raise. So that's taken about eight months, talking about [Unintelligible]. So we 
did market mapping, we have done product mapping and then road map and then we've also done, 
if this business is successful, what it does, what are the other supplementary businesses that can 
surround this and then that's that and work closely with that team 
 
P Thng  17:53   
Typically what is your intent? Do you want to hand hold them for 12 months, two years, three years, 
five years? 
 
R4V  18:01   
I think it's more a and this is a discussion between us and the management because we will be on 
the board. So we need not ideally it's actually the six month process is ideal. I think beyond that, 
hopefully we're just involved in the checkings but also I think having close touch with the 
management team enables us to look at other opportunities that we can support so I wouldn't say 
hand hold it becomes more 
 
R4AV  18:34   
guidance 
 
R4V  18:35   
No it actually becomes more partnership like like we a strategic partner and then we, you can unlock 
stuff 
 
P Thng  18:44   
Then can I ask you, do you have a  like accelerators they have a formal program right? Accelerating 






R4V  18:52   
I'd say that we are designing that process right now. 
 
P Thng  19:02   
What you think are the main services of a venture builder, what should you be providing? 
 
R4V  19:08   
Exactly what we, except for I think the this will be doing the early phase then I think the, to fully 
express that then if you're fully building the venture you will eventually become a strategic partner 
what. Staying alongside the team.  
 
P Thng  19:29   
So the main services are what you just said over here, what about facilities? You all provide 
facilities? 
 
R4V  19:34   
Err 
 
P Thng  19:34   
Or you 
 
R4V  19:35   
I mean that won't not necessary I mean we operate quite digitally. 
 
P Thng  19:44   
So you don't really enforce them like you got to come to this 
 
R4V  19:49   
I think we see a more democratic, more learned 
 
P Thng  19:54   
So what are the strengths of a venture builder? Interesting, why did you choose this model given 
that you have acceleration background? Why did you decide to choose this model? 
 
R4V  20:09   
I think the team structure I guess we have like we've managed to assemble such a strong team that 
can cover macro you know that have done ventures before, have exited ventures before that have 
done legal structuring for M&A. So that's one, then on the technology side also we've had people 
who've built entire systems who worked on banks, security for banks, worked on identity system. So 
we've I think we've got quite a well-rounded team that enables us to do a lot more and frankly I was 
so my previous company was invested in by Incubate Fund, which is one of Japan's largest seed 
stage funds, they sit between a venture builder and a VC because the experience that I had with 
them was awesome was really, really good. I was inspired by that, that process because all the 
downsides that people talked about in working with VCs, I didn't experience that. I had a super 
positive experience and we're still continuing to work together after we exited the previous 
business.  
 
P Thng  21:23   
Can you describe a bit about this super positive experience that you liked? 
 





It was similar to what we did so they would work with us on our macro strategy, our market 
mapping. 
 
P Thng  21:32   
Do they work closely with you?  
 
R4V  21:33   
Work closely with us, they would see how they come open up Japan-side strategic partnerships. 
 
P Thng  21:39   
So what we call smart investors, add a lot of value and network for you. 
 
R4V  21:46   
And then, so we had two similar ones another one was a Chinese company in Beijing that helped us 
to get investment and strategic partnerships with Baidu. So that sort of speaks for itself. 
 
P Thng  22:03   
Talk to you about Baidu [Unintelligible] a few weeks ago 
 
R4V  22:06   
Okay, [Unintelligible] before. 
 
P Thng  22:10   
Okay. So so those are the strengths, having people who add a lot of significant value through either 
opening market or connecting with investors and all that. 
 
R4V  22:19   
But also I think the, the, what differentiates the venture builders is that they have, they would have 
a strong internal formation process or ability so they can really work alongside the management 
team to work out the strategy. Not just macro. 
 
R4AV  22:38   
Not just a numbers game. 
 
P Thng  22:42   
What are the weaknesses of a venture builder? 
 
R4V  22:46   
Could be anything from, you know, too involved in the business, right? There's a tendency to be that 
inability to let go. I think it should be then, what else? 
 
R4AV  23:00   
Slower returns. [Unintelligible] 
 
Question 3: Differentiators of the 2 Incubation Models 
 
P Thng  23:18   
What do you see that the main differences between an accelerator and a venture builder? Key 
differences.  
 





Accelerators seem to have a broader sort of inward base right. 
 
R4AV  23:37   
Feel like they are more targeted towards sort of product so they look more at the product being and 
the team that's able to continuously break and reshape the product to perfectly fit the market so 
that it catches on quickly and just spreads like wild fire. Right, so that's what I think accelerators 
focus on mostly which is why there's a high failure rate because continuously replicating products 
that do so is not easy unless, unless you're like the Koreans where you find one formula and you just 
take the world by storm a bit. 
 
P Thng  24:16   
So whereas accelerators are more focused on their development of this product that meets the 
industry problems or needs right? 
 
R4V  24:24   
I think even venture builders because accelerators have more [inaudible] 
 
P Thng  24:37   
Similarities between an accelerator and a venture builder? 
 
R4V  24:42   
Actually a well-run accelerator it comes out comes quite close already, because  
 
P Thng  24:47   
A will-run. 
 
R4V  24:48   
Yeah, well-run. 
 
P Thng  24:49   
so what do you mean by well-run? 
 
R4V  24:51   
They find their team, they find a strategic partners and similar it so, it comes so like venture builder 
right? Issue that we have today is that the sexy term of accelerators had led to many companies 
terming themselves as an accelerator while they are just so providing basically a physical space and 
some some some form of loose mentorship program and that's the problem it's and it really is 
getting down to the company's strategy over a periodic cycle and understanding when when does 
the company need what form of support. Accelerators who do that well I think [inaudible] 
 
R4AV  25:36   
Can you consider VBs? 
 
R4V  25:36   
Yeah that's what that ah? 
 
R4AV  25:43   
The US one 
 
P Thng  25:45   






R4V  25:49   
Y Combinator's now the valuation becoming crazy so its a bubbly, bubbly market but they seem to 
have a good formula that seems more towards the VB type. 
 
P Thng  26:01   
But VB generally take a bit longer term as you said you're on their board and then you guide them 
where as all this accelerator tend not to, after that you know six to nine months off you go and you 
know  
 
R4V  26:13   
Survive on your own, we're not involved in your boardroom  
 
P Thng  26:16   
Maybe want to track about our equity that we're bringing but [inaudible] 
 
R4V  26:20   
Sure, sure. 
 
P Thng  26:21   
Right okay, so you just now described that you've chosen the VB model because of your experience, 
so you choose the VB model 
 
R4V  26:31   
And also the team la I think, like we managed to..., familiarity. 
 
P Thng  26:31   
Experience plus the current team. 
 
R4V  26:41   
Which is actually one of the key things. 
 
Question 4: Fit for purpose (who is suitable for which models?) 
 
Question 5: Impact on New Ventures 
 
P Thng  26:43   
Okay then my last part of this question five is those companies you have either venture built, do you 
notice that kind of differences before and after the program in terms of their teams market 
awareness, their understanding of business, their understanding of market, do see any differences 
before they went through your program and after you know, what the key differences? 
 
R4V  27:12   
I think we've had two, we had two portfolios so far so I can speak to that. The Indonesian portfolio 
definitely I've seen opening up of the business model opening up of their longer-term product road 
map also and then a subsequent opening up of a client base, customer base, which then opens up 
the potential exit opportunity via exit opportunity or further growth opportunities with strategic 





project management and facilitating the fundraising process. So it's opening up different funder 
raises and different understanding of the need of a strategic view of different funder types. And then 
also in terms of the mapping of the product together with the longer-term vision, I think that opened 
up the team flow and working dynamic, facilitated that. Yeah so, different needs la. 
 
P Thng  28:43   














Appendix 5:  Box Plot of 10 Independent Variables in Study 1A 
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